Humanitas Supplementum

Historiographical Alexander

Alexander the Great and the Historians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

B. Antela-Bernárdez
M. Mendoza
(Coords.)

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B. Antela-Bernárdez is a Full Lecturer of Ancient Greek History at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (since 2005). He wrote books and papers on Alexander the Great and other topics: the Hellenistic World, Historiography, Gender, and Classical Reception in Cinema. Co-Director of the journal *Karanos. Bulletin of Ancient Macedonian Studies*, IP of the Project "History of Conflict in Antiquity". He is at his forties, and he uses to say he strongly believes in a better world.

M. Mendoza completed his PhD with a dissertation focused on cases of irreligious behaviour during Alexander's reign. His main research fields so far have been Alexander the Great, the Diadochi and early Hellenistic Central Asia, but he has also published papers on Achaemenid deportations, modern reception and Catalan historiography. He is the secretary of *Karanos: Bulletin of Ancient Macedonian Studies*. He is currently an Associate Lecturer at the University of Lleida.

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alexander the great and the historians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

eds.
B. Antela-Bernárdez & M. Mendoza

Filiação Affiliation
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Universitat de Lleida

Abstract

In a famous statement, Ulrich Wilcken argues that each historian has his own Alexander. A critical examination of the traditions in Historiographic Alexander allows to reconsider both our ideas of alterity and success, and how great can be a human being, or to what extent what was great in the past still has to be accepted as such in our present days. To sum up, to revisit Alexander from the eyes of the historians in the Contemporary Age offers a genuine opportunity to rethink History as such, and to evaluate how can we imagine new ways to explain the past in order to build a rich appreciation of the present in order to imagine brand new futures. The aim of the following pages is to review Alexander's portraits and concerns in the works and scopes of the more recent historical traditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Keywords
Alexander the Great, Modern and Contemporary Historiography, Droysen, Tarn, Paparrhegopoulos, Altheim, Bosworth, Hammond, Nazism.

Editors

B. Antela-Bernárdez is a Full Lecturer of Ancient Greek History at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (since 2005). He wrote books and papers on Alexander the Great and other topics: the Hellenistic World, Historiography, Gender, and Classical Reception in Cinema. Co-Director of the journal Karanos. Bulletin of Ancient Macedonian Studies, IP of the Project "History of Conflict in Antiquity". He is at his forties, and he uses to say he strongly believes in a better world.

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Prologue

Time has passed since Alexander the Great started his amazing adventure through Asia, crossing the sea to conquer the Ancient Persian empire until the Indus Valley. His life and career have been reviewed in the light of almost every generation of writers during Antiquity. In the Middle Ages, Alexander's stories were widely spread through Christian and Islamic cultures, and the young Macedonian king became a symbol for kingship, a knight of kind ideals and romantic features, but also, in some occasions, a metaphor for the tyrannical exercise of power.

When History became a methodical discipline included in the Academies and Faculties all over Europe during the nineteenth century, Alexander was again reviewed in the eyes of the Classicists. Johan Gustav Droysen published in 1833 the first edition of his famous *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*, a masterpiece of erudite and 'scientific' History that traced the paths that, during almost two hundred years until our days, are still the base of many of the modern approaches to Alexander.

During the last decades, we are usually told by many people, either scholars or not, that there is nothing more new to say about Alexander. Nevertheless, our experience, as specialists in Alexander and Argead Macedonia, is very different. First, although *nihil novum sub sole* about Alexander, works and biographies are published elsewhere every year. It seems that in our time, like those that came before us, humankind (or, at least, Western humankind) is still absolutely fascinated by the life and personality of this thrilling conqueror that was Alexander. Films –both for cinema and television–, novels, comic books and video games keep Alexander and the *Alexandermania* alive, sometimes even actualising and adapting his figure to these times far away from the age he lived. But also in academy and research, we can find brave and smart, ground-breaking, sometimes Herculean, efforts to improve our understanding of Alexander's story. Even so, we usually stress the idea that we must go beyond Alexander, in order to see the world where he lived, and how his conquest of Asia affected the people under his government, their cultures, ways of life and thinking.

Some years ago, Pierre Briant brilliantly challenged scholarship to revisit Alexander with a new perspective, through Historiography. Knowing how authors, ages and peoples perceived Alexander is also a deep way of research that shows more about our days that of Alexander's. Indeed, the knowledge we gain is richer, as far as it warns us not just to think about what happened, if ever happened, but also to review the way we explain it. If we are still using

nineteenth– or twentieth-century ideas to explain events that happened more than two thousand years ago, then something needs a revision. This book aims at a reflection and a reappraisal about the way our time regards Alexander through the eyes of the Historians, and how some conceptual models and ideals have loaded the history of Alexander with worries, explanations and understanding that are not fair with what happened nor with the way we want the world to be for the future. Nevertheless, as far as this kind of discourses works in a subliminal level as representations of a common sense of identity and its relationship with the past we have chosen to be what we guess we are as collectives (peoples, countries, cultures...), to analyse these discourses and realise where they come from are very complex tasks, sometimes even risky.

During the last years, many efforts have resulted in books and chapters about Alexander the Great beyond the facts, by observing the traditions, topics, concrete works and ages, and even Classical Reception. Alexander, key model of conqueror for the European culture during the Age of Colonisation, had been also a clear stepping stone in the aim of historians and intellectuals to perceive reality of their own days and to explain the feelings, fears, emotions and difficulties on power management, subdued peoples and landscapes or discourses of power, to quote here just the usual frames linked with Alexander's history and adventures. In our Late modern period, Alexander's value as historical symbol had, too, to face extreme political interpretations like those of Fascism, Nazism or Francoism. If we follow the famous opinion of Ulrich Wilcken, *princeps papyrologorum*, that each historian has his own Alexander, we can firmly state that Alexander's historiography is so rich that its analysis means actually a way to understand the complex relationship between the observation of the past and its meaning as symbol for thinking and rethinking the world, and even the cultural perceptions of reality and truth. Indeed, a critical examination of the traditions in Historiographical Alexander allows reconsidering both our ideas of alterity and success, and how great can be a human being, or to what extent what was great in the past still has to be accepted as such in our present days. To sum up, to revisit Alexander from the eyes of the historians in the Contemporary Age offers a genuine opportunity to rethink History as such, and to evaluate how can we imagine new ways to explain the past in order to build a rich appreciation of the present in order to imagine brand new futures.

The aim of the following pages is to review Alexander's portraits and concerns in the works and scopes of the more recent historical traditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This collection of essays is in fact a result of a call and the consequent meetings and discussions of a Panel on the topic of Alexander's historiography through the ages, held at the University College Dublin in 2016, during the Ninth Celtic Conference in Classics. Many colleagues came together in those days with papers that covered views on the different interpretations and historical perceptions of Alexander from the Renaissance until our own days.

We want to remember here the efforts of those who took part in the original Panel and were not part of the book, like Claudia Daniotti, Dan-Tudor Ionescu, Richard Stoneman, Hugh Bowden, Daniel L. Selden, Jordi Vidal, Timothy Howe and Giorgio Zoia. In some way, this book can not be a reality without their participation and their efforts, comments, advices and opinions during the sessions of the Panel. To them, we want to add Professor Pierre Briant, who initially had to be part of the Panel but unexpected reasons made his presence in Dublin impossible. Finally, Alexander Thein, colleague and dear friend, was key in the organization of the Panel, and in consequence, also of the origin of this book. The debt of gratitude with all this kind people is also shared by us with those who reviewed the proofs and chapters of this book as referees: Joseph Roisman, Frances Pownall, our dear friend Giuseppe Squillace, Franca Landucci and our close colleagues Antonio Duplà and Manuel Albaladejo. All these people put their time, knowledge and work at our service, in order to improve our task and ideas, giving us the chance to collaborate, to enrich ourselves and to gain wide and plenty research experiences. Our debt is just one reason among many others to dedicate this book to them.

The Editors

Barcelona, 26 September 2022

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Alexander and Modern Historiography: An introductory survey

BORJA ANTELA-BERNÁRDEZ
Autonomous University of Barcelona (Spain)
ORCID: 0000-0002-3118-3300

Abstract: Alexander the Great has been a frequent topic of study concerning the scholarship on the Ancient World. Since nineteenth-century *Altertumwissenschaft* in German study of Classics to some recent interpretations on Alexander in the current twenty-first century, some names and traditions in the common historiographical understanding of such a complex and polyhedric figure as Alexander of Macedon can be viewed in order to observe the topical portrats historians have been considering to explain his life and deeds.

Keywords: Alexander the Great, Historiography, *Altertumwissenschaft*, Modern Scholarship, Current interpretative traditions.

One of the most surprising facts concerning Alexander the Great has been the longevity and ability of his legacy to survive throughout the centuries. Ancient Greeks believed in the idea that great deeds were rewarded with glory, i.e., immortal fame[1]. If we have to judge Alexander, his successful display of fame is well attested until our own days, and not only in scholarship and academic interests. Pop culture and the general public are still fascinated by the terrific adventure of a young Macedonian king, gentle and cruel at the same time, who conquered the East[2], and changed the world forever. Alexander's legend has been alive for the last twenty-three centuries, acting both as a positive model for rulers and as the worst example of autocracy.

Nevertheless, although his career and legend had been taken as life lessons during many centuries, concerning many different historiographical methods and traditions around the world, the birth of Scientific History and Classical Scholarship in the nineteenth-century Germany arouse a new wider, world-history perception of Alexander's nature and the importance of his life and facts. Thus,

[1] I.e., Arr. *An.* VII.27.1; D.S. XVII.117.6; Curt. X.10.14-17; Plu. *Alex.* 77.1-5; Just. XII.14.

[2] Cf. Moore 2018a; Lapeña / Antela-Bernárdez 2020. For a wider scope on Alexander's afterlife, visions and impact beyond his time, there are two brilliant recent essays: Gómez Espelosín 2015; Briant 2016.

since George Grote's *History of Greece* (1846-1856), Alexander holds a prominent role in the academic histories of the Ancient Greek World as the last, conclusive figure of the brilliant Classical Period[3]. In this sense, Grote was simply echoing the general view of Ancient Greek History as an age that came to an end with the argued vanishing of the *polis* as the main characteristic, and Alexander's death meant, of course, the rise of the Hellenistic kingdoms, where the *polis*, according to the Classicists of that era, simply had no longer been what they were during Archaic and Classical age.

In this cultural perception and academic context, we can observe and put into value the impressive novelty that a new, fresh perspective could mean. In 1833, the Prussian historian Johan Gustav Droysen published the first edition of his *Geschichte Alexanders der Grossen* (*History of Alexander the Great*), which offered a radical new understanding of Alexander's impact[4]. In his work, the name of Alexander marked, indeed, the beginning of a new era, for our actual understanding of History and the succession of the events. This exceptional new view[5], resulted from the influence of theoretical approaches and theodicy from philosophers like Herder, and Hegel (who was Droysen's teacher, indeed),[6] stresses the fact that there was another age of ancient Greek History after Alexander, a brilliant epoch of splendour in which the conquest of Alexander was the cause of the spreading of the Greek Culture in the Eastern Mediterranean world and prepared the area for the latter development and expansion of Christianity. From such a point of view, not only Alexander but even his Successors were crucial in the development of the History of Humankind. So, the disappearance of the Greek polis after Alexander was, in Droysen's view, not so conclusive nor important. We must also bear in mind, to understand Droysen's perspective, that he was living during the rise of Prussia, a small reign in Germany, when the German culture was building a strong link with Ancient Greece through many different Cultural displays and perceptions. Prussia could also be viewed as a new Macedon, with the first Hohenzollern kings assimilated to their ancient parallels: Friedrich Wilhelm I as Philip II and Friedrich II the Great as Alexander.

If Droysen *created* a new view on Alexander, it seems to have not influenced so much English-speaking traditions on Alexander and Greek History, at least

[3] Antela-Bernárdez 2018: 63-66.

[4] On Droysen, see Bravo 1968; Southard 1995; Antela-Bernárdez 2000; Vanusia 2007; Wiesehöef 2018.

[5] Which is, in fact, a result of the European historiographical traditions from at least the Enlightenment: Briant 2009: 171 n. 4.

[6] Both Hegel and Herder had a great influence on our models of approaching Ancient History. Some examples of this deep impact has been reviewed, for example, in Antela-Bernárdez / Zaragozà 2018; Antela-Bernárdez 2018b. On Hegel's direct impact over Droysen, see Antela-Bernárdez 2018a, 2-11, with bibliography. Also, cf. Bravo 1968, 169-171; Southard 1995, 13; Bosworth 2009.

until 1931. In the meantime, Droysen published two more books as sequels of his *Geschichte Alexanders der Grossen*, dedicated to the *Diadochi* and the *Epigoni*. The three books were later republished in a reviewed edition as a unitary work: the almost legendary Droysen's *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (firstly published in 1936-1943). The book was translated into French and published during Droysen's life (1883), a clue of its impact on European culture. The idea of the Hellenistic age as a renewal period was spreading through the Western perception of Ancient Greece, while many other works focused on detailing the brilliant age of the Hellenistic Kingdoms. It was also the time of the European modern empires overseas, while the conflicts in colonial interests drove many countries into World War I (1914-1918).

However, Droysen was mainly unknown to English audiences[7]. The large shadow of Grote's imposing work and views were still alive for a long time, and the British Empire preferred to mirror itself in historical terms with Athens and her *Empire of the Sea* more than with the Macedonian kings. Nevertheless, the outbreak of the Afghan War in the Victorian age put finally Alexander at the centre of the English Historians' eyes. In this context, we can find the figure of David George Hoggarth (1862-1927), a renowned archaeologist and Classicist who in 1897 published his *Philip and Alexander of Macedon: two essays in bibliography*, which I consider the cradle of English Historiographical approaches to Alexander.[8] I find the work to trace the influence of this work in English Historiographical tradition a dark and hard task, but many clues seem to show its key role on the building of an historical portrait of Alexander in English culture[9]. Nevertheless, Hoggarth's influence soon vanished from the English Historical tradition in Classics due to the success of a new historian's view: Sir William Woodthorpe Tarn.

Tarn was probably the most influential historian in the English language during the twentieth century[10]. Despite his many critics[11], Tarn's view of Alexander ruled over the most prominent scholars, many of them more skilled and with more solid arguments about Alexander than Tarn. Firstly, in order to understand Tarn's wide reception, we must bear in mind that his was a candid view of Alexander, mostly developed between the two World Wars (1918-1939). Tarn's Alexander was a romantic hero, very close to Plutarch's model of behaviour, and the dreamer of a new world where humankind would be united under a unique realm. Of course, British hegemony was in the mind of Tarn – and, thus, this perception links his

[7] Until the edition edited by A. B. Bosworth of Droysen 2012, there was no translation in English of Droysen's *Alexander*.

[8] Antela-Bernárdez 2014; 2020.

[9] Borza 1978.

[10] A personal survey with interesting perspectives on Tarn can be read in Bosworth 2019.

[11] Badian 1958b; 1958c.

work with that of Droysen's, who had Prussia in his mind when he thought of Macedon. The common perception of Alexander as a metaphor for World-Empire and almighty conqueror was a feature of the European courts since the Middle Age. The novelty of Tarn's depiction of Alexander was this version of Alexander as a gentleman, elegant in success with conquered and prisoners alike, and frustrated in his ground-breaking plan of transforming the world into a new one by his own comrades, fatally death too soon to completely challenge the structures of his own age. However, the commonwealth survived to his creator and a new world arose (in fact, like in Droysen's view of the Hellenistic age) from Alexander's burial fire and the wars of the Diadochi's ashes, with Greek language as a tool, as it was English indeed in his times, to interconnect peoples around the world. Of course, the risen British authority in the Eastern Mediterranean added a deep meaning to the historical narrative of Tarn's works.

In the meantime, a new book on Alexander was published in 1931. Ulrich Wilcken's *Alexanders der Grossen*, quickly translated and published into English, was one of the most striking paradoxes of Historiography. Even though Wilcken, the *prince of papyrology*, a former disciple of the great Mommsen, was brilliantly celebrated through his whole scholar career as a papyrologist, with main research concerning Ptolemaic Egypt's Economy and many other topics, he will be remembered, at least for the English audience, by his late, almost pop, biography of Alexander. The enormous impact that his work on Alexander (which is so close to the centenary of Droysen's that cannot be a simple coincidence[12]) had in English Historians contrasts with the cold reception in German. Wilcken, actually, published his *Alexander* many years after he was retired, and, in many topics, he was just following Droysen's steps, to whom English readers had not access yet. Nevertheless, I also wonder if the impact of Wilcken in English was real and not a result of the brilliant introduction that Eugene N. Borza did in the re-edition of Wilcken's book in 1967[13], which charms every reader with no possible escape. But what hypnotized English readers was, in my opinion, the rich German tradition started in Droysen that Wilcken's captured in its pages.

Nazi Germany also provides Historiography with a lot of new perceptions on Antiquity[14]. This is not a new topic, and a lot has been written since the brilliant masterpiece of Edouard Will, probably the first attempt to reflect on

[12] A commemorative edition in the centenary of Droysen's *Alexander* was published in 1931 with an introductory chapter by Helmut Berve (Berve 1931-1943), a brilliant scholar who was nevertheless closely linked with the National-socialist party and ideologies.

[13] See Borza 1967.

[14] On Nazism and Historiography on Antiquity, for a general view in deep, see Christ 1982; 2009. On Alexander in the Nazism, see Bichler 2001; 2018a; Wiesehöfer 2022, 411-414, with bibliography.

Nazi Ancient Historiography[15]. Names like Franz Hampl[16] and, mainly, the once brilliant and later rejected (due to his links with Nazism) Helmut Berve[17] were main voices in concluding Alexander's conquest as proof of racial superiority. Surprisingly, one name successfully escaped from oblivion and dismissal: Franz Altheim. His survival after his previous links with the *Ahnenerbe*, a society for the study of the *racial heritage* from a historical perspective, reveals also the path many other scholars, both in Germany and Italy (but also in many other countries in Europe after the fall of Fascism[18] after its defeat against the Allies in World War II), followed concerning their racial, Nazi theories: they simply changed the idea of race for that of culture. As one can clearly read in the chapter Altheim devotes to the *High Cultures* in the third project of the *Propyläen Weltgeschichte*[19] to realize what he describes as Culture can previously be assigned to the word 'race'. But he succeeded with a recognized position and scholarly authority that was even acceptable to Momigliano, a well-known Nazi-historians *hunter*. But Altheim was also linked with a view of History that goes beyond scholarship and can be linked with the theodicy of Spengler, and from them, even to Hegel, still following the path of Droysen's and the German usual historiographical tradition on Alexander.

The decades after the end of World War II saw an increasing criticism in Classics. The nineteenth-century traditions and methodologies were superseded at some point, and a new kind of historian arose. Maybe the most popular example can be Rostovtzeff, but the best one is, in my opinion, Ernst Badian[20]. Probably, Badian is mainly remembered for his works on the Late Roman Republic, as my life experience has usually shown me, but every scholar on Alexander is still closely and deeply influenced by what Badian wrote decades ago. Badian's Alexander, however, is also a clue of the transformation of Classical scholarship in the mid-twentieth century. If we take a close look at some of his

[15] Will 1956.

[16] Deglau 2017.

[17] Although his work on Alexander's prosopography has been the key reference in this topic since, at least, the apparition of Heckel's prosopography: Heckel 2006. On Berve, see Christ 1990.

[18] Many historiographical traditions and works were published under the influence of Fascism in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Although the Italian and French Fascist approaches to Alexander (as those like of Benoist Mechin or even the probable links of a young Momigliano with Fascism in Italy when he wrote his *Filippo il Macedone* in 1934) can be considered to come to an end with the defeat of Fascism in these countries, in Spain this tradition survived (with names like Montero Diaz, for example). On Momigliano, see, for example, Sierra Martín 2016.

[19] Antela-Bernárdez 2018c.

[20] On Badian, see Antela-Bernárdez 2012-2014; Thomas 2013, with full bibliography.

first papers[21], we can see just a dialogue between the historian and the sources, but later on, this dialogue has many other interlocutors, i.e., the other scholars, and their opinions and perspectives. Thus, reading Badian is a way to see how Classics were becoming increasingly complex during the decades from the '50s to the '80s. The huge amount of research published on Alexander becomes almost impossible to be completely scoped, and a lot of new resources were required to be able to question any aspect of Alexander's life and history.

During the same period, other scholars carried out main works that changed scholarship concerning ancient Macedonia. Nicholas G. L. Hammond developed a prominent role in popularising Ancient Macedonia, with a deep approach that went beyond what had been done so far. By mixing archaeology and a great *Quellenforschung*, he wrote the stepping stone of *History of Ancient Macedonia* with the help of brilliant colleagues such as G. T. Griffith and F. W. Walbank[22]. This period can be considered as a kind of Golden Age for scholarship on Ancient Macedonia, and the prize to most of these efforts arrived in 1977, November 8th when Manolis Andronikos and his team of Greek archaeologists opened the door of the burial chamber at Vergina, which they attributed to Philip II. This magnificent discovery challenged even more Classical Scholars concerning Macedonia and Alexander, and attracted also funding and interest alike.

However, the academic production concerning Alexander was intensely increasing fast and unstoppably. In 1973, a young scholar named Robin Lane Fox published his *Alexander the Great*, which due to the nice tone and fashionable narrative quickly became a *best seller*, and we can even consider it a Modern classic in English essays. In the first lines, nevertheless, he also confesses he had to read more than a thousand documents, including papers, chapters and books, to be able to face the complex scholarship on Alexander the Great. From the early works of Badian[23] to Lane Fox's *Alexander*, the academic production multiplied completely out of control. The discoveries at Vergina by Andronikos made nothing but fuelled the attention and interest, and it has been a common feature in Alexander's studies until nowadays, when it seems impossible to get access to every study published on the topic, not even to review it all[24].

During the last 40 years, new names, perceptible changes and new perspectives have arisen. A. B. Bosworth's impressive commentary on the main source of

[21] Compare, for example, his "Alexander the Great and the Loneliness of Power" (Badian 1958), or any other of his *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (collected in 1964) with any of his later works, like "Alexander the Great: Between two thrones and Heaven" (Badian 1996). The scholarship evolution is clear in the deep bibliographical perspective and also in the wide scope at the sources' criticism.

[22] Hammond 1972; Hammond / Griffith 1972; Hammond / Walbank 1972.

[23] See Badian's astonishing criticism to Lane Fox in Badian 1976b.

[24] Such a challenging task was already done, with a Herculean effort, by Molina Marín 2018.

Alexander, Arrian's *Anabasis*, rose up the erudition on Alexander, connecting topics, bibliography and sources[25]. This erudition also resulted in what can be probably the last great study in deep of Alexander, beyond usual biographical approaches: Bosworth's *Conquest and Empire*[26]. To this new feature, the work of Pierre Briant, Helen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, Amelie Kuhrt and many others, those who can be collected in what themselves called the *Achaemenid Studies*[27], can be added. As far as they reviewed in deep what we know about Achaemenids, they also challenged the place of Alexander in Achaemenid History, even to be so brave to question Alexander's Historical meaning not as Droysen's New Age in History of Mankind but just as the last chapter of the Achaemenid Empire[28].

But despite this increasing amount of criticism, revisions, proposals, understandings, and theories on Alexander, scholarship on Macedon is still very alive. The *Alexandermania* which resulted from the movie directed by Oliver Stone in 2004[29] (with a clear aim to link ancient conflict between Greece and Persians with the Western *War against Terror* drove by President George W. Bush's administration against Iraq and Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of 11/09/2001[30]) prompted a new wave of books on Alexander. Nevertheless, the usual balance between biographies on Alexander, which usually review almost the very same points and events, and the deep and rich scholarship on Alexander, which is almost as wide as Jorge L. Borges' infinite library, is still working in a way I cannot but consider a failure of the communication between scholarship's research and the general audience. In some way, historians who, although brilliant scholars, publish a biography on Alexander just visiting general, very well-known topics and write the same every time, without adding both the new experiences and perspectives of our challenging and changing world and the great advances in our knowledge on Alexander and his age, are stealing the audience the chance to change the common view on Alexander, in order to create new ones[31].

And now, how can we face the challenge of approaching Alexander in a new way? After two centuries of intense collective criticism and narratives to try to describe almost every detail in the life of Alexander, we are still at the same starting point. People still prefer to read Droysen and Wilcken, or their Modern

[25] Bosworth 1980a and 1995.

[26] Bosworth 1988b.

[27] On the causes and origins of this collective of scholars and their approaches, see Imanpour 2013; 2015.

[28] Briant 1979 [1982]: 1414; c*ontra* Lane Fox 2007. Likewise, my minor approach in Antela-Bernárdez 2018d.

[29] See the collected papers of Cartledge / Greenland 2010.

[30] Romm 2007; Müller / Howe 2012; Antela-Bernárdez 2014; Howe 2016.

[31] Among the best biographies published in the last decades on Alexander, I must highlight here the one I consider the most balanced and complete, written from a sincere and complex personal point of view, as it is that of Domínguez Monedero 2013.

versions, i.e., Lane Fox, than going into the deep labyrinth of the hermeneutics and theoretical perspectives that conditioned any approach. Does criticism kill the question, or has even murdered the aim to know? Hard problems, indeed, but the traces over the way we have written the History of Alexander are so rich that drive us to review not only Alexander and Ancient History, but even more, mainly the goals and wishes of our European culture in constant evolution and revision.

Alexander the Great: Historical or Historiographic Failure?

ERAN ALMAGOR
Jerusalem

Abstract: This chapter addresses the theme of failure in the modern historiographic presentations of Alexander. In its first part, it surveys the theme under several headings, which give us some impression of the scholarly currents employing it. These are: (1) an appreciation with hindsight of the political disaster Alexander brought to Greece and Macedonia through his conquest of the Achaemenid Empire; (2) Alexander's administrative incapacity to control the areas he conquered; (3) Alexander's bad military, tactical and strategic decisions in his campaign; (4) Alexander's moral failures and flawed character, as explanations for his other blunders; (5) Alexander's inability to fulfill some high ideals attributed to him – or, conversely, his attempt to realize them. The focus is on the main and the most recent historiographic presentations, while some of their ancient counterparts are reviewed. The second part deals with the inadequacies of the ancient sources depicting Alexander. It culminates with Plutarch's sophisticated presentation in his biography of Alexander, which connects the failed historiographic tradition to the images of failure associated with the Macedonian king.

Keywords: Alexander, Failure, Historiography, Plutarch, Callisthenes of Olynthus, Arrian

The association of failure with Alexander III and the Macedonian campaign in Asia needs no apology today. At the forefront of scholarship, it is found, for example, in the title of a recent book (John Grainger's *Alexander the Great Failure*, 2007). It is also present in the most influential popular image of Alexander that was produced in the last generation, that is, Oliver Stone's *Alexander* (2004). In the concluding scene, Ptolemy (played by Anthony Hopkins) sums up Alexander's career: "What failure! His failure towered over other men's successes".[1] It would

[1] The failure *motif* appears in the movie also in the words of Alexander himself: "I've failed...utterly", interestingly evoking the ending of Klaus Mann's *Alexander* (1929). The movie itself was not a commercial failure (grossing worldwide, mostly overseas $167 million while its budget was $155 million: http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=alexander.htm [date: 26/04/2020]), but the result was frustrating to many a viewer. The sense of failure appeared in the criticisms of both movie critics and historians. See Solomon 2010: 48-50; Lane Fox 2010: 60. Cf. Nisbet 2010: 230, who quotes the narrator Ptolemy "Alexander, son of

appear that certain facts in particular almost necessitate setting the bar high in the case of Alexander and judging him rigorously for his own flaws.[2] One is Alexander's ambition and association with his predecessors (including gods and heroes), even within his mythic ancestry, which goes back to Heracles[3] and Achilles;[4] Alexander competed with them and tried to succeed where they allegedly failed.[5] Another fact is that Alexander died prematurely (almost at

a god –it was a myth, of course" by saying that it "applies equally well to *Alexander*'s own failed self-mythologization". The screenplay is credited to Oliver Stone, Christopher Kyle and Leta Kalogridis, but Stone presided over the entire project. On the movie, see also Lane Fox 2004; Petrovic 2008; Chaniotis 2008; Pretzler 2013.

[2] Cf. Mossman 1988: 85; Chamoux 2003: 8; Anson 2013: 7.

[3] Alexander descended from Heracles on his father's side (D.S. 17.1.5; Plu. *Alex.* 2.1; Arr. *An.* 2.6.4; cf. 4.10.7, 11.6; 5.26.5; 6.3.2); the hero was the ancestor of the Macedonian royal house under the title Heracles Patroios: cf. *SEG* XLVI 829; XVLIII 836. See O'Brien 1992: 22, 87, 163. See the examples listed in Heckel 2015: 25-30, among them the sacrifice to Zeus Soter, Heracles and Ister (Arr. *An.* 1.4.5); again to Zeus, Athena and Heracles after crossing the Hellespont (Arr. *An.* 1.11.7), again after the victory at Issus, the setting up of altars on the banks of the Pinarus river, dedicated to Zeus, Heracles and Athena (Curt. 3.12.27); the demand to sacrifice to Heracles (Melqart) in Tyre (Curt. 4.2.2-5); the erection of altars in imitation of his predecessors Heracles and Dionysus (Str. 3.5.5). His child with Barsine, daughter of the Persian noble Artabazus, was aptly called Heracles (cf. D.S. 20.20.1-2; Curt. 10.6.10-12; Iust. 14.6.2; 15.2.3; Berve 1926: 168, nº. 353). See, however, Tarn 1948 II: 330-337, who denies his existence. Here belongs also the depictions of Alexander as a descendent of Zeus in Siwah (see notes 4 and 118, below) and before the Battle of Gaugamela too (Plu. *Alex.* 33.1) —both from Callisthenes— confirmed by his oracle at Didyma near Miletus (Arr. *An.* 3.5; Plu. *Alex.* 50.11; cf. Curt. 8.1.42, 52); he was hailed as the "third son of Zeus to come" to the boundaries of India (Curt. 8.10.1). One of Alexander's reported "Last Plans" was to sail westward to the Pillars of Heracles (D.S. 17.113.2). According to Ephippus (Ath. 12.537e), Alexander dressed up as Heracles.

[4] Alexander alleguedly took pride of the fact that he descended from Achilles on his mother's side (Plu. *Alex.* 2.1; *Pyrrh.* 1.2; *Mor.* 332a-b; Curt. 4.6.29). Cf. D.S. 17.1.5, 97.3; Arr. *An.* 1.12.1-5; Plu. *Alex.* 8.2; 15.8-9 (cf. *Mor.* 343ab); Curt. 8.4.25-6. See Mossman 1992; O'Brien 1992: 13, 20-1, 56, 59, 87, 109, 161, 166; Stewart 1993: 78-86. Like Achilles (Hom. *Il.* 19.409), Alexander died young (cf. Arr. *An.* 7.24.1) and his death was preceded by that of his best friend (Arr. *An.* 7.14.4; cf. Ael. *VH.* 7.8). On this subject more generally, see Maitland 2015; Heckel 2015: 21-25, 30-32 who denies the historicity of Alexander's imitation, rivalry or allusions to Achilles. The resemblances were probably rhetorically emphasised after Alexander's death: among them were Alexander's tutor's reference to himself as Phoenix (Plu. *Alex.* 5.8); the description of Alexander's visit to Achilles' tomb at Troy, and of Hephaistion's to that of Patroclus (Arr. *An.* 1.12.1-2; Ael. *VH.* 12.7); the punishment of Batis, commander of Gaza, as imitating Achilles' treatment of Hector (Curt. 4.6.29); Alexander's battle with the Indus River, like Achilles with Scamander (D.S. 17.97.1-3; Curt. 9.4.8-14); his marriage with Roxane was compared to Achilles' relationship with Briseis (Curt. 8.4.26; 10.3.11. Cf. Bowden 2018 on one section in Arrian, from Alexander's arrival at Troy to his victory at the Granicus (1.11.6-16.7) as a literary fictional creation. Cf. D.S. 17.97.2-3. See, however, Ameling 1988, who argues for the historicity of Alexander's emulation of Achilles.

[5] For Alexander rivalling Achilles, see Arr. *An.* 7.14.4. In this, he resembled Achilles himself, always striving to be the best over the others (Hom. *Il.* 6.208; 11.783-784, with O'Brien 1992: 9). For Alexander's rivalry with Heracles, see the scene at Siwah: Arr. *An.* 3.3.3-4 (from Callisthenes; cf. Howe 2013: 62); 4.10.6-11.7, 28.4, 30.4; 5.2.1, 26.5. See also

the age of 33) before he could accomplish more,[6] let alone realize his so-called "last plans"[7] —that is, failing to be universal (conquering all space) or immortal (defeating time)— or indeed dying before he could triunphantly return home, also contributed to this image of failure.[8]

The historiography of Alexander has been traditionally presented as split between positive and negative approaches to him, and most historians seem to fit either of these approaches. The most notable prominent modern positive portrayal of Alexander is perhaps J. G. Droysen, *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen* (Hamburg, 1833), in which the Macedonian king is set against the decadence of Asia.[9] In his admiring treatment, Droysen somewhat echoes one ancient trend, found, for example, in Diodorus' claim that Alexander, "by his acumen and courage surpassed in the magnitude of his achievements (τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἔργων) all kings whose memory is recorded from the beginning of time" (17.1.3; trans. Welles).[10] Among the more recent ones to uphold this sunny position towards Alexander is Hammond (1980: Book Summary): "Within the span of thirteen years, Alexander the Great changed the face of the world more decisively and with more long-lasting effects than any other statesman has ever done".

Alexander's insistence to conquer (327/6 BCE) the isolated Rock Aornus in the Indus valley, which Heracles is reported to have failed three times to capture (Arr. *An*. 4.28.1-4, 30.4; *Ind*. 5.10; Curt. 8.11.2; D.S. 17.85.2, 4-6; 96.2-3; Iust. 12.7.12-13; Str. 15.1.8). See Bosworth 1996a: 121-124, 164. Cf. Sen. *Ep*. 94.63; *Ben*. 1.13.1-3. For Alexander's competition, cf. Arr. *An*. 4.3.4, 8.3, 28.2; 6.24.2; Curt. 8.11.2; see Edmunds 1971: 369-370, 373-378. For his excessive ambition, cf. Curt. 10.5.29. For the creation of the Alexander Myth in relation to the previous heroes, see Bosworth 1996a: 98-132; cf. Stoneman 2019: 84.

[6] Cf. Tarn 1948 I: 121: "he died with the real task yet before him. He had made war as few have made it; it remained to be seen if he could make peace".

[7] Among the last plans are the exploration of the Caspian Sea and Arabia, or circuiting Africa; see D.S. 18.4.2-6 (from Hieronymus of Cardia? See Hammond, 1980: 300); cf. 17.113.1-2; Arr. *An*. 7.1.2-3, 16.1-4; 19.6-20.2; cf. 6.7.5; 5.25.4-5; Plu. *Alex*. 68.1; Curt. 10.1.17-19; Robinson 1940; Badian 1968; Hamilton 1969: 187-189, 1973: 154-158; Bosworth 1988b: 164-169. Cf. Luc. 10.37-38.

[8] Cf. Barletta 2010: 40: "[Arrian's readers] would see Alexander's seven-year refusal to effect a *nostos* from Asia after having defeated Darius III as a tragic error that in the end cost him his kingdom, his mind, and his life".

[9] Droysen 1833 [1877]: 437-444. Not surprisingly, he also portrays Alexander as advancing historiographic research (440). On Droysen's *Alexander* see Bosworth 2006: esp. 16-17. Droysen appears to follow (esp. 414), in general, Plutarch's two essays, *De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute* (Plu. *Mor.* 328c-e) (cf. Wiesehöfer 2018: 602-605), where Alexander is the great civilizer of the east, being oblivious to their ironic tone and content; cf. Robertson 1701: 24-25, before him. For further influence of Plutarch's imagery, see Bosworth 1996a: 2-5. Cf. a variant coming ultimately from Nearchus (*apud* Arr. *Ind*. 40.6) on the building of cities to lead the Cossaeans to forsake their nomadic existence. Cf. Hamilton 1973: 34, 159-160, who is more sceptical; cf. Fraser 1996: 181-182, 189.

[10] A recent exceedingly positive treatment is the discussion of Moore 2018b: 5-35, absolving Alexander in the episodes of the assassination of Philip II, the razing of Thebes and the death of Callisthenes.

Conversely, negative sentiments towards Alexander are found in many contexts in antiquity. The first most noted critical modern historian of Alexander as a general or a statesman is that of K. J. Beloch (1927: 299-300, 305), who claims:

> "That it is Parmenion who won the great battles of the Persian War and led this war strategically, is left without doubt [...] the successes in the Persian wars are evidence that Parmenion was the greatest general of his time, and one of the greatest generals of all time [...].[11]
>
> The great statesman shows himself above all in the fact that he knows how to limit himself in his goals. Alexander could not do that; instead of consolidating what was acquired after Dareios' death, he moved further and further east until the army finally refused and forced him to return".[12]

The theme of failure can thus appropriately belong to the latter, a negative approach towards Alexander, which underscores the shadow rather than the light of the Macedonian king.

The ancient view that tended to associate moral flaws with a sense of failure can also be seen in modern accounts. Let us review, therefore, negative judgments of Alexander to that effect in our survey. The modern view of Alexander as a moral as well as a political or military failure is now so well entrenched,[13] that in fact, it is its co-existence with the designation of Alexander as "Great" (*megas*) that requires some explanation and justification.[14] This is apparent even in the words of the sympathetic Rogers (2004: xviii):

[11] Cf. a close attitude by Polybius 8.10.8-10.

[12] Beloch 1927: 299-300: "Daß es Parmenion ist, der die großen Schlachten des Perserkriegs gewonnen und diesen Krieg auch strategisch geleitet hat, unterliegt keinem Zweifel [...] sind die Erfolge im Perserkriege voller Beweis, daß Parmenion der größte Feldherr seiner Zeit, und einer der größten Feldherren aller Zeiten gewesen ist [...] 305: Der große Staatsmann zeigt sich vor allem darin, daß er sich in seinen Zielen zu beschränken weiß. Alexander hat das nicht vermocht; statt nach Dareios' Tod das Erworbene zu konsolidieren, ist er immer weiter nach Osten gezogen, bis endlich das Heer versagte und ihn zur Rückkehr nötigte". See the brief mention in Bichler 2018a: 643-644.

[13] Cf. Anson 2013: 1: "[m]any more would hail him as 'the-downright-awful'". Cf. Welles 1965: 228.

[14] Was the epithet "Great" understood by some of the ancients as sarcastic? Its first occurrence ever, as far as is known, is in a Latin comedy, namely, Plautus' *Mostellaria* 775-777 (between the end of the third and the beginning of the second centuries BCE: see Duckworth 1952: 56). According to Strootman 2020: 147, the title was given to Alexander by the Romans, in a presentation which associated them with the Macedonian king directly, by-passing the Hellenistic monarchies "as if they were an irrelevant interlude in the process of *translatio imperii* from Alexander to Rome", whilst denigrating Antiochus *Megas* (on which title, cf. App. *Syr.* 1.1; Plb. 4.2.7; *SEG* XLI. 1003; *OGIS* 245, 246). Yet, the context and content of the epithet in Plautus' play do not seem to give it a sincere significance. In it, "Great Alexander" (*Alexandrum magnum*) and the tyrant of Syracuse Agathocles

> "Indeed, it is the flaws and mistakes of the great that allow us to appreciate their gifts, and it is by their missteps and failures that the great are ultimately redeemed as human beings. Great as he was, in the end Alexander turned out to be a mortal, just like the rest of us, if only in that one inescapable way. If we can accept that fact, as Alexander himself was finally forced to, perhaps we can forgive him for the ambiguity of his greatness".

In a sense, then, Alexander was great *because* he was imperfect as a man and as a statesman. Compare the description of Spencer (2010: 176):

> "The world after Alexander continued to reference him as a model not only because of his exceptional and world-changing military achievements, but also because of his failure to secure the future politically. In the aftermath of his brief but spectacular career, successive Hellenistic kingdoms, and eventually Rome, needed to face up to the more mundane problems of government [...]".

For the sake of convenience, I here address the theme of *failure* under several headings, which would give us some impression of the scholarly currents employing this theme. I shall focus on the main and the most recent presentations, and try to show some of their ancient counterparts. I will not establish their validity. This exposition will not be comprehensive, for, to paraphrase Plutarch in his *Alexander*, this is a chapter and not a monograph on the matter.

(1) The first category of failure attributed to Alexander is the appreciation, from a broader historical perspective, of the political disaster he brought to Greece and Macedonia. It views Alexander's achievement in conquering the Achaemenid Empire in hindsight, and attributes failure to Alexander because of the ensuing events. An explicit statement of this view is found in the depiction of Burn (1947a: 283-285):

> "[…] Was this in its effect for the good of the world? I cannot think so.
>
> By marching into Iran, Alexander overstepped the bounds of the Mediterranean world; and it was his *personal* achievement, by conquering so much, to lay a greater strain than could be borne upon the strength of the Seleukid Empire […].

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are credited with "two achievements" (*duo res gessisse*), comparable to the deceiving slave Tranio, about to be credited with a "third" immortal accomplishment (*quid mihi fiet tertio qui solus facio facinora immortalia*). Gilley 2018: 304-305 assumes that the former "achievements" were conquests, but it is not necessarily so. These could be acts of deception as well. Cf. the sardonic Cuppy 1950: 38: "Alexander was great because he killed more people of more kinds that any other man of his time".

> Moreover, by drawing off so much Greek man-power so far into the East, Alexander weakened even Greek resistance at home to Roman aggression […] What a blessing to humanity if the Greeks could have checked Rome, at least long enough to civilize her, before Italy became the centre of a unified Mediterranean world".

Burn goes on to compare Alexander push into Asia and the consequent overstaining of the "strength of Hellenism" with the outcome of Napoleon's wars and the impact it had on weakening France, "with results that were not ultimately for the good of humanity". One notices the strong disdain for Rome in these words,[15] as well as the inevitable *what if* question.[16] This counterfactual query was popular in the rhetorical schools of the Roman Imperial era,[17] and traces of it are also found in modern treatments of Alexander.[18]

This sentiment may go back to the ancients themselves. We learn from Plutarch's *Alexander* (65.6-8) that Calanus, the Indian philosopher, made an illustration of government before Alexander: when he stepped on one edge of a dry hide, the other rose up, but when he stood in the middle of it, the hide was held down firm. Plutarch intervenes to say that this act was designed to show that Alexander "ought to put most constraint upon the middle of his empire and not wander far away from it".[19] Apart from the emphasis on the *moral* middle course of action, the lesson intimates that Alexander, who expanded his empire to the Far East, and disregarded his own center, abandoned the other end of his empire and eventually led to its political calamity by a strategic blunder. If this interpretation is true, it comes close to Burn's theory.

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[15] A slightly different view, which is not so negative to the Romans, is that of Badian 1962: 89-90: "he ended an epoch and began another —but one of unceasing war and misery, from which only exhaustion produced an approach to order after two generations and peace at last under the Roman Empire".

[16] Cf. Braudel 2001: 250, on "Alexander's mistake": "If Hellenism, with all the vigour and critical mass it possessed at that moment, had turned towards the west and its comparatively unknown lands, might it not have pre-empted the destiny of Rome?"

[17] Cf. *Rhet. Her.* 4.31 with Muccioli 2018a: 292-293. Cf. also Plu. *Pyrrh.* 19.1-4. See Liv. 4.17-19, obviously with a different, pro-Roman answer, with Morello 2002 and Briquel 2014. Cf. Amm. Marc. 30.8.5; Flor. 1.23.2; cf. Julian. *Ep.* 47.433c. Cf. Plu. *Mor.* 326b-c: the essay subtly breaks off before dwelling on this counterfactual battle; cf. Wardman 1955: 99-100; Swain 1989: 505, 514-516, Whitmarsh 2002: 176.

[18] See Grote 1856: 349-352, at 349: "[g]reat as his past career had been, his future achievements, with such increased means and experience, were likely to be yet greater"; cf. Toynbee 1969: 464-470. An opposite counterfactual hypothesis, to the effect that Alexander would have been satisfied with liberating the Greeks in Asia Minor, is set by Rollin 1733 VI: 703-704; see Mossé 2004: 193.

[19] τὰ μέσα δεῖν μάλιστα τῆς ἀρχῆς πιέζειν καὶ μὴ [δὲ] μακρὰν ἀποπλανᾶσθαι τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον (from Onesicritus? Cf. *FGrH* 34 F 17a). The scene is portrayed differently in Arr. *An.* 7.1.6.

Indeed, it would appear that this is what Plutarch had in mind. One of the following passages (*Alex*. 69.1-8) begins with an aside, which states that Ochus (Artaxerxes III), one of the last Achaemenid kings, did not visit Persia.[20] Alexander executes the Macedonian who had plundered Cyrus' tomb, and has the inscription upon the tomb translated into Greek. Plutarch then claims that Alexander is reminded of the mutability of life. Immediately, the story mentions once again Calanus the Indian, who immolates himself on a funeral pyre.[21] Finally, Plutarch claims that the same thing happened later to an Indian who was following Augustus in Athens.[22] What seems at first to be a strange amalgam of details is in fact a very pointed comment on Alexander's campaign. The key phrase is the "mutability of life". Just as the Persians gave way to the Macedonians, they, in turn, would give way to the Romans. Ochus, who did not visit Persia, the centre of his empire, and stayed in one edge of it, brought disaster upon the Persians with the arrival of the Macedonians. Alexander apparently did the same with his behaviour, which ultimately introduced the Romans. The mention of Augustus at the end of the list is surely not accidental.[23] It is of note that Augustus is said to stay in Greece, which could roughly be the geographical center of his own empire; Augustus has learned the lesson of the Persians and Macedonians. This portrayal thus goes back to the idea that Alexander weakened Macedonia and Greece to such an extent, that the Romans could easily come and conquer the area. Compare Toynbee (1981: 67): "After Alexander's sudden premature death in 323 BC the expanded Hellenic World relapsed into political disunity and consequently resumed its fratricidal warfare —now on a far larger scale".

Grainger, in the aforementioned volume, is one of the recent scholars to uphold the view, that Alexander's campaign brought calamity to Macedonia, as is also evident in the secondary title of his book (*The Collapse of the Macedonian Empire*). He asserts (2007: 190-191):

> "Alexander's expedition left Macedon substantially weakened, and its geographical position left it vulnerable to invasion from the north. It had suffered this repeatedly during the previous two centuries, and it was only in Philip II's reign that the kingdom became organized and led in such a way that its resistance to invasion was invariably successful [...] The end came with

[20] Plu. *Alex*. 69.2: καὶ διὰ τοῦτό φασιν ἐνίους μὴ πολλάκις, Ὤχον δὲ μηδ' ἅπαξ εἰς Πέρσας παραγενέσθαι, διὰ μικρολογίαν ἀποξενώσαντα τῆς πατρίδος ἑαυτόν...

[21] Cf. Arr. *An*. 7.3.1-6; D.S. 17.107.1-6; Str. 15.1.64, 68 Cf. Onesicritus (*apud* Lucian *DMort*. 25), and Chares (*apud* Ath. 10.437a).

[22] *Alex*. 69.8: τοῦτο πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον ἄλλος Ἰνδὸς ἐν Ἀθήναις Καίσαρι συνὼν ἐποίησε, καὶ δείκνυται μέχρι νῦν τὸ μνημεῖον, Ἰνδοῦ προσαγορευόμενον. Cf. Str. 16.1.73 with Bosworth 2013. See D.C. 54.9.10.

[23] Cf. Augustus' own boast of embassies coming to see him from India in his *Res Gestae* 31.1.

> the Galatians, who broke into and overran Macedon with appalling ease [...] Royal authority only revived when Antigonus Gonatas recruited pirates and Galatians to drive other Galatians out. A warrior kingdom such as Macedon could not sink lower. It was the ultimate result of Alexander's expedition, which had meant that his homeland was unable to defend itself".[24]

This also appears in the description of Adams (2005: 257): "[t]o balance his achievements, Alexander's failures were great as well [...] It drained human resources from and ultimately crippled Macedonia and the Greek homeland [...]"

In other words, what Philip had built, Alexander destroyed. The rhetorical theme of comparison between father and son to the latter's detriment appears in many forms in ancient and modern historiography.[25] As Bosworth (1986: 10-12) puts it:

> "Philip's reign had brought the country to a position of overwhelming supremacy in the Greek world [...] Macedon was the supreme and invincible, her military dominance based on reserves of manpower which could not be remotely matched by any other state. By the end of Alexander's reign the balance had been tipped. The actual armies of Macedon were depleted and the potential for supplementing them destroyed [...] The hero of Macedon was Philip, who had built his country's supremacy. His son had squandered that inheritance – in the eyes of the Macedonians at least [...] the country was set on a path of decline that proved irreversible [...]".

(2) The second category of failure associated with Alexander in historiography is linked with the administrative incapacity of the Macedonian king to control all the areas he conquered. Most clearly, this view is found in the portrayals concerning India. Heckel (1997: 213) claims: "India could be defeated, but not governed, by the European invader. Soon these regions were incorporated into the Mauryan empire of Chandragupta, who reaped the political rewards of Macedonian blood and conquest".

[24] The general sentiment is ancient; cf. Plb. 3.4.5: the greatest success can bring the greatest calamity. Cf. Anson 2013: 185: "[u]nlike the later Romans, lands secured overseas by Macedonian armies did not redound to the benefit of Macedonia". See Cawthorne 2004: 145: "with the exception of […] Alexandria, nothing significant he did survived".

[25] Cf. Alexander's speech to his men at Opis (Arr. *An*. 7.9.2-5). Cf. Plb. 8.10.7; Iust. 9.6.17; Lucian *DMort*. 14; see Müller 2018a: 79, 81-82, 90. See Fredricksmeyer 1990: 309: "possibly the resentment was exacerbated by the thought, if only intermittently, that the conquest of the Persian Empire was equalled or even surpassed, by Philip's achievements". Cf. Isoc. *Ep*. 3.5; Iust. 12.6.3-4. Cf. Rice 1997: 100: "[he] set his country on a path of decline that proved irreversible [...] the period of Macedonian greatness was the reign of king Philip II, not that of his over-ambitious heir".

Similarly, Bosworth (1983b: 45) affirms:

> "Alexander tacitly recognized that his conquests were untenable. He retained nominal suzerainty, but over vast tracts of India he abdicated any attempt to maintain military control. For all the ostensible victories and all its dreadful carnage the campaign in India had proved a failure in the end".[26]

The Indian campaign created another problem for the territories already attained. According to Lonsdale (2007: 57), the difficulty arose when Alexander and his military force were away: "[T]he main problem was not necessarily Alexander's political organisation of the empire. Rather, it was the absence of Alexander and his main army that seemed to encourage thoughts of rebellion".[27]

Correspondingly, in her interpretation of the burning of the palaces in Persepolis in the spring of 330 BCE, Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1993: 185), concludes that it was not premeditated, and at the first stage was merely designed to destroy items that could be used to propagate political power by the men left behind:

> "How does that fit the image of Alexander? It does not fit into the picture of the ruler, trying to establish a governmental structure in his empire. It rather fits the picture of Alexander, the soldier and explorer [...] That is the expedition of a conqueror, not of a ruler who has the safe-keeping of the government apparatus foremost in his mind".[28]

[26] Bosworth 2002: 1 repeats this view: "the process of disintegration had started even before his death. Alexander himself had tacitly admitted that the Indian lands were out of control, relinquishing the Indus provinces to native rulers". Stoneman 2019: 69 quotes the sentiment of the first Prime Minister of modern India, Jawaharlal Nehru, who dismissed Alexander's expedition as "a minor and unsuccessful raid across the border". Cf. Narain 1965: 165, who succinctly described the invaders of India: "They Came, They Saw, but India Conquered". It is interesting to read an apology to Alexander's withdrawal from the control of India in the form of the statements by Rogers 2004: 227: "Macedonian interests between the Indus and the Hydaspes were secured by a native prince [...] and Alexander's great ally Porus ruled over the enormous area from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean. By these measures Alexander adjusted the administration of his empire to the circumstances [...] If that constitutes failure, rarely in the history of imperialism can a conqueror be said to have failed so successfully".

[27] A judgement shared by the admiring Lane Fox 1973: 336: "by disappearing eastwards Alexander was inviting rebellion from those who still remained behind him".

[28] Cf. Anson 2015: 72: "Alexander was not out to rule an empire; his goal was to conquer an empire that would be bounded only by what he could reach in his lifetime". And in Anson 2013: 182: "While Alexander may have created a new world, he had not created the means to run it". Cf. Prevas 2004: 208: "conquest was not a means to building an empire; it became an end in itself".

While quoting the assertion of Brunt (1965: 213), saying that "there is no sign that [Alexander] had any taste for the humdrum routine of administration", Milns (1968: 253) goes on to comment on Alexander's last plans:

> "[I]t does not reflect well on Alexander's concern for his empire that, with all the abuses which so obviously still existed in the Asiatic satrapies, with Greece seething with discontent, and with Antipater in Macedonia on the point of open rebellion, the matter of prime importance to him was the undertaking of new and difficult conquests".[29]

This evaluation of Alexander, which differentiates between the conquering of the empire and the administering of it, goes back to antiquity. For instance, Aelius Aristides, in his encomiastic oration *To Rome* (Ῥώμης ἐγκώμιον, 24-26), asserts that contrary to the Romans, Alexander was unable to manage the territories he had conquered[30] nor could he create an empire; indeed, he even failed to be considered a proper king:

> "Alexander, who acquired the great empire —so it looked until yours arose[31]— by overrunning the earth, to tell the truth, more closely resembled one who acquired a kingdom than one who showed himself a king (κτησαμένῳ βασιλείαν μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ βασιλεύσαντι). For what happened to him, I think, is as if some ordinary person were to acquire much good land but were to die before receiving the yield of it. [...] one might say that he won very many battles but, as a king, he did very little, and that he became a great contender for kingship, but never received any enjoyable result worthy of his genius and skill (γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγωνιστὴν μέγαν περὶ βασιλείας, ἀπολαῦσαι δ' οὐδὲν ἄξιον τῆς διανοίας καὶ τῆς τέχνης). What happened to him was much as if a man, while contending in an Olympic contest, defeated his opponents, then died immediately after the victory before rightly adjusting the crown upon his head. After all, what laws did he ordain for each of his peoples? Or what contributions in taxes, men or ships did he put on a permanent basis? Or by what routine administration with automatic progress and fixed periods of time did he conduct his affairs? In civil administration, what successes did he achieve among the people under his rule? He left only one real memorial of his endowment as a statesman, the city by Egypt which bears his name [...] Thus he abolished the rule of the Persians, yet he himself all but never

[29] Cf. Milns 1968: 262: "there is hardly any evidence to show that Alexander was interested in the art of governing or in the welfare of his subjects".

[30] Cf. Sen. *Ben*. 7.2.1: "[n]or did he own the kingdoms that he was holding or had conquered" (trans. Basore).

[31] Cf. Plb. 1.2.5-7. Cf. the theme of Alexander not being able to conquer: he cries when he realises that there is an infinite number of worlds, and he is not able to conquer even one (Plu. *Mor.* 466d). Cf. Val. Max. 8.14, ext. 2.

> ruled (ὥστε Πέρσας μὲν κατέλυσεν ἄρχοντας, αὑτοῦ δ' ἐγγύτατα οὐκ ἦρξεν)" (trans. Oliver).

Thus, this category of incompetence sees Alexander not as paving the way to Rome's sway, and thereby casting him as a failure in hindsight, but rather views him as a failure in his own right, and indeed in his own lifetime, with the Romans proving a *comparandum*.[32]

In modern historiography, the Macedonian loss of authority is portrayed in the context of several cases. Its origins may be in Alexander's treatment of Thebes. See the verdict of Green (1991: 151):

> "In the long run his treatment of Thebes proved one of the worst psychological errors he ever made. Had he spared the city he might, eventually, have reached some genuine accommodation with the Greek states. Now that was out of the question [...] the attitude of the Greeks towards Alexander hardened into a bitter and implacable hatred. Outwardly they collaborated, with cynical obsequiousness. But they never forgave him".

Holt (2005: 85) emphasises the negative role of Greek mercenary soldiers sent in 329/8 BCE to be Alexander's colonists in Central Asia:

> "[Alexander's] efforts to establish control through extensive colonization (in lieu of genuine conquest, or effective compromise) were unsuccessful in the long run because his settlers were no less hostile than his new native subjects to the idea of permanent Greek settlements".

The notable case of Alexander's loss of authority among the Greeks of the mainland is the affair of Harpalus (324 BCE), the treasurer, who fled to Greece with a large sum of money and whom the Athenians refused to deliver to three separate embassies from high-ranking Macedonians demanding him.[33] Similarly, Leosthenes was not prevented from building up a mercenary army in Greece, and Alexander's Exiles Decree was not followed by a force to compel it.[34] The Greek

[32] Cf. Bosworth 1980b: 4. See Oliver 1953: 913-914; Fontanella 2008: 204, 215.

[33] Cf. Hyp. *Dem.* 8.18; D.S. 17.107.7, 108.4-7; Curt. 10.2.1; Plu. *Mor.* 531a, 846b. See Badian 1961: 31-33, 36, 42; Blackwell 1999: 1-31, 133-144, 159-160, at 160: "[d]espite the power of Antipater's and Alexander's armies, and despite the charisma of the king himself, the Macedonians did not establish a coherent structure of authority in Greece".

[34] Leosthenes: Paus. 1.25.5; 8.25.5. cf. D.S. 17.111.3-4; 18.9.1-3. See Blackwell 1999: 144: "[t]he fact that Leosthenes had brought his mercenaries across the sea, and Harpalus had brought his, in both cases without apparent molestation, suggests that Alexander's presence was not strongly felt on the Aegean coast". Cf. Bosworth 1988b: 224-227; Faraguna 2003: 126-130. Exiles Decree: Din. 1.82; D.S. 18.8.2. Cf. Blackwell 1999: 149: "the decree was unenforceable [...] Forcing compliance [...] would probably require not only successful

initiative to grant divine honours to Alexander[35] has been interpreted as another instance of the contemporary awareness of the conqueror's failing authority.[36] According to Green (1991: 453): "He became a god when he ceased wholly to trust his powers as a man, taking the divine shield of invincibility to combat his inner fear of failure [...]".[37]

Scholars have also stressed the fact that Alexander gradually lost effective authority on the Macedonian satraps —like Cleomenes in Egypt[38] and his viceroy in Macedonia Antipater, who showed no intention of being replaced by Craterus.[39] As Blackwell (1999: 159) describes it: "In the final year of Alexander's life the failure of the hegemony became complete. Alexander's personal charisma ascended to new heights, but without in any way reaffirming the position of Macedonia as leader of the Greeks".

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battles, but occupation forces in several cities [...] Antipater could not oblige Alexander in this mater, and by claiming that he would, Alexander illustrated how powerless was the Macedonian presence in Greece". Cf. Briant 2010: 80: "his failure was total".

[35] Demades' proposition (Ath. 6.251b; Ael. *VH*. 5.12; Val. Max. 7.2, ext. 13; cf. Plb. 12.12b.3; Plu. *Mor.* 842d) or Demosthenes' one (Hyp. *Dem*. 31-32; Din. 1.94). See Faraguna 2003: 128. This did not come at Alexander's request, despite the later rhetorical tradition (Ael. *VH.* 2.19; cf. Plu. *Mor.* 219e, 804b), cf. Curt. 8.5.5-24; Iust. 11.11; Arr. *An*. 7.23.2. See Balsdon 1950: 385, 387-388.

[36] Cf. Tarn 1948 II: 370-371; Mossé 2004: 82. As stated by Blackwell 1999: 155: "[t]he Athenians could revere Alexander while continuing to resist his orders [...] By honouring the king as a divinity, the Greeks seem also to have elevated him out of his place in the immediate structure of Macedonian power. As a god, Alexander became extra-political". Cf. Plu. *Alex*. 28.6. This is contrary to the intuitive belief, expressed, for instance, by Waterfield 2011: 8: "Many of his subjects were also ready to acknowledge his godhood [...] because Alexander's achievements were incredible, and incredible achievement was precisely the mark of divinity". This interpretation would make the assertion found in the second letter of Isocrates to Philip (*Ep*. 3.5) that after defeating the Persian king, there would be nothing left for the Macedonian monarch but to become a god (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔσται λοιπὸν ἔτι πλὴν θεὸν γενέσθαι), not a token of extreme success but rather a sign of failure. If the letter is not authentic, as some have doubted (cf. Balsdon 1950: 368), it is a tongue in cheek reference to the problematic character of Alexander's own authority in Greece.

[37] A famous instance is the historically questionable story in which Alexander failed to obtain an oracle from the priestess at Delphi (Plu. *Alex*. 14.6-7; cf. D.S. 17.93.4). When the king used physical violence to force her, by dragging her out of the shrine, she exclaimed: "You are invincible (ἀνίκητος)!", thereby delivering the oracle which he sought. Cf. O'Brien 1992: 46-47. The anecdote turns the obvious failure of authority into a mythical show of strength, as the same epithet was used of Heracles (Tyrt. F 11 West). On the anecdote, cf. Anson 2013: 2: "apocryphal proclamation". Yet cf. a similar story told of Philomelos the Theban in D.S. 16.27.1 with O'Sullivan 2015: 36, 42-43: is it a case of Callisthenes recycling his own anecdotes?

[38] See Arr. *An*. 7.23.6-8 with Blackwell 1999: 118, 158.

[39] For the mission of Craterus, who only reached as far as Cilicia when Alexander died, see D.S. 18.4.1, 12.1; Arr. *An*. 7.12.3-4; Iust. 12.12.8-9.

Before that, Alexander was not able to have authority over the non-Greeks and non-Macedonians. This is true not only in Bactria and in Sogdiana.[40] As a result of his ambiguous attitude towards the Persians, Alexander could not supplant the Achaemenid monarchy. Brosius (2003: 192) is one of the scholars who underscores this fact:

> "Failing to create a bond between the Persian satraps and Alexander, the attitude of the dominant conqueror towards the Persian nobility failed to provide the loyalty and military support he needed to maintain the empire […] the vision of a new empire based upon a Macedonian-Persian elite failed not only due to Alexander's unquestioned position as a conqueror, but also due to Alexander's failure to understand the vital role of the Persian noble class as the extended arm of Achaemenid kingship".[41]

Scholars emphasize the Macedonian inability to control entire areas,[42] or the loss of authority on the Persian satraps. When Alexander returned from the Indian campaign (325/4 BCE), many satraps abused their power, forcing him to treat them harshly.[43] Badian (1996: 22) addresses this fiasco:

> "The failure in India and the disastrous march back through the desert had a serious effect both on him and on his subjects. Both his own belief and theirs in his invincibility, in his control of nature as well as of men, had been profoundly shaken, and he took immediate steps to compensate".[44]

[40] Cf. Holt 2005: 81, 87: "[a]lthough Alexander moved on, native unrest had not been eliminated [...] Alexander's authority in Central Asia was steadily eroded by the very settlements established to maintain it".

[41] Cf. Brosius 2003: 169: "at no point during his conquest Macedonian control over the former Persian empire was absolute" [...] 185: "[...] his ambition to become 'king of Asia' [...] could only be achieved through a continuation of Persian royal policy, which included adherence to the Persian idea of kingship and to royal co-operation with the satraps. But the destruction of the royal centre of the Achaemenid kings in fact had already made Alexander's ambition impossible".

[42] Cf. Cartledge 2004: 178, on the Uxians and Cossaeans, whom the Achaemenids had never subjugated: "Alexander attacked them vigorously, but he too failed to subdue them permanently". Cf. Briant 2010: 80; on other areas, cf. 75.

[43] For example, Orxines, satrap of Persis, was executed (Arr. *An*. 6.30.2-3). Similarly, the satraps Abulites and his son Oxathres in Susiana (Arr. *An*. 7.4.1; Plu. *Alex*. 68.7) and Astaspes satrap of Carmania (Curt. 9.10.21, 29). Cf. Olbrycht 2016: 64-65. Cf. D.S. 17.106.2; Arr. *An*. 6.27.1-4.

[44] Cf. Brosius 2003: 191: "Alexander's inability to consolidate the empire, his long absence from Persia while campaigning in India, meant that no king was in the empire itself. By 325/4 the loss of a royal centre and the lack of a royal power represented in the capitals had led to the disintegration of the empire into individual political units striving for power in the former Persian satrapies". Cf. Briant 2010: 127; 74: "the Achilles' heel of Alexander's newly conquered world".

Closely related to this administrative failure is Alexander's political inability to appoint a successor. As put by Heckel (2008: 151):

> "Alexander's death highlighted his greatest failing as a leader – his refusal to address the question of succession [...] The marshals in Babylon were presented with a thankless choice between an illegitimate (half-barbarian) son, now residing in Pergamum, a mentally deficient half-brother of the dead king, and the as-yet-unborn child of Rhoxane. Even if an acceptable choice could be made, the new ruler would require a regent, and here too Alexander must be blamed for the political turmoil. In the years after the elimination of Philotas and Parmenion, the king had been careful to balance the powers of his younger generals, thus failing to establish a clear hierarchy of command".[45]

As Adams (2005: 258) sees it: "[t]he failure to make those provisions saw his achievements sundered within a few years of Alexander's death [...]".

In two sections of his book on Alexander, Grainger (2007: 87) addresses this administrative malfunction, claiming at one point that "[Alexander's] failure to attend to internal affairs had led to the progressive disintegration of the Persian Empire into its constituent provinces [...]".[46] Grainger (2007: 191) also sets this incapacity in opposition to the ability of his successors:

> "He died in the midst of attempts to impose his authority on his empire, another task he ignored for too long. Even in this he was irresponsible, planning to sail off on a new expedition before the administrative work was properly done. He was incapable of delegating work and responsibility, even though the history of the next 40 years demonstrates that he commanded a group of officers of outstanding ability".

As opposed to the first category, in which the disaster is said to have inflicted Macedonia and Greece and led to their eventual surrender to Rome, here the calamity is considered as having affected all the peoples of the region, who yielded to the Macedonians.[47]

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[45] Cf. Luc. 10.43-45 with Celotto 2018: 331, 337. See Badian 1964: 203: "Alexander was, essentially, not interested in a future without himself". Cf. D.S. 17.16.2; for another view, see Briant 2010: 142-144.

[46] Cf. Bosworth 2002: 2: "Further instability and satrapal insubordination was almost inevitable. His death, it could be argued, simply accelerated the process".

[47] Or, in the words of Lucan 10.34-35: *Terrarum fatale malum, fulmenque, quod omnes | percuteret pariter populos, et sidus inicum | gentibus*. Sen. *Ben*. 1.13.3: *qui summum bonum duceret terrori esse cunctis mortalibus*; cf. Sen. *Nat*. 5.18.10. Grainger 2007: 189-190 again is prominent among the modern proponents of this view: "The conclusion must be that for the former subjects of the Akhaimenid empire the Macedonian conquest was a disaster, something they continued to detest after Alexander was dead, and they wished to escape Macedonian rule as soon as possible".

(3) The third category of failure relates to the campaign itself and covers Alexander's alleged bad military, tactical and strategic decisions and choices involving his soldiers or commanders. Upholders of this attitude point at the numerous mistakes throughout Alexander's campaign.[48] To list but a few, the following are some such errors and faults: ignoring the threat of Sparta while crossing to Asia,[49] disbanding the fleet and the risks involved,[50] harshly treating the Greek mercenaries after the Battle of Granicus,[51] failing to remove the Persians from Halicarnassus,[52] letting Darius enter eastern Cilicia through the Amanic Gates north of Issus,[53] not pursuing Darius eastward after the Battle of Issus,[54] laying a lengthy siege to Tyre,[55] marching to Persepolis from Susa,[56] letting Darius choose the battle site at Gaugamela,[57] appointing wrong persons as satraps, like Satibarzanes in Areia.[58] Just as erroneous were the mishandling

[48] On the contrary, see Fuller 1960; Welles 1965: 228: "Alexander never faltered or made mistakes [...]. He was his own greatest accomplishment".

[49] Badian 1967: 173-174, 181.

[50] See Beloch 1927: 298; Bosworth 1980a: 141-143. Cf. Cartledge 2004: 146, on Alexander's strategy of conquering the Persian fleet from the land: "an act of folly or, on a more generous estimate, a highly risky gamble" and similarly on the siege of Tyre: 149: "without a proper fleet, the Tyrian enterprise was foolhardy, even madcap". Cf. Nawotka 2010: 152, on the Persian counteroffensive in spring 333 BCE, that at that point Alexander's "attempt to defeat the Persian fleet by depriving it of ports in Asia Minor had so far failed" and that he was only assisted by the fact that Memnon died during the siege of Mytilene.

[51] Arr. *An*. 1.16.2; Plu. *Alex*. 16.13-14. Cf. Adams 2005: 131: "It was wasteful and foolish, for there had been nearly 60,000 Greek mercenaries in Persian pay, including several thousand Macedonians, at the beginning of the campaign. Now all of them had no option open to them but to fight to the death".

[52] See Lonsdale 2007: 79.

[53] Cf. Hamilton 1973: 67: "Alexander had blundered badly; either he had failed to discover the existence of the Gates, or, less probably, he had taken no precautions to guard them". Adams 2005: 145: "[i]t was a major strategic blunder". Cf. Nawotka 2010: 166: "the Macedonian army was now in a trap".

[54] Cf. Adams 2005: 258; in this way, Alexander allowed Darius to recover and gather a new army. See, however, Heckel 2008: 65-66.

[55] Adams 2005: 153-154: "illogical [...] costly effort that was basically unnecessary". Cf. Burn 1965: 147: "[h]e was never so near defeat; it was during these months (the first half of 332) that the Persians re-invaded Asia Minor behind him [...] But Alexander was rescued when the navies of Cyprus and Sidon went over to him, and he was able to storm the weaker sea-walls".

[56] Badian 1967: 189: "strategically an error [...] the long wait there was nearly a disaster". See, however, Borza 1972: 242.

[57] Cf. Lonsdale 2007: 62: "operational error of failing to manoeuvre Darius away". See Adams 2005: 153: "another major strategic blunder". Cf. Lane Fox 1973: 229: Alexander may have underestimated the size of army Darius could muster for Gaugamela. Cf. Devine 1975: 384.

[58] Cf. Cummings 1940: 266: "another mistake in judgment". On the futility of these appointments and symbolic gestures, as the visit to Pasargadae, cf. Nawotka 2010: 253: "the desire to acquire legitimacy in Fars was probably doomed to fail from the start, especially while Darius III was still alive".

of affairs in the Turkestan Desert (Kara-Kum) during the pursuit of Bessus,[59] the harsh treatment of Bessus,[60] or the establishment of *Alexandria Eschate* along the Iaxartes River which entailed direct control over exchange and movement[61] and resulted in the inability to conquer or control the upper satrapies of Bactria and Sogdiana (329-327 BCE), whose nobility was resisting Alexander's claim for the rule.[62] Other errors were the nature of the operations in India,[63] the assault on the Mallian city,[64] the logistical fiasco of the march through the Gedrosian

[59] See Vacante 2012: 112: "Alexander's previous march in that region in pursuit of Bessus had turned into a complete disaster". Cf. Curt. 7.5.1-15; Plu. *Alex*. 42.5-10.

[60] Which, according to Heckel 1997: 209: "perhaps sent the wrong message: the rebels should expect no clemency from the conqueror".

[61] See Holt 1995: 55-59; cf. Arr. *An*. 4.1.3-5; Curt. 7.6.12-14; Fraser 1996: 186. See Heckel 1997: 209, on Alexander's campaign to the Iaxartes, which incited years of warfare in the region.

[62] Cf. Vacante 2012: 102: "we should consider the Bactrian-Sogdianian region to be the scene of one of Alexander's worst military failures [...]"; 104: "in spite of the wide military resources, neither the Soviets nor Alexander were able to obtain deep and long-standing control of the occupied territories"; 107: "the strategy based on the destruction of agriculture and pastoral activities damaged mainly the Macedonians and not the insurgents". See Smith 2009/10: 64: "[t]his proved to be one of his largest failures, as his empire was already unravelling even before his premature death in 323 B.C." The casualties "and environmental conditions [...] contributed to unrest and dissatisfaction, which eventually led to the mutiny at Hyphasis". Cf. Howe 2016: 160, 162, 166-177. Holt 2005: 59 on the defeat at the Polytimetus River, where a detachment of Macedonians was ambushed and massacred by the insurgents led by Spitamenes (Arr. *An*. 4.5.2-4.6.2; Curt. 7.7.30-39): "worst military defeat of Alexander's career": cf. 2005: 75-76, 78. Cf. Plutarch's description of Bactrian revolts as "the heads of hydra which ever grew again" (*Mor*. 341f). Indeed, as Müller 2012; 2018: 140-141 asserts, Alexander's marriage to Roxane, a daughter of one of the Bactrian leaders, was an alternative to the Macedonian failure to stand up militarily against the revolt: "the Macedonians may have remembered that Alexander's father Philip II usually married into foreign leading families *after* the establishment of political control over their regions and not *instead* of a military conquest". Cf. Tarn 1948 II: 326; Smith 2009/10: 69. Holt 2005: 69 concludes: "[Alexander] was able, after two very difficult years, to extricate himself from a problem largely of his own making".

[63] Cf. Lonsdale 2007: 64: "as Alexander's tactical actions became ever more brutal, they began to have the negative effect of fanning the flames of resistance, and thus working against the need for stability at the higher levels"; 109: "one of the primary flaws evident during his Indian campaign was the absence of a clear objective"; 139: "when he lost sight of the guidance of policy the campaigns inevitably lost a clear purpose and became more costly and brutal [...] [e]vidence of the failure of this approach can be seen in the increasing resistance to his presence in India [...]".

[64] Cf. Bosworth 1996a: 140: the delay in bringing up the siege apparatus and scaling ladders, was "due to a misunderstanding, ultimately to a failure in command"; that Alexander pushed forward —forcing his troops to follow and break the ladder under their weight— was "the military counterpart to his killing of Cleitus". According to him, Alexander "was beyond control". Cf. Arr. *An*. 6.7.5-6; Plu. *Alex*. 63.2-14; D.S. 17.98-99; Curt. 9.4.26-5.30; Iust. 12.9.4-13.

Desert (Makrān),[65] the needless dangers in which he placed himself[66] and in general Alexander's strategy in the east.[67] Then there were the near disasters, such as Gaugamela. By plunging into the Persian left with his right wing, Alexander created a gap into which the Persian cavalry entered, going straight to pillage the Macedonian baggage rather than attacking the Macedonian left, where Parmeion held against Mazaeus.[68] Heckel (1997: 203) comments on this scene "fortune and the leadership of Parmenion and Craterus would save Alexander's reputation, turning youthful folly into military brilliance". Presumably, Alexander at least recognised the impact of the Gedrosian disaster, as Hamilton (1973: 128) writes: "Alexander was still [...] seeking a scapegoat for a disaster for which he was largely responsible and which seriously damaged his reputation for invincibility".

The crucial blunder, as noted by historians was Alexander's fiasco of not being able to pursue and capture Darius III. Rogers (2004: 99) comments on the Battle of Gaugamela: "The story of Alexander saving Parmenio was a fig leaf created to cover over or explain Alexander's failure to capture or kill Darius at Gaugamela and thus to bring the pan-Hellenic campaign to an end".[69]

[65] See Adams 2005: 212: "why is anyone's guess. There was no strategic reason for it"; cf. Cummings 1940: 400 n. 1: "there were other and more logical plans which, if followed, the disastrous march would have been rendered unnecessary"; Cartledge 2004: 159: "a self-inflicted disaster, the outcome of something like a stroke of tactical insanity" (cf. 186: "a major error of military and perhaps political judgement on Alexander's part", cf. 74); O'Brien 1992: 176: "a *débâcle* of major proportion and without parallel in Alexander's career". Cf. Engels 1978: 110: "Alexander's most formidable opponent was the Gedrosian Desert, which came closer to destroying him and his army than any enemy he ever encountered", yet claims that "[i]t was through the forces of nature, and not through a lack of knowledge concerning the difficulties of the march, that the expedition ended so catastrophically". Cf. Arr. *An*. 6.21.3-26.5; Str. 15.2.3-7; Curt. 9.10.4-18; Plu. *Alex*. 66.4-7; D.S. 17.104.3-106.1; Iust. 12.10.7. Green 1991: 435 asserts "This disastrous march through the desert has been compared, and with good reason, to Napoleon's retreat from Moscow in 1812".

[66] Cf. Holt 1999: 114: "Alexander sometimes took risks that today may seem reckless and irresponsible for a leader. [... it] allegedly illustrates Alexander's failure as a king and is exemplified by the senseless attack upon the Malli in India"; Rice 1997: 91: "he took foolhardy risks". Cf. Arr. *An*. 6.13.4. Cf. the list in Anson 2013: 181-182.

[67] Cf. Lonsdale 2007: 64: "[t]he great military genius seems to have been increasingly motivated by emotional forces, and was thus losing his strategic touch and the loyalty of his men [...] it was difficult to establish an appropriate military strategy that would bring lasting political success [...] it is difficult to extract any real sense of lasting achievement from the Indian campaign". Cf. Gabriel 2015: 151: "Alexander could easily have avoided most of his violent encounters with the Indians".

[68] Cf. Burn 1947a: 118. Cf. Marsden 1964: 59; cf. 53, 64 for Alexander's "gamble". Cf. Devine 1975: 383 on the launching of Menidas' mercenary cavalry as "irresponsible" and "an error of carelessness [...] part of a carefully laid tactical plan that happened to misfire"; cf. Devine 1986: 108.

[69] Cf. Lane-Fox 1973: 241.

The burning of the Persepolis palaces is also mentioned in connection with failure[70] either as itself an example of miscalculation,[71] which forced upon him a continuous fight for legitimacy in the east,[72] or as a result of political failure to gain such acceptance.[73]

Gabriel (2015: 103-104) asserts that Alexander's brutality and violence were in fact harmful to the attainment of his goals:

> "He never regained support in Greece after the Theban massacre, and Sparta rose in open revolt three years later [...] Because of the hatred of the Greeks, Alexander was never able to make good use of the Athenian navy [...] The destruction of Persepolis, the religious capital of the country, only created popular support for the insurgency. Afghanistan was a disaster that cost Alexander thousands of troops and gained him nothing [...] The victory over Porus had no strategic effect except to unify the Indian tribes on the other side of the river to rally and prepare to fight Alexander together [...]".

A major failure involving his men is Alexander's well-known experiment with court protocol in the introduction of the *Proskynesis* (obeisance) as a shared

[70] Arr. *An.* 3.18.11-12; 6.30.1; D.S. 17.72.1-6; Curt. 5.7.2-8, 11; Plu. *Alex.* 38.1-8. Cf. Milns 1968: 138-139. Associated with shame: Curt. 5.7.10-11; Plu. *Alex.* 38.8; Arr. *An.* 6.30.1. Blamed on others (Thais): Cleitarchus *apud* Ath. 13.576d-e with Pearson 1960: 215, 218-219; cf. Berve 1926 II: 175-176, nº. 359.

[71] It failed to persuade the Macedonians to support Alexander's creation of the kingdom of Asia, as Anson 2013: 158-9 notices: "[i]f the purpose of the pillaging of the city and the burning of the palace in Persepolis was meant to change the attitudes of his Macedonians and Greek mercenaries, it was not a successful policy [...] the troops with exuberance prepared for the homeward march [...] It was only with difficulty that Alexander won them back for further campaigning". Some have also compared it with the literary motif of the tyrant, disregarding his "Tragic Warner" (cf. Hdt. 1.88; in this case, Parmenion: Arr. *An.* 3.18.11). See Carney 2000a: 272; cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993: 177-178, 180.

[72] See Badian 1958a: 497; 1967: 187-90; and especially 2000b: 264: "Alexander's failure to capture Darius alive was his one piece of ill fortune; coming on top of his one serious mistake, the burning of the royal palaces at Persepolis, it let him in for years of difficult guerrilla war in the eastern provinces, far more difficult and wearing than the battles he had won". Cf. Green 1991: 319: "such an act finally destroyed any chance Alexander might have had of legitimizing himself as an Achaemenid by peaceful means". Cf. Heckel 1997: 207: "In the long term, the act was detrimental to the cause of Hellenic rule in Asia". It was certainly contrary to one trend of his policy: cf. Iust. 11.6.1. See, however, Borza 1972: 243-4, who presents this as a success: "the end of Persepolis may have discouraged those who would, under other circumstances, have rallied to the Achaemenid's side". Cf. Brosius 2003: 182-3.

[73] See Briant 2002: 852: "Given the impossibility of achieving acceptance by the Persians, Alexander decided to burn the palaces. He thus demonstrated to the recalcitrant Persians that the age of imperial grandeur was over, unless they turned to him *en masse*. The regrets that the Macedonian expressed later imply that, from his point of view, the destruction decree of 330 was vengeance for a political failure". Cf. Briant 2010: 109-110.

and uniform ritual of respect (or veneration) by all of his subjects.[74] Heckel (2009: 46) claims that it "not only proved a dismal failure but increased the alienation of the Macedonian aristocracy", while Cartledge (2004: 125) draws a far-reaching conclusion:

> "The fact that Alexander failed to achieve universal and willing compliance to him from his Macedonian and Greek courtiers in performing ritual obeisance to him is a telling comment on the overall success of his new imperial project as a whole".

Similarly, the plan to include Iranian youths in the army alienated his men,[75] as Nawotka (2010: 349) claims:

> "If the creation of this new army unit had been intended as a political ploy to discipline the Macedonian troops by showing them that they could be replaced by other soldiers, it failed completely [...] soon their pent-up negative emotions would explode".

Lastly, the greatest political debacle with regard to Alexander's men was his inability to compel them, at the Hyphasis-Beas tributary of the Indus, to proceed further, presented as Alexander's inability to lead his soldiers.[76] See the position of Heckel (2008: 123-124):

> "The Hyphasis, more than any other event in Alexander's career, displays a complete failure of leadership in that the king asked his men to do something that was dangerous in the extreme and of questionable value to the success of his campaign. He did nothing to make his proposal palatable to his men, whose personal safety and suffering he utterly disregarded".[77]

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[74] Cf. Arr. *An.* 4.9.9-12.7; Curt. 8.5.1-6.1; Plu. *Alex.* 54.2-6; Iust. 12.7.1-3; 15.3.3. Cf. Hamilton 1969: 150-153, 1973: 105-106; Lane Fox 1973: 322-323; Schachermeyr 1973: 370-85; Goukowsky 1978 I: 47-49; Green 1991: 372-376; Bosworth 1995: 68-90; Anson 2013: 109-114. Cf. the opinion of Bowden 2013.

[75] Arr. *An.* 7.6.1; 8.1-3; Curt. 8.5.1; 10.3.10; D.S. 17.108.1-3; Plu. *Alex.* 47.3, 6; 71.1-5; cf. Iust. 12.11.5-12.10.

[76] Cf. D.S. 17.93-95; Curt. 9.2-3; Plu. *Alex.* 62.1-8; Arr. *An.* 5.24.8-29.2; Iust. 12. 8.10-17. See Hamilton 1969: 170-175; Will 1986: 151-152; Green 1991: 406-411. Cf. Briant 2010: 64: "The weariness and low morale of the soldiers can also be attributed to the brutality of some of Alexander's tactics".

[77] Cf. Green 1991: 410: "For once his infallible charisma had failed him"; Heckel 1997: 213: "The camp and altars erected at the Beas [...] were monuments to Alexander's failure". See Carney 2000a: 283: "the event on the Hyphasis was a failure in discipline brought on by problems in the personal relationship between the commander and his troops". Cf. Martin / Blackwell 2012: 149: "Alexander had dreamed of surpassing Dionysus and Heracles by

It is interesting that Heckel attempts to portray this failure[78] as a success,[79] corresponding to a *motif* frequently employed in ancient literature with regard to Alexander (see more below), in that "the only reasonable conclusion is that [Alexander] wanted to incite the men to mutiny".[80] That is, according to Heckel, Alexander had no serious intention of proceeding "but wanted to place the blame for turning back on the shoulders of his men".[81] Put differently, Alexander staged this failure of authority, in order not to face another failure, the inability to conquer all of India.[82]

A correlation between the physical impact of the campaign and Alexander's failing authority is suggested by Will (1986: 189):

> "As a Macedonian king, he was a leader without troops [...] After the exertions, illnesses and numerous injuries, Alexander was not only physically exhausted, but also lonely and isolated among Macedonians, Greeks and Persians, also mentally at the end of his strength. The death in Babylon was no accident".[83]

In other words, the bodily death was only symptomatic of Alexander's isolation and incompetence, as it were.

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continuing into the unexplored (by Greeks) east until he had encircled the world. Now he had turned away from the dream. The pain of this failure was vivid". In Plutarch (*Alex*. 62.5), the retreat for Alexander was an admission of "defeat" (ἥττα).

[78] Heckel 2008: 124: "the 'abandonment' of the eastern progress must have had left a lingering impression of failure". See Anson 2013: 120: "His failure to conquer India, although the cause was laid at the feet of his reluctant army, still was a blow to the invincible Conqueror".

[79] Not unlike the attempt of some ancient writers to downplay Alexander's failure to reach the Tanais River (Don), the northern frontier of Asia, by making the Iaxartes equivalent to the Tanais: cf. Str. 11.7.4; Plu. *Mor.* 335e; 341c; cf. Pearson 1960: 14, 75-76.

[80] Also in Heckel 2003: esp. 160, 165-166, 172; 2004; 2020: 250-252. The position was proposed earlier by Spann 1999. In another variation of this interpretation, Howe and Müller 2012: 37-38 even claim that the "Alexander planned to end his campaign at the Hyphasis […] By having extended his control over the whole of the Achaemenid Empire at this point, Alexander's mission was accomplished". Cf. Briant 2010: 38. Cartledge 2004: 63 believes the same of another failure, the mutiny in Opis (324 BCE): "there is some reason to suspect that [Alexander] may actually have provoked the showdown as a test of strength".

[81] Cf. Carney 1996b: 35 or Anson 2013: 171-174; 2015, who oppose this view.

[82] Cf. Heckel 2020: 252: "he had set himself up for 'failure' [...] The failure was blamed on the men [...]". Cf. Spann 1999: 68: "[t]he failure to conquer all of Asia, to reach the eastern Ocean was indeed a defeat, but the army was responsible for it". Cf. D.S. 17.9-94. The assertion that Alexander was "fortunate [...] that the army refused to listen to him"; Narain 1965: 156 echoes the rhetorical claim with regard to his hypothetical clash with Rome. See above and cf. Tarn 1948 I: 121.

[83] "Als Makedonenkönig war er ein Führer ohne Truppen [...] Alexander der war nach den Strapazen, Krankheiten und zahlreichen Verletzungen nicht nur körperlich ausgelaugt, sondern zudem, isoliert und vereinsamt zwischen Makedonen, Griechen und Persern, auch psychisch am Ende seiner Kräfte. Der Tod in Babylon war kein Zufall".

(4) The fact that a permanent rule over the conquered areas was eventually not established and that Alexander struggled to preserve his authority is attributed by both ancient and modern historians to the problematic character of the Macedonian king himself. While admitting that Alexander was good at fighting,[84] Grainger (2007: 92) nevertheless condemns him:

> "This was a failure to grow up. In many ways, he was a perpetual adolescent; his superstition, impulsiveness, carelessness with money, extravagant grief over the death of Hephaistion, unwillingness to see that other work needed to be done, love of fighting, all show this".[85]

Indeed, other historians highlight Alexander's irresponsibility[86] and the moral flaws of overall demeanour. One variant was an adapted form of the famous "lucky tyrant" theme,[87] going back to the orator Demosthenes[88] and allegedly to the Peripatetics, who strove to disparage any achievement Alexander may have had, starting from Theophrastus' book on Callisthenes, *On Grief*.[89] In essence, the claim made is that Alexander's successes had nothing to do with virtues but with *Tyche*.[90] Holt (1999: 111) is concerned that this approach may be dominant in the portrayal of Alexander: "The danger now [...] is that the new orthodoxy —a reprehensible Alexander beset by paranoia, megalomania, alcoholism, and violence— may gather a deleterious momentum of its own".

But surely, this portrait is as old as Alexander. In contradiction to certain modern eulogistic portrayals of Alexander, which are not bothered with his immorality, and even explain Alexander's political and military achievements as

[84] According to Grainger 2007: 92, he "clearly enjoyed it more than anything else". Cf. Arr. *An*. 6.13.4.

[85] Cf. O'Brien 1992: 2, 220.

[86] Cf. Arr. *An*. 4.9.5: "it was not displeasing to have the catastrophe ascribed to divine wrath rather than his own moral failure".

[87] It is diametrically opposed to the rhetorical (and ironic) argument set by Plutarch in his essays *De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute*; cf. Wardman 1955: 97-100; Curt. 5.3.22. Luc. 10.21.

[88] See Koulakiotis 2018: 55-56, 60, although (*pace* 43-45) Pseudo-Demosthenes (17) may be a later rhetorical exercise.

[89] D.L. 5.44; cf. Cic. *Tusc*. 3.21; 5.25. One variant is that a virtuous Alexander was corrupted by his fortune; cf. Tarn 1948 I: 82. Badian 1958a: 154-157 argues against the existence of such a "Peripathetic portrait".

[90] Cf. the variant portrayed by Agatharchides of Cnidus (*Peripl.M.Rubr.* 17) of the contrast between the fact that Alexander was invincible on the battlefield, but was most helpless in his personal relationships (ἀήττητος ὢν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, ἀσθενέστατος ἦν ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις). While Alexander is not portrayed as a tyrant here (cf. Malinowski 2018: 117), his moral flaws nevertheless exist and are set apart from his military success. Cf. Milns 1968: 266, on Alexander as "Felix".

resulting from it,[91] the king's gradual despotic lack of moderation and restraints is decried by the ancient historians, starting from the contemporary Ephippus of Olynthus, and most typically by Curtius Rufus.[92] It is associated with his angry fits,[93] excessive drinking[94] and murderousness,[95] especially of capitulating

[91] Cf. Strauss 2003: 138: "Alexander was lucky not only in what he was but in what he was not. He was not given to doubt nor to the contemplation of ethical niceties". Cf. Hegel 1848 [1837]: 333-334; cf. Briant 2010: 61: "a sweeping judgment in harmony with our current values but not with those of Alexander's time"; cf. 86, 140.

[92] Curt. 3.12.19: "If he could have continued to practise such moderation (*continentia*) to the end of his life… he would surely have overcome the faults he failed to conquer (*mala invicta*), his pride and wrath, and thus refrained from murdering his friends at banquets" (trans. Rolfe, slightly amended). See Iust. 9.8.14. See also Sen. *Nat.* 6.23.2. See Anson 2013: 4. Plutarch insinuates Alexander's lack of self-control with respect to the captive Persian royal women. Cf. *Alex*. 21.7-11; 22.3; 30.1 (the wife of Darius died in childbirth). Cf. D.S. 17.38.3-7; Curt. 3.12.18-23; 4.10.18-19, 24; Arr. *An*. 2.12.3-8; 4.19.6; Iust. 11.12.6-7. Cf. Carney 1996a: 571: "In any event, whatever the real nature of the relationship, the theme of Alexander's sexual restraint was clearly intended to cope with rumors that he had not exercised it with Dareios' wife [...] Having a sexual relationship with the wife of Darius would seem to be the sexual equivalent of Alexander's burning of Persepolis (and surprising for the same reasons, in as much as it too jeopardized with the Persians his themes of legitimacy and continuity)". See, however, O'Brien 1992: 76: "[t]he king grieved formally when Darius' beautiful wife, perhaps untouched by Alexander as Pantheia was untouched by Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia,* died in childbirth"; cf. Whitmarsh 2002: 181. See the cluster of accusations against Alexander in Lucian *DMort*. 12; cf. Bosworth 1980a: 221.

[93] E.g., Curt. 3.12.19; 4.2.5, 6.29; 8.1.31, 43; 9.3.18; 10.3.18, 4.3; Plu. *Alex*. 13.2; 50.2; 51.1, 5 (with Hamilton 1969: lxiii); Arr. *An*. 2.16.8; 4.8.7, 9.1; 5.28.2; 7.8.3, 29.1; cf. D.S. 17.9.6. See Maitland 2015. See Sen. *De ira* 3.17.1-3 with Wardman 1955: 104-105. In this respect, Philip is even presented as faring well in comparison with Alexander (Sen. *De ira* 3. 23). Cf. Gabriel 2015: 51, 74-75, 88, 120, 128, 135, 151.

[94] Cf. Plu. *Alex*. 4.7-8; 6.5; 23.8; 38.1-8; 50-51 (esp. 50.9); 67.6; 67.8; 70.1-2; 75.3-6; *Mor.* 65b, 337f, 339f; 623d-f; Curt. 5.7.1; 6.2.5; 9.10.27; Arr. *An*. 4.8.2, 9.1; 7.24.4; D.S. 17.100.2, 106.1, 110.7, 117.1-2; Iust. 9.8.15. cf. Sen. *Ep*. 83.19, 23. *Ben*. 1.13; Ath. 12.538a; Ael. *VH*. 2.41; 3.23. The beginning of this depiction is in Chares (*apud* Plu. *Alex*. 70.1-2 and Ath. 10.437a-b) and Ephippus (*apud* Ath. 3.120d-e; 10.434a-b). See O'Brien 1992: 6-8, 98-99, 216, 252 n. 13; Pownall 2010: 60-61, 64. *Pace Alex*. 23.1-2, which is surely ironic. Note that Aristobulus (*apud*. Arr. *An*. 4.13.5-6) depicts a scene in which it is drinking which saves Alexander's life (cf. 7.29.4).

[95] See Strauss 2003: 140: "taste for blood", 142: "he was also a great killer of innocent people". Cf. Luc. 10.1-35 (echoed later in Racine, *Alexandre le Grand*, Act 1, Scene 2), Sen. *De clem*. 1.25.1; *De ira* 3.17; 23.1; *Nat*. 6.23.2-3; Ephippus (*apud* Ath. 12.538a); Plu. *Alex*. 59.6-8; 72.3-4; Curt. 4.6.29; Val. Max. 9.3, ext. 1; Iust. 9.8.16. Cf. Gabriel 2015: 85, 93-104.

enemies[96] or in the famous episodes in which he kills his companions.[97] As Bosworth (1996a: 30) states: "The price of Alexander's sovereignty was killing on a gigantic scale, and killing is unfortunately the perpetual backcloth of his regime".

He even (2000b: 48-49) compares the atrocities committed by Alexander to those of Spanish Imperialism in America:

> "[...] the campaign against the Malli was deliberately planned to inflict the greatest possible number of casualties [...] there is a clear implication that the majority had perished —and the grossly overused label of genocide may not here be inappropriate. For large areas of Asia the advent of Alexander meant carnage and starvation, and the effects were ultimately as devastating as that of the Spaniards in Mexico. The conquerors created a desert and called it empire".[98]

Moreover, the ancients attributed Alexander's downfall to his *hybris*.[99] In a similar fashion, O'Brien (1992: 229-230) considers Alexander's hybristic demeanour, which offended men and gods alike, the reason for his own undoing:

[96] E.g., in the campaign in the Swat region: Arr. *An.* 4.30.2-4; cf. Lonsdale 2007: 64. See Bichler 2018b: 53: "Alexander's success was overshadowed by his order to have the Indians, who had already offered their submission, massacred on ill-founded suspicion". The massacre of the mercenaries at Massaga in 327 BCE (D.S. 17.84.2; Plu. *Alex*. 59.6-7; Arr. *An*. 4.27.3) —on which Milns 1968: 260 exclaims "no amount of apology can explain his treacherous slaughter"— evoking the memory of the treatment of the Greek mercenaries after Granicus (above), despite the conviction of Cartledge 2004: 113 that "Alexander rarely made the same mistake twice".

[97] Cf. O'Brien 1992: 122: "Philotas and Parmenio caused Alexander more trouble dead than alive […t]he number of men who entertained reservations about the king's virtue now multiplied". Philotas' Execution: Curt. 6.7.1-2.38; Arr. *An*. 3.26.1-3; D.S. 17.79-80; Plu. *Alex*. 48-49; Iust. 12.5.1-8. Badian 1960: esp. 326; nuanced in 2000a: 68 claims that the only conspiracy was that *against* Philotas and the house of Parmenion. Parmenion, his father, was soon executed: Arr. *An*. 3.26.3-4. Milns 1968: 165 and later Cartledge 2004: 69 differentiate between the "judicial murder" in the case of Philotas and an "undisguised assassination" in the case of Parmenion (cf. Tarn 1948 I: 64). Killing of Cleitus the Black: see Arr. *An*. 4.8-9; Curt. 8.1.20-52; Plu. *Alex*. 50-2; Iust. 8.6.4-6; 9.8.4-6, 14-15; 12.6.1-18; Cic. *Tusc*. 4.79; Sen. *Ep*. 83.19; 94.62; 119.7; cf. *De ben*. 5.4.3, 6.1; 7.2.5, 3.1. On both episodes see Milns 1968: 189-194; Hamilton 1973: 103-104, 139, 143-144; Goukowsky 1978 I: 44-47; Carney 1981; Green 1991: 360-366; Bosworth 1995: 45-47, 51-68, 1996b; Adams 2003; Tritle 2003; Briant 2010: 120-126; Stoneman 2013. This impression of Alexander would linger on: cf. Shakespeare, *Henry V*, Act 4, scene 7.12-53 with Quint 1982 and Montesquieu, *De l'esprit des lois* 10.14: "deux mauvaises actions" (along with the burning of Persepolis).

[98] Cf. Bosworth 1986: 12: "[t]hat was the unity of Alexander —the whole of mankind, Greeks and Macedonians, Medes and Persians, Bactrians and Indians, linked together in a never ending dance of death". Cf. Milns 1968: 261: "Alexander's glory was purchased at the cost of hundreds of thousands of dead and maimed".

[99] See, for example, Arrian's comparison (*An*. 5.7.1) of the bridge over the Indus to the proverbial instance of the attempt to defy nature, the bridge of Xerxes over the Hellespont.

> "Alexander exploited mankind and god with relentless perseverance. In the process, his *hybris* offended a deity capable of revealing and expiating mortal deficiencies with artful brutality. Dionysus chose wine as the vehicle through which he would unveil and magnify the defects of a brilliant man who was spiritually blind".[100]

Without reverting to a deity in the historical description, the strictest form of this idea is to explain the political, administrative or military failure by the moral shortcomings.[101] Its ancient manifestation may be found in a well-known symposium scene,[102] in which the drunk Philip, in a quarrel which involves Attalus and Alexander, jumps with his dagger and goes after his son, but eventually trips and falls, eliciting Alexander to say: "This is the man who would lead us from Europe to Asia, and cannot even make it from one couch to another!" Ostensibly, Alexander should fare better than his father, but in fact, this scene subtly reflects upon the future failure of the drunkard Alexander, who would be unable to make the opposite journey from Asia to Europe. Its modern variant was succinctly put by Badian (1962: 91): "After fighting, scheming and murdering in pursuit of the secure tenure of absolute power, Alexander found himself at last on a lonely pinnacle over an abyss, with no use for his power and security unattainable".

A different variant would be to posit Alexander's moral flaws as a means to *solve* a grim political or military situation rather than its cause. Badian (1961: 30) addresses the "reign of terror" after Alexander's return from the East:

> "[T]he King had created an unprecedented and apparently insoluble social problem, which now turned out to be an unprecedented political and military problem as well: a mass of men with nothing to lose, and with military skill and

Cf. A. *Pers*. 130-132; Hdt. 7.21-22, 25, 36-37, 122. Cf. Pearson 1960: 11: "its implication that Alexander also may be calling down the nemesis of the gods". Cf. Cleitus' complaint of Alexander's *hybris* in the comparison of Alexander to the gods, thereby denigrating these divinities (Arr. *An*. 4.8.4). Cf. Curt. 4.10.3; 8.7.13. Alexander complains that Asclepius dealt unkindly to him by letting Hephaestion die (in Arr. *An*. 7.14.5 explicitly compared to Xerxes; cf. Arr. *Epict*. 2.22.17). Cf. the allusion of Arrian (*An*. 7.20.5) to Icarus. Cf. Arr. *An*. 4.12.6 with Schachermeyr 1973: 587; cf. Iust. 11.11.12. Cf. Prevas 2004: 208: "Alexander destroyed himself because he came to believe his own propaganda".

[100] See Plu. *Alex*. 13.4; 75.6; 17.1: κζ. Cf. Ephippus *apud* Ath. 10.434b; D.Chr. *Or.* 64.20 ; Paus. 8.7.8. Cf. Curt. 8.2.6; Arr. *An*. 4.2.5. See Mossman 1988: 85; Koulakiotis 2017: 236-241.

[101] Cf. Fraser 1996: 67, who groups together the incident of killing Cleitus or the imprisonment of Callisthenes with "the substitution of Persian court-dress for Macedonian military accoutrement" as "serious errors of judgement". Cf. Mossé 2004: 107: "[h]e was neither the political and military genius that some have described nor the sage who derived total self-control from Aristotle's teaching"; according to this view, however, Alexander was also not the savage barbarian who razed Thebes and burned Persepolis, but rather "[h]e was a man of his times", affected by the extent of his conquests.

[102] Plu. *Alex*. 9.7-11; cf. Satyrus (*apud* Ath. 13.557d-e); Iust. 9.7.3-5. See Fredricksmeyer 1990: 302.

> training of the highest order, had suddenly been provided with leaders willing and able to use it. Nowhere in the short history of Alexander's reign does his ultimate political failure appear so nakedly as in the spiral of terrorism and fear that culminated in the situation of 324 B.C.".

(5) Other scholars attribute high ideals to Alexander, whom they present as unable to fulfill. These portrayals are based on (mis)interpretations of the ancient texts, as, for example, that of Welles (1965: 220): "If, as Plutarch claims, it had been Alexander's aim to establish a world state defended by one army and governed by one law, he had failed dismally. No accomplishment there."

The most famous example is given by Tarn (1948 I: 137-148, at 137), assuming, based on an interpretation of ancient sources, that Alexander's policy eventually aimed to bring all of humanity as one:[103]

> "Alexander's policy of the fusion of races. It was a great and courageous idea, which, as he planned it, failed [...] And it is doubtful whether, even had he lived, he could have carried out his idea of a joint commonwealth; for his system of Iranian satraps had broken down before he died".[104]

Similarly, Martin and Blackwell (2012: 181-182) maintain:

> "[H]e wanted to go beyond the violent parochialism of traditional Macedonian attitudes towards others by extending his policy of "mixing", from clothing to court protocols to military units to entire populations [...] he aimed to implement his vision of an empire that would surpass anything ever seen before [...] He failed, of course. He died too soon to finish the mission he set for himself. Perhaps the mission was impossible".[105]

From a completely different angle, some German scholars of the NS period blamed Alexander for this imagined policy of "racial fusion" or cosmopolitanism —not for failing to implement it, but for aiming to achieve it in the first place, thus allegedly failing in the tasks of the statesman to protect his own race and nation. Thus, according to Kolbe (1936: 22):

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[103] Arr. *An*. 7.4.4-8, 6.2; 7.11-12; cf. Curt. 10.3.11-14 (Alexander's justification for his marriage to Roxane, in the context of the army's mutiny in 324 BCE) with Baynham 2001: 124-125.

[104] Tarn's assignment of this idea to Alexander was influenced by Droysen 1833 [1877]: for example 216, 346-347, 486-487. For criticism of the attribution to Alexander of an idea of the unity of humankind, see Badian 1958b; Baldry 1961.

[105] They make this claim despite arguing that "[t]he ideal we mention was not a vision of 'unity' or, as Tarn also called it, 'brotherhood' among peoples based on universal equality or sentimentality. Alexander did not believe in equality, and he was not sentimental".

> "Alexander's cosmopolitan ideal [...] deviated far from the natural gravitational line of the people than it could be [...] in the care and development of their own nationality lies the highest, but also the most difficult task of the statesman".[106]

This attitude is reminiscent of that of the ancient Macedonians reacting to the Medizing Alexander.[107]

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It would seem that part of the reason for the appearance of the motif of Alexander's failure in ancient and modern historiography is the faulty nature of the literary, historical evidence at hand.[108] Thus, ostensibly, the failure we find in Alexander stems from the condition of the accounts of his story.

Firstly, from Antiquity to modern times, Alexander's story is a difficult one to narrate.[109] Alexander died before he could manage to oversee and direct an official comprehensive and coherent written version to cover all the aspects of the campaign,[110] including the building of cities bearing his name, the burning of the

[106] "das weltbürgerliche ideal Alexanders [...] viel zu weit von der natürlichen Schwerkraftlinie der Völker abwich, als dass sie von bestand sein könnte [...] : in der Pflege und Entwicklung des eigenen Volkstums liegt die höchste, aber auch schwierigste Aufgabe des Staatsmanns". See Bichler 2018a: 648. Similarly, cf. Schachermeyr 1944: 240-243, that although Alexander was an Indo-Germanic with pure Nordic blood, his goal of universal rule by the fusion of races endangered his own race and people: his "decisive biological sacrilege lies in […] disregarding not so much the race as the people" ("das entschiedende biologische Sakrileg liegt in [...] der Missachtung nicht so sehr der Rasse, wie eben der Volkhaftigkeit"). See Chapoutot 2016: 347; Wiesehöfer 2016: 358-360; Bichler 2018a: 649-650.

[107] Cf. Arr. *An.* 4.14.2; 7.6.2, 5; Curt. 8.7.1-6; Plu. *Alex.* 51.2-5; Iust. 12.5.2-3. Cf. Grote 1856: 359-360: "Macedonians as well as Greeks would have been pure losers by being absorbed into an immense Asiatic aggregate". Cf. Vasunia 2007: 95-98.

[108] This is certainly visible for the post-Alexander period. Cf. Wheatley 2009: 56: "we have a chaotic source tradition to record one of the most chaotic and poorly understood periods in ancient history". Surely, this is no coincidence. Cf. another correspondence noted by Nawotka 2010: 297: "We will most probably never know exactly why Alexander chose to invade India; quite probably Alexander himself did not really know either". Cf. Cleveland 1992: 7: "no account of him is altogether right".

[109] See Wieber 2008: 148: "American film-makers were not interested in Alexander's life as a story of simultaneous success and failure". Cf. Lane Fox 2004: 7-8; Blanshard 2018, on Robert Rossen's movie *Alexander the Great* (1956).

[110] Indeed, to return to the modern popular example, Oliver Stone's version does not cover all the aspects of the campaign. Moreover, its sequence is not coherent. Stone was not pleased with the structure of the theatrical version of his own movie and reassembled the scenes to create three different director's cuts; cf. Petrovic 2008: 182. Whereas the *Theatrical cut* (2004) was 175 minutes long, the *Director's cut* (2005) was 167 minutes long with a different sequence. The *Alexander Revisited: The Final Cut* (2010) was 214 minutes long and the *Ultimate Cut* (2014) was 206 minutes long. Cf. Stone 2010: 341, 343, 345, 347. The narrator in Stone's *Alexander* (the elder Ptolemy) at the end reveals that Alexander was murdered by his companions, but then changes his mind, and orders his slave to "throw

palaces at Persepolis, the appointment of Persians to high offices or the Indian adventure[111] and his own claim to be the king of Asia.[112] Not only did Alexander's life end abruptly, but also there were similar surprising terminations within his own life. Although he began by shaping his own myth and narrative,[113] aware as he was of the power of images,[114] the Macedonian king also obstructed his own PR machine,[115] and gradually lost the plot.[116]

The story told by Callisthenes of Olynthus in his "Exploits of Alexander" (Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις)[117] —indeed, like the very life of this court historian,[118]

all that away" and write instead: "he died of fever and a weakened condition" (a sequence inspired perhaps by Arr. *An.* 6. 1.2-6, 2.5? [two versions of Alexander's letter to his mother]). Ptolemy's irresolution only highlights Alexander's confusion earlier. Cf. Chaniotis 2008: 187: "In this respect, Stone's *Alexander* is indirectly as instructive an essay on history, its methods and limitations". It ironically corresponds to Stone's own alterations of the story line after the movie came out and his toying with the sequence of scenes.

[111] This is reflected in the misunderstanding of the entire Indian campaign. Cf. Lonsdale 2007: 148: "there appeared to be no clear understanding of how these tactical actions would link together at the operational level".

[112] Cf. Badian 1958a: 376: "[h]ow could all this be related to the Hellenic crusade? In fact, of course, it could not". See Hammond 1980: 77: "Alexander was fortunate in having no ideology".

[113] See Whitby 2008: 62-63, on "Alexander's determination to maximise his personal heroic glory" at the Battle of Granicus. Baynham 2001: 121 suggests as much regarding stories of the encounter of Alexander and the Amazons: "if tales of the king's earlier alleged liaison with an Amazon queen were already in circulation, he wished to retain exclusive rights". Cf. Squillace 2018b.

[114] See Plu. *Mor.* 335ab; 360d; *Alex*. 4. 3 [Apelles of Cos and Lysippus]. Cf. O'Brien 1992: 59, 63-64; Anson 2013: 6. See his attempt to invent himself as a youthful ruler: Killerich 1993: 86-90; Stewart 2003: 34-39.

[115] He was also not too pleased with his court poet, Choerilus of Iasus, saying, "I would rather be Homer's Thersites than the Achilles of Choerilus" (Porphyrion ad Hor. *Ep.* 2.3.357). Cf. Arr. *An.* 1.12.1. See Curt. 8.5.8 for other flatterers/poets; cf. Cic. *Arch.* 24.

[116] This happened to Alexander's east-oriented propaganda as well, as Heckel 2008: 96 notes on Bactria and Sogdiana: "Alexander had lost control of the propaganda war, he had failed to win the trust of the ruling elites [...]".

[117] Str. 17.1.43. Pearson 1960: 33: "an encomiastic biography rather than a history".

[118] Cf. Anson 2013: 6; "public relations officer", according to Pearson 1960: 16; "press agent" (Hamilton 1973: 12); "war correspondent and propagandist" in Heckel 2015: 27-28; "chief spin-doctor for the expedition", as Adams 2005: 157, 196 aptly puts it (cf. 137). See Cartledge 2004: 263. Cf. Timaeus *apud* Plb. 12.12b against Callisthenes' flattery. Yet, cf. Plu. *Mor.* 65d. On Callisthenes see Berve 1926 II: 191-199 nº. 408; Pearson 1960: 22-49; Pédech 1984: 15-69; Baynham 2003: 6-7; Heckel 2006: 76-77. His two most memorable scenes are (1) the sea withdrawing and performing *proskynesis* of sorts before Alexander at the foot of Mount Climax in Pamphylia (Plu. *Alex*. 17.6-7; most probably inspired by Hom. *Od*. 11.243-244; cf. Pearson 1960: 36-38; Hamilton 1969: 44; Bosworth 1980a: 164-166; Pédech 1984: 52-54; Montgomery 1993: 94; Zahrnt 1998; Arr. *An.* 1.26.1-2; (2) the journey to the oracle at Siwah (Arr. *An.* 3.3.3-4.5; D.S. 17.49.2-51.4; Curt. 4.7.5-28; Iust. 11.11.2-12; Plu. *Alex*. 26.11-27.11; Str. 17.1.43; cf. Pearson 1960: 33-36; Hamilton 1969: 69; Bosworth 1980a: 269; Howe 2013; O'Sullivan 2015: 39-41, 43. Cf. Lane Fox 1973: 95: "through his efforts Alexander can still be seen as he wished to be seen".

implicated in the so-called Pages' Plot (and executed?) in 327 BCE[119]— ended suddenly.[120] It was never fully replaced by another contemporary author who enjoyed a similar official standing and who could carry the narrative further with the same capacity[121] —although there were certainty other accounts by concurrent participants.[122] There might be thus a grain of truth in Callisthenes' apparent arrogance that it was his narrative, which made Alexander famous.[123] In a way, the historian immortalised Alexander but died before completing it.[124]

Furthermore, Alexander's story lacked a clear opponent or one that could be seen comparable to his stature.[125] In the words of Arrian (*An*. 7.1.4):

> "I have no data from which to infer precisely what Alexander had in mind [...] one thing, however, I feel I can say without fear of contradiction, and that is that his plans, whatever they were, had no lack of grandeur or ambition: he would never have remained idle in the enjoyment of any of his conquests, even had he extended his empire from Asia to Europe and from Europe to the British isles. On the contrary, he would have continued to seek beyond them

[119] Plb. 12.23.3-6; Arr. *An*. 4.13-14; Curt. 8.6.2-8, 20; Plu. *Alex*. 55.3-9. See Hamilton 1969: 153-157; Bosworth 1995: 100.

[120] Cf. Borza 1967: xxi: "the death of Callisthenes brought to a halt the 'official' accounts". According to Müller 2018b: 135-144, Callisthenes' account reached as far as Alexander's campaign in Bactria and Sogdiana, but this is doubtful (cf. her alternative, and more probable, suggestion in 134 n. 10, that it is an echoing of Callisthenes' motifs, such as in Plu. *Alex*. 17.2 or Str. 17.1.43). On Callisthenes' death, see Robinson 1932; Pearson 1960: 48-49; Golan 1988; Shrimpton 2015.

[121] See Pearson 1960: 17: "who offered a reasoned comprehensive interpretation of his character? The fragments give no answer to this question", 20: "even if they offered full-scale portraits, their interpretations were not thought sufficiently interesting to be quoted by any later writer". Some scholars are surprisingly baffled by this reality, like Griffith 1966: ix, who claims that the fact "that this King, who made arrangements unusual at that date for his doings to be recorded [...] should have been handed down finally in history as an enigma" is "one of the paradoxes of history (and of historiography)". Cf. Anson 2013: 3: "it is both peculiar and frustrating that no contemporary narratives of his life have survived".

[122] Cf. Hamilton 1973: 14: "[p]erhaps [...] since it was cut short by the author's arrest, other versions were preferred simply because they were complete".

[123] Rejected by Arr. *An*. 4.10.1-2. Callisthenes may have published his work in Greece in instalments. Cf. Pearson 1960: 23. Yet, cf. Lane Fox 1973: 95; Anson 2013: 6: "the actual provenance of the work is unknown".

[124] Moreover, Bamm 1968: 303: "Callisthenes had every opportunity to become an Alexander among historians. Although a man of great erudition, he failed". On Callisthenes' own Diadochi, as it were, see the following, for example, on Chares, by Pearson 1960: 54: "[i] t is disappointing to find that the fragments do not record more of his personal impressions with regard to the character of Alexander and his marshals".

[125] Cf. Heckel 1997: 216, for the "disaffected Macedonian nobility" as "the internal enemy".

> for unknown lands, as it was ever his nature, if he had no rival, to strive to better his own best"" (trans. de Sélincourt).[126]

By extension, Justin's summary of Pompeius Trogus has Alexander beginning to rage against his own men "with the hatred of an enemy" (12.5.1: *hostili odio saevire in suos coepit*).

Like Arrian, we are limited in understanding key elements in the campaign, oftentimes lacking knowledge of events and their proper sequence.[127] In general, the extant descriptions of the battle scenes are wanting.[128] The writers of the sources did not always follow a chronological sequence, like Plutarch in his biography of Alexander.[129] On occasion, the sources contradict each other about facts and motives,[130] so much so that they reflect differently on the character of Alexander.[131] Our inability to fully grasp Alexander's motivation presumably explains the appearance of the theme of the irrational *pothos* ("desire", "yearning")[132] as a way to understand some of his actions. Each of the lost or the extant accounts is problematic in its own way. Some appear to be biased in

[126] Cf. O'Brien 1992: 18. Cf. Robinson 1957: 328: "[...] his temper, which was his worst enemy".

[127] Cf. Anson 2013: 117: "large gaps in their texts at the relevant points". Cf. Bosworth 1981: 29, on 328 BCE: "[t]here is a lacuna of nearly six months in [Arrian's] chronicle of Alexander's campaigning", while there are too many events in the spring of 327 BCE.

[128] See the criticism of Polybius (12.17-22) on Callisthenes' account of the Battle of Issus. Cf. Tuplin 2010: 152, 154, 156, 159, 169-170, 179, 181, on the problematic descriptions of the role of the cavalry. See Stadter 1980: 93, 95, 99, on Arrian's repeated use of scouts as a feature of Alexander's activity, although it was quite rare in reality and 97-98 on the schematic description of the Battle of Gaugamela, downplaying or omitting incidents. Cf. Marsden 1964: 60. See O'Brien 1992: 93: "Only the barest outline of the battle is recoverable from the surviving accounts [of Gaugamela]". Cf. Bosworth 1976: 16-23, on Arrian's bias which leads him to a false report on the siege of Tyre. Cf. Heckel 2008: 50, on the battle at the Granicus: "Arrian's failure to mention the Thessalians may simply be the result of abbreviation, since he does not give a full account of the battle".

[129] Cf. Oliver Stone's reference to this non-chronological order in Lane Fox 2004: 42.

[130] Cf. Arr. *An*. Pref. 2; Bosworth 1986: 1: "the sources present a series of irreconcilable caricatures of Alexander but no uniform or coherent picture". One case in point is the battle at the Granicus River in 334 BCE: according to Arrian (*An*. 1.14-15), Alexander advanced at once to the attack. Diodorus (17.19.1-3) has him camping in the night and crossing the river at dawn. Cf. Arr. *An*. 4.3.5.

[131] Cf. Cartledge 2004: 129: "[t]here have been many modern Alexanders, a multiplicity due ultimately to the failings of the ancient sources".

[132] Arr. *An*. 1.3.5; 2.3.1; 3.1.5, 3.1; 4.28.4; 5.2.5; 7.1.1, 2.2; *Ind*. 20.1. See Ehrenberg 1938: 52-61; Goukowsky 1978 I: 173-174; O'Brien 1992: 85.

Alexander's favour,[133] or, in other words: their obvious historiographic failure is that they seem to cover Alexander's real failures.[134]

The description of Pearson (1960: 21) concerning these writers holds true:

> "Cleitarchus would not have succeeded so well if he had been preceded by some historians of real Thucydidean quality. But we can go further than that and explain his success by the failure of Alexander's contemporaries to offer a convincing interpretation of his character [...] whatever the reason for it, their failure goes far to explain why later ages were content with such a strange mixture of the heroic and the grotesque".

Furthermore, the focus on the person of Alexander yields a partial story, as succinctly put by Grainger (2007: xvii):

> "Rather as the *Iliad*, one of Alexander's standard references for behaviour, begins *in medias res* with regard to the Trojan War as a whole, and never reveals the result of that war, so a life of Alexander which skips over his father's work and pays no attention to the events which followed his own death neither accounts for his success in a proper way nor shows what he actually accomplished".

Accompanying this focus is the exaggerated sense of self-importance displayed by the writers themselves. Callisthenes' case, quoted by Arrian, was brought above; Arrian himself appears to suffer from the same failing (*An*. 1.12.2-4):

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[133] See Pearson 1960: 16: "all the historians were propagandists of one kind or another, determined to flatter Alexander or to vilify him". Most of them were biased for Alexander. For Callisthenes, see above; on Medius of Larissa as a flatterer, see Plu. *Mor.* 65c-d; 124c. According to Pearson 1960: 10, his contemporaries displayed flattery, and later authors, "romanticism". Billows 2000: 305 points out that Arrian's choice of Ptolemy and Aristobulus as his main sources should actually be a source of criticism: "it is very likely that he could have produced a better, more balanced account had he relied on Callisthenes, Hieronymus, and perhaps Duris or Diyllus, reserving the memoirs of Ptolemy and Aristobulus for supplemental usage". Cf. Baynham 2003: 8: "Arrian's apparent desire to follow such obviously pro-Alexander accounts, has also rendered the reliability of his own history vulnerable." Cf. Stadter 1980: 102: "Arrian's desire to demonstrate Alexander's genius has adversely affected the accuracy of his narrative". On the ''apologetic tendency'' of Aristobulus towards Alexander, see Pearson 1960: 150. For criticisms of Ptolemy as omitting important details, which might shed a negative light on the military campaign, see Pédech 1984: 329. For a hostile contemporary source, see Ephippus of Olynthus with Pearson 1960: 62-64; Theopompus is said to have written both a praise and a condemnation of Alexander (Suda s.v.Ἔφορος, ε 3953 Adler).

[134] Green 1991: 504: "our main account of the Granicus has been doctored to conceal some kind of initial failure", 509: "forced to admit defeat, they turned back across the river. This is the central fact which Ptolemy and Aristobulus are at such pains to conceal". Cf. Beloch 1927: 294-299, on the historiographic tradition that downplayed or falsified Parmenion's role, which was in reality much more crucial; cf. Curt. 7.2.33.

> "Fortunate as Alexander was in other ways, there was a great gap left here, and Alexander's exploits were never worthily spread abroad; no one did so in narrative prose, no one sang of him in verse [...] whence Alexander's exploits are far less known than the minor deeds of past ages [...] That, I declare, is why I have set forth to write this history, not judging myself unworthy to display before mankind the deeds of Alexander" (trans. Robson, slightly amended).[135]

On this self-representation, Hamilton (1973: 22) says: "Arrian's expectation that he had written a masterpiece which would set the record straight was not fulfilled – or deserved. There is no definitive history of Alexander."

Secondly, these limits are enhanced by the imperfect *material* condition of our sources.[136] A great number of works about Alexander, including those written by his own contemporary writers, disappeared. Among them are Callisthenes of Olynthus, Chares of Mitylene, Ephippus of Olynthus, Medius of Larissa, Polyclitus of Larissa, Onesicritus of Astypalaea, Nearchus of Crete, Aristobulus of Cassandria, Ptolemy son of Lagus, Marsyas of Pella or Philippi, Cleitarchus of Alexandria and many others.[137] Our extant secondary sources, all dated to the Roman period, fail to provide access to the lost texts.[138] We are no closer to the lost accounts of Alexander than we are to Alexander the person.[139]

Moreover, some of those texts that we do have are not complete. For instance, the first two books of Curtius Rufus are missing from our manuscripts; his work is lacunose and the text is corrupt; similarly, there are extensive lacunae in Diodorus' Book 17 on the events in Bactria and Sogdiana —items known only from its Table of Contents. As summarised beautifully by Lane Fox (2004: 25): "[t]hink of Alexander's history as a half-finished building which has all the beams and girders in place, but all the gaps unfilled".[140]

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[135] See Bosworth 1980a: 104-107; Montgomery 1993: 94.

[136] Cf. Hamilton 1973: 11.

[137] On these, see Pearson 1960; Hamilton 1969: lvii-lix, 1973: 12-22; Pédech 1984; Bosworth 1980a: 22-29; 1988a: 1-15; 1995: 361-365; Baynham 2003; Zambrini 2007.

[138] Cf. Baynham 2003: 11 on the burning of Persepolis: "[w]e do not know what Ptolemy's account of the conflagration was, since Arrian's version is not only very brief, but loaded with his own opinion, and he seems uncomfortable with the whole affair" and (20): "[g]iven the sophisticated way secondary ancient historians appear to have adapted and shaped their material (as recent analyses have shown), detecting an earlier 'voice' is very difficult". Cf. Stadter 1980: 89, 99-100, on Arrian and Ptolemy (cf. 96).

[139] Cf. Pearson 1960: 1: "we should have a very different impression of Alexander if these secondary authorities had selected their material differently".

[140] This situation has led Badian 1958a: 157 to maintain, sadly, that "[p]erhaps, with what materials we have, a proper history of Alexander cannot be written at all - certainly not for a long time yet". Cf. Bosworth 2000a: 14, on the question of the burning of Persepolis: "given the state of the evidence, it is unlikely that a satisfactory resolution of the problem will ever be achieved".

As we saw in Arrian's passages above[141], the ancients themselves were critical of these two faults of the historiographical accounts, namely, the absence of key elements in the narrative and the material loss of the descriptions. In his *Alexander*, perhaps the most sophisticated literary display of the story and life of the Macedonian king, Plutarch seems to play with these two flaws at the beginning and end of the biography. The first chapter addresses these problems both overtly and implicitly (*Alex*. 1.1-3):

> "It is the life of Alexander the king, and of Caesar, who overthrew Pompey, that I am writing in this book, and the multitude of the deeds to be treated is so great that I shall make no other preface than to entreat my readers, in case I do not tell of all the famous actions of these men, nor even speak exhaustively at all in each particular case, but in epitome for the most part, not to complain. For it is not Histories that I am writing, but *Lives*; and in the most illustrious deeds there is not always a manifestation of virtue or vice, nay, a slight thing like a phrase or a jest often makes a greater revelation of character than battles when thousands fall, or the greatest armaments, or sieges of cities. Accordingly, just as painters get the likenesses in their portraits from the face and the expression of the eyes, wherein the character shows itself, but make very little account of the other parts of the body, so I must be permitted to devote myself rather to the signs of the soul in men, and by means of these to portray the life of each, leaving to others the description of their great contests" (trans. Perrin).

The first chapter is clearly apologetic. Plutarch is aware of the faults of the biography and asks the reader at the outset not to judge it unkindly for omissions. Concerned for his reputation, what Plutarch is saying in effect is that his own project may be deemed a failure by some, for it is partial and incomplete.

Interestingly, modern monographs, like that of Lane Fox (1973: 11), stress the failure to write a *biography* of Alexander instead of his history, quite the opposite of the sentiment expressed by Plutarch:

> "Augustine, Cicero and perhaps the emperor Julian are the only figures from antiquity whose biography can be attempted, and Alexander is not among them. This book is a search, not a story, and any reader who take it as a full picture of Aleander's life has begun with the wrong suppositions".[142]

Similary, Briant (1974: xi) in the first edition of his *Alexandre le Grand* in the *Que sais-je?* series, claims: "This is not a biography. Its aim is rather to consider aspects of

[141] Arr. *An*. 7.1.

[142] Cf. Bosworth 1988b: xi: "[t]his book is in no sense intended as a biography of Alexander, which I consider undesirable to attempt and impossible to achieve". Cf. Chaniotis 2008: 188, who reverses Plutarch's words: "[m]odern historians can write more or less reliable accounts of the times of Alexander and of his campaigns, not of his life".

a historical phenomenon that is not reducible merely to the person of Alexander, however important the role played by that personal element may have been."[143]

Plutarch craftily changes his stated objectives as the chapter progresses: he first presents the choices he makes as deriving from his desire to reach at the truth, almost like a systematic man of science, and yet a better one, for the biographer excels the historian in arriving at reality. Then, he relates to his work as the result of a desire to create something new, almost like an artist.[144] These pursuits, especially from the Platonic point of view, which Plutarch embraced, could not be further apart. The artistic metaphor Plutarch uses to describe his project turns his ostensible impending failure in reaching the truth into success by supplying an ideology for it.

Plutarch presents himself as under no obligation in making his artistic choices and he leaves to others (ἑτέροις) the role of writing meticulous proper history. It is because the others will be doing history in the future that he can indulge in his own art and abbreviate[145] while having no need to excuse himself.[146] In all these features, Plutarch presents his own work as comparable to the deeds of Alexander.[147] The emphasis he places on what some may perceive

[143] "Ce livre n'est pas une biographie. Il tente d'exposer les principaux aspects d'un phénomène historique qui ne peut pas être réduit à la seule personne d'Alexandre, quelle que soit l'importance reconnue de l'élément personnel". Translation in Briant 2010. Recently, however, Martin / Blackwell 2012: xi return to Plutarch's position: "[w]e are therefore diverging from the approach of some prominent modern scholarship on Alexander, especially the opinion that rejects the value of writing the life of such an enigmatic man. We are writing the story of an ancient life".

[144] This is relevant to the criteria he uses in his method of selection; cf. Pearson 1960: 2; cf. 1.12.2-4.

[145] If Arrian has built his narrative in certain places by elaborating Plutarch's account, it is possible that he took his cue from this sentiment. Cf. Steele 1916: 420: "It is not impossible, though it cannot be proved, that some of the statements of Arrian were intended to define more clearly the words of Plutarch, or even to correct what he had written".

[146] Yet, Plutarch presents himself as failing even in this respect: by the time he reaches the final chapter of the biography (*Alex*. 77.1), he asserts that he is giving the report of the so-called royal "Journals" (ταῖς ἐφημερίσιν) "word for word" (κατὰ λέξιν) —that is, he is not abbreviating at all. Cf. Plu. *Art*. 11.11 *vs*. 11.1. Plutarch thus confesses his inability to manage the story. For the question of the authenticity of the *Ephemerides* (the daily records kept by the Macedonian kings) of Alexander, see Pearson 1954/5; 1960: 3; Badian 1968; Goukowsky 1978 I: 199-200; Hammond 1988; 1989a.

[147] On Alexander's concern for his reputation (like the narrator), cf. *Alex*. 4.8; 5.4-6; 42.2-4; 62.6 with Buszard 2008: 194; cf. Sen. *Ben*. 13.1: *homo gloriae deditus*; Arr. *An*. 7.2.2. Cf. Adams 2005: 149. His practice of relinquishing responsibility to others (cf. Milns 1968: 249) is also beautifully presented by the various excuses Plutarch's narrator supplies for Alexander's questionable deeds in the biography: e.g., 4.7; 10.1; 13.4; 50.2 (with Stadter 1980: 223 n. 35). Cf. O'Brien 1992: 31, on the Pixodarus affair: "the poor counsel referred to in the sources can often be explained as a device on the part of apologists to absolve Alexander of complete blame for his mistakes". Cf. the apology in Curt. 10.5.26, excusing Alexander's faults as the result of "fortune or his youth" (*vitia vel fortunae vel aetatis*; cf. Arr. *An*. 7.29.1). Frank 2017: 212-216, 222 is wrong not to see these as tongue in cheek apologia; see also

as his own failure to represent history highlights the question with regard to his protagonist. It also underscores the intricacies of this issue as set between history and historiography.

Ironically, yet more likely intentionally designed by Plutarch, the text of the *Alexander* itself appears to have lost an important section and thus be imperfect. It is said that the MSS as we have them are missing an ending,[148] which incidentally corresponds to the theme of material absence of sources as stated above. The claim was made by many scholars, and, corresponding to alleged damage to the beginning of the parallel *Life* of Julius Caesar, it is believed that a lacuna exists at the juncture of the two biographies.[149] Yet, this may not be true,[150] and Plutarch may have purposely created this image. If so, there was an artistic reason for the abrupt end of the *Alexander*:[151] not only does the *Life* of Alexander ends sharply, like the Macedonian king's actual life, but it also implies a sense of loss or failure at the end.[152] The finale is thus left open-ended, both displaying the character of Alexander as failing to find a middle and moderate path between his uncurbed unrealistic passion for immortal glory and his limited human condition (cf. *Alex*. 42.2),[153] and implying an uncertain heritage. It is like the first chapter, which ends with an open path for future historians to deal with Alexander.

Hamilton 1973: 20: "Plutarch was perhaps [...] too prone to seek to explain away Alexander's failings". For the apparent change of Alexander's goals, see *Alex*. 34.1 (the middle point of the *Life*), 51.2.5; 71.1-2; cf. Arr. *An*. 4.11.7. Cf. Anson 2013: 153, 157, 162-163; cf. Nawotka 2010: 356: "After conquering the Persian Empire and ascending the Achaemenid throne, Alexander no longer cared for the *polis* particularism which was so cherished by the Greeks and which he himself had used so effectively in the first years of his reign". Similarly, Brosius 2003: 173-174: "[i]n the course of his conquests of Persian satrapies Alexander's attitude changed from the ideology-laden slogan of 'Greeks *versus* barbarians' to that of a conqueror who saw himself as 'king of Asia' and adopted Persian dress, the tiara and the girdle, Persian court ceremony, and —unsuccessfully— *proskynesis*". Cf. O'Brien 1992: 94: "After Babylon Alexander would have to claim that he was emancipating the Persians from themselves. Sustaining his persona of liberator would become virtually impossible once Alexander had occupied Susa, the administrative center of the empire, and Persepolis, its ceremonial hub". See also Flower 2000: 120: "[n]o one would deny that Alexander adjusted his policies to suit his needs". Cf. Squillace 2010; 2016: 79; 2018b: 150, who addresses the alteration of the theme of revenge: first in the name of Philip (336 BCE), then in the name of the Greeks (until 331 BCE) and then in the name of Darius (331 BCE).

[148] See Ziegler 1935: 387-390; Hamilton 1969: 217; Pelling *1973; cf.* Manfredini 1993: 22-23.

[149] See Niebuhr 1848 III: 28-29; Ziegler 1935: 387-390; cf. Indelli 1995: 49-50; Pelling 2011: 129-132.

[150] Cf. Lundon 2013; Almagor 2017b: 283 n. 139. See recently Almagor 2022: 16-21.

[151] *Pace* Petrovic 2008: 170 n. 48: "[i]t is […] improbable that Plutarch would end the biography without relating the fates of Roxane and Olympias". Cf. Ziegler 1935: 389: "[e]s ist unmöglich".

[152] Cf. Koulakiotis 2017: 233, on Alexander's loss of charisma and the feeling of abandon by the gods.

[153] Cf. Whitmarsh 2002: 188, on Plutarch's Alexander's physiology as "a pathological deviation from the norm". *Pace* Frank 2017: 211, the *Alexander* is not really "generally

Thus, artistically, in a way that precedes many notions found in modern scholarship, Plutarch is able to connect both the historiographic failure of dealing with Alexander and the historical failure of Alexander the man, binding together the themes explored in this paper. It is thus no wonder that in the text of *Alexander*, Plutarch supposedly fails. In fact, it is also not surprising to find Plutarch portraying Alexander's imitators as failing,[154] given that their model may be seen as a token of failure himself.[155] This brings us full circle to our first category above since the Hellenistic successors of Alexander ultimately failed against the Romans.

Conclusion

In Gordium, Phrygia, during the winter of 334/3 BCE, Alexander was faced with a pointed problem posed by a local ancient tradition, a well-known story that was probably circulated by Callisthenes.[156] According to that tradition, it was said that the rule of all Asia would be granted to whoever would be able to unfasten the complex knot that bound the yoke of the wagon of Gordius, the founder of the Phrygian dynasty, to the wagon's beam, located in the temple of Zeus.[157] Alexander did not untie the knot but instead cut it open with one stroke of his sword.[158] One ancient source relates another version; nevertheless, even in that one, Alexander did not try to unfasten the knot.[159] Arrian gives the impression that Alexander did not report his deed accurately; one may infer that

favourable" of Alexander's reign; the pair of biographies is not only about comparing "Alexander's successes with Caesar's failures in both the political and the moral spheres"; also *pace* Asirvatham 2018a: 355: one of the two "most laudatory pieces on Alexander". For instance, Plutarch's claim (*Alex*. 13.3) concerning Alexander's remorse after the destruction of Thebes, "which made Alexander's milder towards many people" is obviously ironic.

[154] Almagor 2017a: 146 n. 6; Asirvatham 2018b: 223, 233, 235-236, 238, 248.

[155] Cf. Mossman 1992: 97. Cf. Keegan 1987: 91: "His dreadful legacy was to ennoble savagery in the name of glory and to leave a model of command that far too many men of ambition sought to act out in the centuries to come".

[156] See Pearson 1960: 38; Schachermeyr 1973: 161-162. See the very (ultimately) Callisthenean Arr. *An*. 2.3.8, in which there were allegedly thunder and lightning bolts in the night, and signs showing Alexander the way to loosen the knot. It was probably a publicised event; cf. Wood 1997: 49: "[p]erhaps the whole thing was set up, rather as politicians today will have a photo-opportunity stage-managed for them by their handlers. Perhaps, though, this was slightly less controlled"; cf. Heckel 2008: 55: "[it] offered too great a publicity stunt to be ignored".

[157] Cf. Plu. *Alex*. 18.1-4; Arr. *An*. 2.3; Curt. 3.1.14-18; Iust. 11.7.3-16. See Fredricskmeyer 1961.

[158] Plu. *Alex*. 18.3; Curt. 3.1.18; Iust. 11.7.16. Cf. Hamilton 1969: 46-47; Bosworth 1980a: 184-188; Pédech 1984: 367-368.

[159] Aristobulus recounted that Alexander removed a pin that held the knot together: Plu. *Alex*. 18.4; Arr. *An*. 2.3.7. Yet, this would hardly count as "loosened the knot in keeping with the prophecy", as Squillace 2018a: 125 has it.

this was designed to conceal failure.[160] Consequently, Alexander's action became almost proverbial to his resolution,[161] or conversely, his impetuousness.[162] The former interpretation is a clear case of presenting failure as success.[163] As Hamilton (1973: 64) clearly describes it: "Whichever method he adopted, he cheated [...] It is easier to suppose that Alexander was well aware of the propaganda value of 'solving' the problem. And that he had no intention of failing".[164]

Modern, as well as ancient historiography of Alexander III, initially and partially followed the Macedonian king in representing his failures as successes. When Alexander's image also began to be viewed negatively, in Antiquity and, certainly, in the modern era, this attitude was easily substituted into the reverse approach of perceiving Alexander's successes as actual failures,[165] as if Alexander reached India and vanquished his enemies through a series of blunders. What is called for is a more balanced view of Alexander' deeds and his choices when faced with bad alternatives. This, however, is beyond the scope of the present chapter. Alexander is still an enigma, treading on the border between success and failure, historiography and history. In this chapter, I have attempted to present this picture along with its nuances and sub-categories without committing to its truthfulness. I hope I have succeeded in showing some presentations of Alexander's failure(s) as well as the failure(s) of Alexander's presentations.

[160] Arr. *An*. 2.3.8. Cf. O'Brien 1992: 69: "an exasperated Alexander is unsuccessful in every legitimate attempt". Indeed, Tarn 1948 II: 262-263 refuses to believe in the sword-wielding version. Cf. Will 1986: 62.

[161] Cf. Burn 1965: 140; cf. Chamoux 2003: 15: "this story is a perfect illustration of the Conqueror's [...] disinclination to put off action". See Pearson 1960: 38: "Alexander attempts an apparently impossible task, performs it [...]"

[162] Cf. Mossé 2004: 24; Blanshard 2018: 686.

[163] Heckel 2008: 55: "[t]here was, after all, no specific requirement that it be 'untied'. Those who so chose considered the prophecy fulfilled [...] For Alexander it was sufficient to have averted failure". Cf. Adams 2005: 140-1. This is beautifully presented by the historical fiction of V. M. Manfredi, *The Sands of Ammon* (Manfredi 2001: 349-352). Cf. Squillace 2018a: 126. An analogous case is Alexander's gesture when water was brought to him in the Gedrosian Desert (Arr. *An*. 6.26.1-3); as Martin / Blackwell 2012: 152 claim: "Alexander took it before the eyes of his army and poured it onto the sand without taking a sip. The enemy was thirst [...] the message was clear: Alexander could defeat this enemy. As Arrian tells the story, it was as if Alexander had provided a drink for every man in the army".

[164] Cf. O'Sullivan 2015: 46: "[t]o modern eyes, Alexander's behaviour there [...] looks perilously like cheating". Also to ancient eyes: cf. Curt. 3.1.18: "he either tricked the oracle or fulfilled it" (*oraculi sortem vel elusit vel implevit*).

[165] The cue is given by Plutarch again: Alexander was not, after all, the one who loosed (τῷ λύσαντι τὸν δεσμὸν: *Alex*. 18.1) the Gordion knot. Was he indeed the one who utterly dissolved (καταλελύσθαι: *Alex*. 34.1) the Empire of the Persians? Cf. Bowden 2017: 165. Let us conclude with the words of Cuppy 1950: 45: "nothing remained of his work except that the people he had killed were still dead".

Before and after Alexander: Continuity and rupture in the Hellenistic history*

ANTONIO IGNACIO MOLINA MARÍN
Co-Director of *Karanos*
ORCID: 0000-0001-5237-503X

Abstract: Alexander the Great is considered as an agent of change, the opposite of continuity. He was a turning point in history of the mankind. Curiosly, this point of view is shared by scholars independently on their point of view about the Macedonian conqueror. Maybe the best example of this was J. G. Droysen. The main goal of this paper is to show how the historians think that there was a deep transformation in the world with Alexander's conquests. As a result of this, Alexander is the only individual in the Universal History that cannot be explained in his social and historical context, given that he is regarded as a man ahead of his time, a man, indeed, who has no connection with his own people.

Keywords: Alexander the Great, Ancient Macedonia, Vergina, Kausia, Ruler Cult, *Póthos*.

Introduction

To start with, I would like to begin with the most famous sentence quoted by the *Geschichte Alexanders der Grossen* of J. G. Droysen. When this German historian wrote the phrase, he established a way of understanding the legacy of Alexander the Great and expressed very brilliantly in words the conception that every historian has about Alexander: "The Macedonian marked the end of one era and the beginning of other".[2] Therefore, it is possible to find the name of Alexander the Great as a sort of temporal reference point in several publications.

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[2] Droysen 2013: 11: "Der Name Alexander bezeichnet das Ende einer Weltepoche, den Anfang einer neuen".

If we look up the bibliography about Alexander, we can easily find more than one hundred and twenty studies in which the Macedonian is not the main theme, but his name is simply given as an important historical fact. The only person of Antiquity who is used in the same way by historians, and overtakes these numbers, is Jesus of Nazareth, which makes it absolutely clear how significant Alexander is considered in the course of history.[3]

This circumstance is not only due to the traditional denigration of the Eastern civilizations and the idealizing of the Greek west.[4] Another factor to take into account is the widespread opinion that the world was changed completely by Alexander himself and there are several examples in Alexander's historiography which are shown below:

> "All the world, too, made up their minds that the rise of Alexander was a great turning point, when an older volume of history was finished, and a new one begun" (Mahaffy 1887: 2).

> "For, whatever be our verdict on Alexander's actual achievements, his name is rightly associated with a vital change in the aspect of the world" (Abrahams 1927: 5).

> "It will be best to consider first how far this latter verdict, which would make Alexander the turning point in our story" (Baldry 1965: 113).

> "Within the span of thirteen years, he changed the face of the world more decisively and with more longlasting effects than any other statesman has ever done" (Hammond 1980: 268-269).

> "The face of the world was changed within a decade, and the events and the forces at work are worth exposition and discussion, even if the personalities of the main actors are irretrievable" (Bosworth 1988b: 5).

> "Alexander changed the face of the Ancient world forever" (Stewart 1993: 1).

> "Alexander's expedition was a turning point in human history" (Wood 1997: 15).

> "Someone who so much personifies this great turning point in the history of the Western civilization naturally attracts scholarly interest" (Nawotka 2010: VII).

[3] Molina Marín 2018: 191-192.
[4] Bosworth 1996: 5.

After reading remarks such as the mentioned beforehand, the words of B. Brecht inevitably come to mind: "Young Alexander conquered India. He alone?" (*A worker reads history,* 14-15, Grimm 2003: 63). Everyone knows why he asked the previous question. Alexander is a paradigm of the so-called great man theory, namely, an idea according to which, history can be explained by the impact of "great men". Droysen thought of Alexander as a great man who was chosen to change historical events. His opinion is still followed by many scholars who remark the exceptionality of the Macedonian king:

> "Alexander's policy of the fusion of races. It was a great a courageous idea" (Tarn 1948: I.137).
>
> "Alexander's dreams, of course, never received a full test, but they have remained a challenge to humanity to substitute the idea of the solidarity of the world" (Robinson 1949: 304).
>
> "His creation of a state which rose above nationalism and brought liberators and liberated, victors and defeated into collaboration and parity of esteem puts most of the expedients of the modern world to shame" (Hammond 1980: 268-269).
>
> "We also know, given his actions, that he was far ahead of his time, with regard, for example, to integrating cultures and his views on women" (Kurke 2004: 151).
>
> "His farsighted view of an ethnically integrated society was millennia ahead of its time" (Yenne 2010: 196).

Alexander is an agent of change, the opposite of continuity. However, some exceptions can be found. For example, the one stated by Pierre Briant, who highlights the fact that Alexander and his successors took over much of the Achaemenid system, namely, that continuity existed after the Macedonian conquest of Asia more than we think, and therefore, Alexander was, according to this author, the last of the Achaemenids.[5]. Whereas other historians, such as Bosworth, adopt an intermediate position, Briant states that the face of the world was changed within the space of a decade, but refuses to consider "Alexander as the conscious architect of a new epoch of history" (Briant 1988: 5).

As already noted, most scholars affirm that there is no doubt that there has been a deep transformation in the world with Alexander's conquests. However,

[5] Briant 2002: 2.

the few researchers who believe differently are more interested in focusing this debate on Alexander's personality:

> "Alexander was one of the few men who deserve the title "The Great". Most of his defeated enemies, astonished by his clement and magnanimous treatment, became his devoted followers" (Savill 1955: V).

> "I think, from the fact that posterity has never been able to decide whether Alexander was a good guy or a bad guy… Each succeeding era seems to re-create Alexander in its own image" (Allen 2005: 220).

In other words, they call into question whether he actually deserves the title of the Great. The other main issue under discussion is whether he was only a simple tyrant and mass killer or not:

> "A supreme egoist, determined to be the greatest ruler" (Hamilton 1973: 164).

> "He was, nevertheless, a rootless, sadistic, drunken, murderous egomaniac" (Gillis 1977/78: 57).

> "Remember him as a power-hungry megalomaniac, destroyer of many great civilizations, marauder extraordinaire, a rapacious autocrat, and a mass killer" (Bose 2004: 262).

> "Alexander had become "a stone cold killer", just like Achilles" (Gabriel 2015: 96).

The methodology used to study our topic is basically the same as the age of Droysen: the analysis of Alexander's personality. As Flower (2007: 419) recently commented: "Alexander scholars are too fixated on the details of Alexander's life and personality and are stuck in the rut of a rather old-fashioned type of political and military history".

In the last few years, perhaps the best example of this controversy has been carried out by Ian Worthington and Frank Lee Holt.

> "However, does a man deserve to be called "The Great" who was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of his own men and for the unnecessary wholesale slaughter of native peoples? How "great" is a king who prefers constant warfare over consolidating conquered territories and long-term administration? Or who, through his own recklessness, often endangered his own life and the lives of his men? Or whose violent temper on occasion led him to murder his friends and who towards the end of his life was an alcoholic, paranoid, megalomaniac, who believed in his own divinity?" (Worthington 1999: 64).

> "The strong inclination today to de-heroize Alexander has contributed to a new consensus about the King that may be making us careless. Tarn's ideas, in as much as they arose from a prejudiced reading of the sources, have rightly been rejected; but, the corrective back-lash begun so well by Badian has perhaps led us to a new extreme orthodoxy that, too, runs counter to the interests of historical accuracy" (Holt 1999: 117).

Nevertheless, none of these great historians explains which aspects of the world became different after Alexander; their purpose is simply to preserve or destroy the myth linked to his name.

Unlike other great conquerors such as Charlemagne, Genghis Khan or Napoleon, Alexander is not the son of his own time; on the contrary, he is the creator of a new one. It means that according to some scholars he has nothing to do with his contemporaries since he was gifted with some traits or features, like, for example, his *póthos* ("longing, yearning"), which made him different from the Greeks and especially the Macedonians.[6] In fact, some researchers consider Macedonians as rude and primitive, which might be exemplified as follows:

> "Mais, si le people macédonien restait rude et étranger à la culture, la Cour du moins s'était hellénisée" (Flacelière 1962: 42).

> "It is a relatively primitive society, loosely organized" (Edson 1970: 24).

> "Many caracteristic customs within the Macedonian court, which we tend to judge rather as primitive and even barbarous, are archaic features, and we can trace them back to the Mycenaean period" (Marinatos 1970: 48).

> "It is a fact that the ancient Greeks regarded the ancient Macedonians as barbarians" (Gandeto 2002: 149).

Thus, some researchers have maintained that the Macedonians took some cultural elements from other civilizations due to their low level of development. Therefore, it is easy to find terms such as Hellenising[7] or Persianising[8] in Macedonian studies. It implies that Alexander is the only individual in the Universal history that cannot be explained in his social and historical context, given that he is regarded as a man ahead of his time, a man, indeed, who has no connection with his own people. As a result of his distinctiveness, we can

[6] Cf. Molina Marín 2017a; 2018: 192-193.
[7] Sawada 2010: 392; Shea 1997: 62.
[8] Carney 2000: 112; King 2017: 174.

find articles with the title: "The extraordinary ideas of Alexander the Great",[9] or similar.

Also, because of his exceptionality, we are predisposed to study this topic adopting a biographical approach rather than a social-historical one. The considerable number of biographies written about Alexander illustrates this fact, and most of these are only of limited value. In fact, more than 215 biographies were written between 1829 and 2015.[10] By 1976, books based on Alexander were appearing at the rate of more than one per year,[11] but between the period of 2003 and 2006, namely, a year before and after Oliver Stone's movie, 43 books of very different types were published. It is true as stated by U. Wilcken that every researcher has his own Alexander,[12] but it does not mean that all historians have to write a biography of the young Macedonian conqueror. Regarding the Macedonian studies and the biographies about his father Philip, the number is significantly lower.[13] Curiously, the historians who realize it tried to fixed it adding a justification in the need to write again a biography about Alexander:

> "A new monograph therefore requires apology and justification" (Bosworth 1988b, reprint. 2001: xiii).
>
> "There are hundreds of excellent studies available on all aspects of Alexander's life, along with several comprehensive academic biographies in print that surpass mine in detail and technical argument. Why then another book on Alexander? The answer is partially selfish" (Freeman 2011: xxi).
>
> "Why another book on Alexander? It's a good question with, perhaps, not an adequate answer" (Anson 2013: vi).

The simplest solution is that scholars need only to affirm that their studies cannot be considered as such:

> "Augustine, Cicero and perhaps the emperor Julian are the only figures from antiquity whose biography can be attempted, and Alexander is not among them. This book is a search, not a story, and any reader who take it as a full

[9] Robinson 1957: 326-344.

[10] Cf. Molina Marín 2018: 73-75.

[11] Badian 1976a: 279: "In English alone, books on Alexander have been appearing at the rate of at least one per year".

[12] Wilcken 1932: v; Badian 1971: 45: "and here interpreters have tended to see Alexander in the light of their own views or dreams".

[13] Cf. Molina Marín 2018: 231ff.

> picture of Alexander's life has begun with the wrong suppositions" (Lane Fox 1973: 11).
>
> "This is not a biography. Its aim is rather to consider major aspects of a historical phenomenon that is not reducible merely to the person of Alexander, however important the role played by that personal element may have been" (Briant 1974, reprint. 2010: xi).
>
> "This book is in no sense intended as a biography of Alexander, which I consider undesirable to attempt and impossible to achieve" (Bosworth 1988b, reprint. 2001: xiii).
>
> "But in defense I may say that this one is not a biography of that incredible king; it is rather a book about Bactria and Sogdiana" (Holt 1988: ix).
>
> "This is not a biography, and I have said little or nothing about Alexander's youth, his sexual orientation…" (Heckel 2008: IX).

In other words, as Carlsen (1993: 41) stated 26 years ago, the number of studies about Alexander is so vast that it is almost impossible for researchers to know everything that is published about him. A good example is offered by R. Lane Fox, who claimed in 1973 to have consulted 1,472 references between books and articles while he was carrying out his research.[14] Currently, the total number of books and articles is much higher than 3,000 and it can be estimated that more than 200,000 pages have been written about Alexander to date.

Another logical consequence of Alexander being considered a turning point in the history of mankind is that experts from many different disciplines have felt the need to write about him.[15] This diversity of points of view serves to stimulate and contribute to this debate, but at the same time it avoids reaching a conclusion, and thus there is not any advance in our understanding or knowledge of Alexander. Therefore, frequently, we find old arguments and ideas in new publications.

Nevertheless, it is not our intention to bore my colleagues and readers with data and numbers. The main purpose of this paper is to show that this idea of Alexander as a turning point in history is still present among scholars, to the extent that it is the origin of some of the most important controversies in

[14] Lane Fox 1973: 11.

[15] 1) Journalists (Bercovici); 2) Politicians (Belgrave); 3) Doctors (Bamm; Betolotti); 4) Barristers (Tarn); 5) Medievalists (Cantor); 6) Travellers (Freya Stark); 7) Soldiers (Fuller; P. D. Armandi); 8) Novelists (M. Renault; C. Cameron); 9) Sociologists (F. Ferrarotti); 10) Philosophers (M. H. Fisch; B. Russell).

Alexander's historiography. Hence, to give an illustration of what I mean, some examples are shown down below.

Kausia

The kausia is a type of hat that was popularized after the Macedonian conquest of Asia. In 1981, Kingsley developed the very interesting theory that the cap should be identified with the famous Afghan pakol or chitrali. A passage of Diodorus and the absence of evidence in our sources made her think that this was an Asian costume and not Macedonian.

> "There had been many losses among the soldiers, and no relief from fighting was in sight. The hooves of the horses had been worn thin by steady marching. The arms and armour were wearing out, and Greek clothing was quite gone. They had to clothe themselves in foreign materials, recutting the garments of the Indians" (D.S. XVII. 94.2, trans. Walton 1935).

The source of Diodorus is certainly Clitarchus of Alexandria, and his accuracy is questionable, because no other evidence exists for the Macedonian adoption of Indian clothes.

Moreover, Kingsley was inclined to think this way, since she thought it was a period of deep changes and the Macedonians were a people without great customs and traditions. Nowadays, we know that in all probability this cap was Macedonian, given that it appears in some coins before the era of Alexander,[16] such as famous tetradrachm of Philip II. It must be made perfectly clear that the Kausia was very much appreciated among the soldiers who claimed to be of Macedonian background (Plut. *Eum*. 6.1). Therefore, due to our lack of knowledge of the Macedonian traditions and our own wish to see significant changes in history because of Alexander the Great, we have created a historiographical myth from nothing.

Vergina

The frieze of Tomb II of Vergina may be the most exciting example since it is well known that there is a great deal of controversy about the true owner of this tomb.

[16] Le Rider 1996: 44-47; Sheedy 2007: 39.

It is not my intention to resolve this conundrum, on the contrary, from my point of view it is impossible to know who was buried in this tomb with the current data available, but what I do want to reflect on is that yet again this question is marked by our ideas of Alexander the Great. Tomb II of Vergina is a barrel-vaulted tomb. Boyd stated that the true arch was introduced for the first time in the Greek world in the late fourth century BCE after the barrel-vaulted tomb was popularised in Macedonia by military engineers, who had encountered this structural form in Mesopotamia during and after the campaigns of Alexander.[17] It brings to our attention that the Greek world had to wait for Alexander to discover a simple thing such as an arch and a barrel-vaulted tomb. Furthermore, this theory presumes that there were no contacts between Asia and Europe before Alexander, however we know that a constant exchange existed between both regions. Finally, Plato demonstrates in his *Laws* (947d-e) that the Greek world already knew this kind of structure prior to Alexander the Great.[18]

A more complex issue is the hunting frieze from Vergina. Olga Palagia claims that this work was painted after Alexander's death for several reasons specified as follows:

1) First, we can see a *paradeisos* in the image, that is to say, a typical Persian game park. However, P. Aemilius found this sort of space in Macedonia after the Roman conquest (Plb. 31.29.3-4). Undoubtedly, Polybius is describing a *paradeisos*, but it is not known when these were introduced in Macedonia. Athenaeus (12. 531e-f), quoting Theopompus, describes a sacred forest that was used as a game reserve in times of Cotys and Philip II. Thus, it is entirely possible that the *paradeisoi* existed before Alexander, given that Macedonia and Thrace had been Persian satrapies for almost 30 years, and there was a *paradeisos* in every satrapy. Moreover, hunting was the favourite pastime of the Macedonian kings. We cannot conclude when this Persian tradition was adopted, however almost all scholars affirm that it was after Alexander.

2) The second reason is that the main prey represented in the frieze is a lion. In the opinion of Borza and Palagia, we have no confirmation that the Macedonians ever hunted lions in their country before or after Alexander, moreover there is no evidence of the existence of lions in Macedonia after the fifth century.[19] Yet again, we use *argumenta ex silentio* to support a theory. We have to admit that we do not know whether or not there were lions in Macedonia during the fourth century. Moreover, Heracles, the ancestor of the Argead royal house, was a famous hunter

[17] Boyd 1978: 89.

[18] See Posidonius *ap.* Sen. *Ep.* 90.32, who says that Democritus discovered the arch in Egypt.

[19] Borza / Palagia 2007: 95.

of lions, therefore it is not necessary to link this animal to Persian or oriental influences.

3) Finally, Palagia asserts that the iconographical representation of the lion hunter on horseback is another oriental detail, given that in Greek art, the hunter used to kill his prey on foot. It was due to the importance of the hoplite as a paradigm of a warrior, but in Macedonia the phalanx was not developed until Philip II, and the rider-hunter was still the model of manhood. Moreover, in Asia the king hunted alone, whereas in Macedonia the king hunted in a group, that is, with his *hetairoi*.[20]

In a word, as Franks has recently written "this approach not only relies upon the premise that the Macedonians knew little or nothing of Persian (Achaemenid or the closer satrapal) royal culture prior to the campaigns of Alexander, but also on the problematic conception of a single and coherent Persian tradition that existed both in reality and in Macedonian reception" (Franks 2012: 117). Likewise, Greenwalt has stated: "Amyntas III's depiction of the rider/hero hunter makes moot all the discussions about the influence of Persia on the Macedonian royal hunt and any dating of monuments based upon the notion that that influence returned home to Europe only after Alexander's invasion of Asia" (Greenwalt 2015: 348).

Having accepted that Alexander marked an era, the use of diffusionist explanations is almost an obligation for scholars, whereas in contrast, continuity is considered an absurd and eccentric idea.

Without the necessity of setting aside the topic of Vergina, another topic is going to be analyzed now. The diadems found in this tumulus called into question everything known about the royal Macedonian paraphernalia. In 1965, Ritter affirmed that Alexander the Great was the first of the Macedonian kings wearing a diadem as a symbol of his majesty, an item taken from the Persian kings.[21] Scholars such as Lehmann and Prestianni Giallombardo followed this argument to establish a later chronology for Tomb II. Therefore, Philip II could never have been buried with this object.[22] In accordance with the above, Aymard stated a long time ago that Alexander was the first Macedonian ruler who was officially called king after his victory in Gaugamela.[23]

[20] Étienne 2002: 271.

[21] Ritter 1965. Cf. Diod. 17.77.6; Curt. 6.6.4.

[22] Lehmann 1980; Prestianni Giallombardo 1986.

[23] Aymard 1948; Goukowsky 1978-1981: 1.182; Badian 1989; Badian 1996: 12: "The practice seems to carry on into the early years of Alexander, apparently until after the battle of Issus, when he seems to have regarded himself as King of Asia and, at least potentially, as

However, as Calder argues,[24] the word diadem merely means headband and the item found at Vergina is more similar to a crown or *stephanos*, since generally diadems were made of ribbon rather than a metal object. Thus, this object cannot be used to establish a chronology of the tomb.

On the one hand, in a few coins, diadems can be seen on the heads of some Macedonians kings such as Alexander I or Archelaus.[25] This issue, as stated by Andronikos, seems to be on the visual ability of the specialists.

On the other hand, the term *basileus* (king) is witnessed in some inscriptions before Alexander's reign. The most famous of these is the inscription of Lebadea (*SEG* 44.414; *IG* VII 3055 1-15) in which Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III, is called *basileus* by the Lebadeans. Perhaps it is only a polite way to address a member of a royal house, but the same behaviour can be found in other inscriptions in the time of Philip II.[26] It is true that the royal titles were not usually employed by the Macedonians, indeed the first Argead woman to be called queen was Phila, the wife of Demetrius Poliorcetes, however it is nonsense to think that Alexander created *ex nihilo* the titles and symbols of the Macedonian monarchy.[27]

Ruler cult and ancient geography.

If we continue with this analysis, the Alexander´s contribution to two different fields such as the ruler cult and the ancient geography must not be forgotten.

Hence, the subject under discussion is not going to be focused on whether or not Alexander had ever believed in his own divinity, the point is that after him all kings received divine honours in their lifetimes or after their deaths. In no other area of Alexander's historiography, does he appear so clearly as a *terminus post quem*. However, we know from our sources, that Lysander was the first mortal worshipped like a god by the Greeks (cf. Plut. *Lys*. 18). Other names can be added as precedents such as Dionysus of Syracuse,[28] Dion,[29] Clearchus[30] or Agesilaus.[31] In addition, it is almost definite that Philip II flirted with deification on more than

successor to the Achaemenids. There is no persuasive evidence for any change before early 331"; Arena 2004: 226.

[24] Calder 1981; 1983.

[25] Andronikos 1980: 177; Hammond 1982: 117-118.

[26] Hatzopoulos 1996: nº 5; Rhodes / Osborne 1997: nº 76. Cf. Errington 1998.

[27] *SIG*^{3} 333, 6-7. Cf. Carney 1991: 156: "Two major factors, as well as several minor ones, suggest that basilissa did not develop as a title for royal women until at least the period after the death of Alexander and in all likelihood until some time no sooner than 306/305".

[28] Sanders 1991: 275-87.

[29] Diod. 16. 20. 6; Plut. *Dion* 46. 1. Cf. Bosworth 1996: 127.

[30] Burstein 1974: 89-92.

[31] Flower 1988: 123-34.

one occasion during his lifetime.[32] However, in 1981, Badian claimed that the cases cited above were only rhetorical inventions, given that the border between immortals and mortals was very clear to the ancient Greeks. Therefore, Alexander was the first king who demanded to be worshipped as a divinity. Professor Badian during his whole career was a strong exponent of Alexander's megalomania; as a result, his interpretation of Alexander's deification was another negative feature of the Macedonian. On the contrary, Fredricksmeyer thought that Alexander was following the religious politics of his father, Philip II.[33] Once again, the historians are divided between those who consider Alexander as a historical breaking point and the large minority, who want to see continuity in his policy. As we have seen both views are antagonistic and irreconcilable.

The last example is Alexander the Great's contribution to ancient geography. In the opinion of Burstein: "Like the voyages of Christopher Columbus, the campaigns of Alexander the Great marked the beginning of a great age of exploration that profoundly changed western conceptions of world geography" (2000: 31). According to many scholars, Alexander was more of an explorer than a conqueror.[34] His interest in science was genuine and probably the result of Aristotle's effect on him.[35] Therefore, the man who conquered the physical world and the man who changed the intellectual one were united forever in one person. This thought was and is an irresistible temptation for ancient and modern scholars, since the relationship between teacher and student is usually seen as evidence of the influence of the intellectuals in historical changes, namely, we are predisposed to accept this in order to satisfy our own ego.[36]

Although this fact is attested in our sources, most of the data were created with the objective of reflecting the influence of Aristotle on his most famous student, for example, it is said that Aristotle dissected an elephant because of the envoys of Alexander,[37] but this is a myth, given that our main sources never mention that Alexander did this, and Aristotle did not know the difference in size between an Asian and African elephant.[38] Besides, Alexander was not the only Macedonian who was a student of Aristotle, therefore his relationship with his teacher could never have transformed him into something completely different from his fellow students.

[32] O'Brien 1992:11: "Philip only flirted with deification"; Borza 1990: 249-250; Badian 1996; Carney 2000: 22: "Philip II flirted with divine cult".
[33] Fredricksmeyer 1979; 1981; 1982.
[34] Bodson 1991: 129; Dilke 1985: 59.
[35] Bosworth 1988b: 21; Stoneman 1997: 14; Alvar 2000: 84.
[36] Molina Marín 2017b: 295.
[37] Plin *NH* 8.44.
[38] Romm 1989; Bigwood 1993; Fraser 1994.

However, scholars of the entire world agree that Alexander helped to advance science with his conquests.[39] It is true that we have more information after Alexander's invasion of Asia, but the manner of writing about ancient geography is exactly the same. As J. Gerhke has recently declared: "Alexander had not fundamentally changed the Greek vision of the world" (2015: 97). Moreover, according to Russo, Greek science entered into a phase of decline in the late third century BCE,[40] which is in clear contradiction to any significant progress after Alexander. If we want to see a true change in the way of understanding the world, we have to wait for the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century. In other words, after the conquest of Persia, Greek science remained more or less the same, with a few laudable exceptions such as Eratosthenes, Archimedes or Hipparchus. Herodotus and Homer were still the main model for writing geography.[41]

Póthos

Finally, I want to comment on a word closely linked to Alexander that is for many historians a symbol of his exceptionality: *póthos* (longing). Traditionally, *póthos* has been considered as a particular personality trait of Alexander the Great, a yearning or longing to go beyond the unknown. Although many authors use this word, there is an idea widely accepted among scholars that the Macedonian always utilised this term in a different sense. An analysis of our sources confirms that some differences existed in the use of this word by the king and his soldiers, whereas the former seemed to give it a romantic or even mystic meaning, Macedonians only used it in order to reflect nostalgia for their home.[42] V. Ehrenberg stated that it was a true expression of Alexander.[43] Nevertheless, there is evidence, such as Thucydides (6.24.3), in which *póthos* has a similar meaning in the context of the Sicilian expedition. Moreover, Eurydice,

[39] Bucciantini 2015: 98: "The asiatic expedition of Alexander the great not only updated the geographical knowledge that dated back at least to Aristotle, but also created the outcome of a real "revolution" in the arrangement of the world, grasped in his new borders and conquered. We can reconstruct this "revolution" thanks mainly to the fragments from the first generation of Alexander's historians, who were at the same time hetairoi of the king, and who tried to explain the new geographical prospect on the basis of the extant knowledge of the world, explaining the unknown through what was known"; 109: "these accounts share a common element, that is, the authors are fully aware they are exposing an expedition which was destined to change history".

[40] Russo 2004: 231.

[41] Molina Marín 2011.

[42] Alexander: Arr. *An*. 1.3.5; 2.3.1; 3.1.5; 3.3.1; 4.28.4; 5.2.5; 7.1.1; 7.2.2; 7.16.2; *Ind*. 20.1; Macedonians: Arr. *An*. 5.27.6; 7.26.1.

[43] Ehrenberg 1938: 56. Cf. Molina Marín 2017a.

grandmother of Alexander, dedicated an inscription to the Muses that indicated that she felt the same longing:

> Eurydice made this offering to the muses, having conceived a vast love for knowledge. For when a mother with sons grown to manhood she learnt letters, the preservers of knowledge (*Mor.* 14 b-c).

Póthos is again mentioned by Aristotle in his hymn of the virtue written during his stay in the court of Philip II.

In addition, Seleucus shortly after defeating Lysimachus expressed the same feeling: "Seleucus, buoyed by his successess over Lysimachus, set out to cross over to Macedonia, having a longing for his homeland (πόθον ἔχων τῆς πατρίδος)" (Photius = Memnon BNJ 434 F1 8.1). The context tells us that here pothos could be read as longing for conquest, since he had just defeated his enemy and was preparing to take his place on the throne of Macedonia. Keep in mind that according to Borsippa's inscription, Seleucus could have proclaimed himself king of Macedonia before crossing the Hellespont.

Therefore, it is entirely possible that other members of the Macedonian royal house could have used the term *póthos* and could not have been only something related to Alexander.

Conclusions

To conclude, I have shown in this exposition that the only common point in all the historiographical trends is to highlight the exceptional nature of Alexander both positively and negatively. This attitude is persisting to such an extent that the question is whether he deserves the title of the Great, given that he appears before our eyes like a forerunner: the first dreamer,[44] the first mass killer,[45] the first ruler worshipped,[46] the first megalomaniac of antiquity, the first model for ambitious executives,[47] the first king-philosopher, the first true tyrant or the first defender of human rights and women.[48] Heuss was quite right when he said that Alexander is a bottle that can be filled with any wine.[49]

Nevertheless, it is a turning point for all Alexander's scholars. Whatever our personal opinion might be and the reservations of one historian, the events

[44] Tarn 1948.
[45] Hanson 1998.
[46] Badian 1981.
[47] Hasnas 2012, 183-95.
[48] Bosschart 2011.
[49] Heuss 1954: 102.

need to be studied in the historical context and the so-called great men, such as Alexander, have to be seen as exponents and products of their society. On the contrary, scholars of Alexander remain largely untouched by the influences, which have transformed history and classics since 1945. Heckel believes that "there is still much to be said about military matters",[50] but in my opinion the important thing is to contextualise Alexander. How can we evaluate his actions, if we do not pay attention to his background? The key cannot be military matters, but it has to be the kingdom where Alexander was born: Macedonia.

All things considered, Scholars need to stop regarding Alexander of Macedonia as the origin of everything, in both light and darkness. It may be true that Alexander changed the world, but what is unquestionable is that the world has changed the image of Alexander more times than he did. Whether we like it or not, it is time to end this part of the legend which is perpetuated in historiography. It is high time that the Alexander who soars over the world mounted on griffins comes down from the heavens and becomes human.

[50] Heckel 2004, 12.

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Alexander III according to nineteenth century-Hellenic historiography: Paparrhegopoulos and the editions of the *History of the Greek Nation*[*]

GUENDALINA D. M. TAIETTI
University of Haifa
ORCID: 0000-0003-4472-8039

Abstract: This paper discusses the development of Paparrhegopoulos' interpretation of Alexander the Great, and the impact that the *History of the Hellenic Nation* had on the reception of the Macedonians in the nineteenth-century Greek historiography. It also aims to offer an analysis of the possible reasons which triggered the historian's revision of his initial views about Alexander, which followed the traditional interpretation of the Macedonians as barbarians and foreign conquerors of Greece.

Keywords: Alexander the Great, Ancient Macedon, Paparrhegopoulos, Modern Greek Historiography.

In the eighteenth century Europe was overrun by ideals of freedom and progress proclaimed by the Enlightenment and, with the nineteenth century, it saw the diffusion of Romantic ideas, such as confidence in the uniqueness and peculiarity of each population, and claims for national independence. Greece participated in the Eastern Enlightenment, which emerged in Orthodox Christian Academies and reworked core ideas of the Western movement in response to the

[*] For the transliteration of Ancient and Modern Greek words, I have followed the so-called Erasmian convention. Personal and place names which are famous to the English-speaking audience, such as Alexander and Athens, or Greek words which have passed into English in their original or Latinised form, e. g. *hubris* and *oecumene*, constitute an exception to the methodology adopted. Moreover, for Modern Greek toponyms or people's names, I will respect the transliteration by which they became known to non-Greek scholarship (e. g., Rhigas and Korais instead of Rhegas and Coraes respectively).

Abbreviations:
Encheiridion = Paparrhegopoulos 1849.
FGrH = Jacoby 1923-1958.
Historia = Paparrhegopoulos 1953.
IEE = Paparrhegopoulos 1860-1874.
IEE^2 = Paparrhegopoulos 1886-1887.

needs of the different Balkan peoples still living under the Ottoman Empire.[2] From the 1790s onwards, the Greek thinkers of the *diaspora* –educated according to Western standards and enjoying more freedom of speech and action than the intellectuals in the East– became particularly active in informing the masses in mainland Greece in the development of a national consciousness and they, with their writings, prepared the ground for the Greek Revolution of 1821.[3]

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If the Enlightenment brought fresh air to the interpretation of the Classical past, the Hellenic revolutionary movement of 1821-1830 had the merit to awaken the Philhellenes' interest in Greece and its cause for freedom.[4] In their own writings, European intellectuals discussed and revived the ancient Greek spirit, not because they could rediscover a glimpse of it in the modern inhabitants of Greece, but because they interpreted *Hellas* (ancient Greece) as a cultural or politico-philosophical model. In the arts, Neo-classicism spread all over Europe during the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries and applied intrinsic ideas of the Classical Greek Canon, like simplicity and symmetry, to different fields: from literature to sculpture, from music to architecture. In politics, the ancient Greek polis-state, autonomous and free, was interpreted as the prototype of the modern state, the paradigm to follow for the nation-building of modern European countries. It is worth noting that the European scholars were very

[2] Gallant 20015: 40. In the 1750s Western Enlightenment started to have an impact on the Orthodox society living in the Balkans, which led to the creation of the idea of a 'secular Hellenic National identity'; cf. Roudometof 1998: 11-48.

[3] On Greek Enlightenment, see Tabaki 2003: 45-56; for the so-called third generation of thinkers of the Greek Enlightenment, cf. Gallant 2015: 41-45; Brewer 2001: 17-25 on "the Prophets of Revolution" Rhigas Pheraios and Adamantios Korais; Augustinos 2008: 168-200 on Korais. For the Greek Revolution, see Brewer 2001; Gallant 2015: 65-105.

[4] For a definition of European Philhellenism, see Woodhouse 1977: preface IX: "Philellenism was a phenomenon of the second and third decades of the nineteenth century. […] The Philellenes were more than Byron plus an entourage of eccentrics, ruffians and romantics, though there were plenty of all three. They were part of an international movement of protest in which nationalism, religion, radicalism and commercial greed all played part, as well as romantic sentiment and pure heroism"; Most 2008: 201: Philellenism was "the modern enthusiasm for ancient Greece, which gathered force throughout Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century and then climaxed in Germany at the turn of the nineteenth century"; Gallant 2015: 89-91: Philhellenism, Christian humanitarianism and Romanticism motivated many idealistic American and European young men, such as Lord Byron, either to go to Greece and join the conflict or to support the Greeks by raising money for them. Cf. Van Steen 2010; especially 67-108 on Marcellus' description of the reading of Aeschylus' *Persians* in Constantinople in 1820, in order to foster patriotism and to guide Greeks to a revolution against the Turks; Beaton 2014: 47-58 on Shelley's Romantic ideal of Greece and his involvement in the Revolution of 1821; Beaton 2016: 601-617 on the Romantic reception of Greece.

selective in their approach to Greece: it was ancient democratic Hellas –mainly Athens– which found a place in their historical and political narratives, whereas the kingdom of Macedon was either consigned into oblivion or considered an enemy of Greek freedom, and Philip II was remembered as the barbarian *xenos* who destroyed the superior Hellenic genius at Chaeronea in 338 BCE.[5]

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A first turning point in the modern historiographical reception of the Macedonian kingdom was provided by the late-eighteenth century British conservative reaction to the French Revolution and its ideals of liberty, equality, and brotherhood. The anti-revolutionary historians saw in the Argead monarchy a solid antidote to the misrule and decadence of the sectarian Greek *poleis*, and Philip II and Alexander III were enthusiastically welcomed as skilled and liberal kings fighting for a national cause.[6] The second decisive step for the re-evaluation of the Macedonians was taken by the Prussian historian Johan Gustav Droysen (1808-1884). In his *Geschichte Alexanders des Großen* (1833), the historian condemned the Greeks' localism and praised the political unity of the (racially Greek) Macedonians;[7] Alexander is presented as the hero chosen to put an end to the long enmity between Greeks and Persians and to create the basis for a linguistically, culturally and politically unified *oecumene*.[8] Droysen's Alexander is similar to a Hegelian hero,[9] since he brings progress and sets in motion a new era –the so-called Hellenistic period– in which the Greek *pneuma* unified different territories and brought together peoples from the West and the East. Thus, according to Droysen, rather than a brutish conqueror and destroyer of Greek freedom, Alexander III was to be understood as a saviour of the Greeks and a world civiliser. This positive interpretation was dictated by the historian's political beliefs, which were in favour of the unification of Germany into a single nation under Prussian hegemony, and by the consequent need for a historical

[5] Alexander enjoyed a special position in many moralistic and philosophical works from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century French Illuminism, where he was often presented as a model of virtuous prince. However, the focus of these works was restricted to Alexander's person and did not include the cultural and political role that the Macedonians played in Greek history, which, conversely, became crucial in the historiographical production of the nineteenth century. For Alexander's reception in the Middle Ages, see Cary 1967²; in French Enlightenment, see Briant 2017.

[6] Demetriou 2001: 27-29.

[7] Droysen 1877²: 28: "Aber die öffentlichen und privaten Zustände der Griechenwelt waren schwer krank; sie waren hoffnunglos, wenn man fortfuhr, sich im falschen Zirkel zu bewegen"; 31-33; 67-76.

[8] Droysen 1877²: 3-4.

[9] Demetriou 2001: 30. According to Hegel, historical figures such as Alexander the Great and Napoleon were instrumental to the continuous progress of the spirit of History.

counterpart to the divided German states to support his ideas.[10] The factious Greek polis-states were a perfect match to the partition of the German land and, as the Macedonians were awarded the credit for having put an end to the ruinous internal strifes in Greece, similarly the Prussians were welcomed by the historian as the 'new Macedonians', who would unify and pacify the Germans.

Droysen's interest in Macedonian matters and his reassessment of the figure and of the historical role of Alexander the Great were not only innovative in German scholarship, but also extremely influential in Greek historiography. In fact, in the difficult years following the constitution of the Hellenic State in 1830, Konstantinos Paparrhegopoulos (1815-1891) was one of the first Greek historians to welcome Droysen's idea and to understand the importance of integrating the Macedonians in his historiographical system projecting the idea of 'the continuity of Hellenism'.[11] Before the foundation of the modern Hellenic State, the collective consciousness of the Greek-speaking population living in the Ottoman Empire was fluid, and *Rhomiosyne* expressed both their religious status as Orthodox people and their 'political' status as heirs the Roman Byzantine Empire. The Enlightenment emphasised the idea of being *Hellenes* –rather than *Rhomioi*– and the direct connection with the Classical (democratic) past, which the uninterrupted usage of the Greek language also vouched for.[12] It is with Zambelios and Paparrhegopoulos that we see the creation of a National Historiography in Greece, able to reconcile all the differences between being *Rhomios* and being *Hellene* and to create a 'Helleno-Christian civilisation', based on both the Classical and the Byzantine eras. This new way of perceiving Greekness –now a fluid and dynamic force– was the ideological cornerstone for the promotion of a united and independent (modern) Hellenic Nation,[13] but also of irredentist views, such as the *Megali Idea*.[14] The appropriation of Macedonian symbols and history, and their assimilation into the Greek historical narrative

[10] On the political matters which influenced German, French, Bulgarian and Modern Greek historiography, see Kalléris 1954: 36-44.

[11] See also the historiographical production, sources and methodology of Spyridon Zambelios in Oikonomides 1989: 9-15; 26-30; Koubourlis 2012: 17-46. On Zambelios' contribution to emerging Hellenic folklore, see Beaton 1996: 96-97, 106.

[12] Koubourlis 2005: 31-33.

[13] On early attestations in nineteenth-century Greek historiography of the interpretation of Alexander as a means and a symbol of Greek unity, see Demetriou 2001: 54-55, n. 13: further to Paparrhegopoulos and Zambelios, also the erudite philologist Konstantinos Asopios praised Alexander for his Panhellenic views in his lecture on becoming rector of the University of Athens. Cf. Zambelios 1852: 38: Alexander's Persian campaign is defined as "a plan of (political and cultural) catholicism (σχέδιο τῆς καθολικεύσεως) […] of philosophical and political equality of rights (τῆς φιλοσοφικῆς καὶ πολιτικῆς ἰσονομίας), the purpose and the end of the divine thought (σκοπὸς καὶ τέρμα του θείου νοήματος)".

[14] See I. Kolettis' *Megali Idea* in Gallant 2015: 135-136. In 1844, with the term *Megali Idea* the politician Kolettis presented his plan to continue the fight in order to liberate all the territories in which Greeks were a majority, namely Asia Minor.

became the historian's first step to achieve these national political *agenda*. In fact, in his Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους (*History of the Greek Nation*, 5 vols., 1860-1874) Paparrhegopoulos supports the idea that the founders of the ancient Macedonian kingdom were Greek fugitives from Argos (φυγάδες τινὲς Ἕλληνες).[15] To remove all doubts about the Macedonians' ethnicity, the historian also quotes some of the ancient traditions on the Argeads' Heraclid lineage[16] and praises Alexander III as the real king of all the Greeks, who embarked on the Persian campaign not only for his personal ambition to conquer new territories but also with the aim to spread the cultural and artistic achievements of the Greek *pneuma* in Asia.[17] These statements were particularly relevant to the fortunes of the Greek Nation, as they provided the Greeks with a historical pretext to claim the regions covered by the ancient kingdom of Macedon for themselves –a matter still important to today's politicians and historians– and laid the basis for a new interpretation of the uninterrupted vitality of Hellenism, now more flexible, open to different strands of population and comprehensive of a variety of expressions and degrees of Hellenicity.

The continuity of the Hellenic *ethnos* was an idea already present among nineteenth-century Greek intellectuals, but it was restricted to an elitist Athenocentric interpretation of the capacity of the superior ancient *pneuma* to endure foreign (barbaric) rule –be it the Macedonian, the Roman, the Frankish, the Venetian, or the Ottoman– and to repeatedly come back to life. The Modern Greek State formed in the aftermath of the Revolution was thus interpreted as the 'embodiment of the myth of the reborn Phoenix', and a direct link was established between modern and ancient freedom, the Revolution of 1821 and the Persian Wars in the fifth century BCE, the Ottomans and the Persians.[18] According to Paparrhegopoulos instead, the Macedonians were to be considered a Greek people, and neither had the Argead kingdom to be shied away, nor were the Hellenic *ethnos* and its *pneuma* wiped out at Chaeronea in 338 BCE. On the contrary, after the Macedonian period Hellenism progressed in a dynamic way, being able to reinvent itself, to assimilate other cultures, and to develop into

[15] *IEE* II: 4.

[16] *IEE* II: 4.

[17] Cf. *IEE* II: 76; 81: the endeavour was national, Greek (τὸ ἐπιχείρημα ἦτο ἐθνικόν, Ἑλληνικόν). Although still a Macedonian foreigner, Alexander is presented as the bearer of the Greek *pneuma* to the *oecumene* as early as in the *Encheiridion* (see p. 194); see also *Historia* 62; and the preface to *IEE*[2] II: ε': Alexander however did not stop stating by words and actions (δὲν ἔπαυε κυρῶν λόγῳ τε ἔργῳ) that he set forth to Asia fighting in defence of Greece (ὑπέρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀμυνόμενος).

[18] Liakos 2008: 204-208.

the Byzantine Empire, considered by the historian as the real cradle of modern Hellenicity –both Orthodox and politically united under a single king[19].

The inclusion of the Macedonian and the Byzantine periods within the chronological and cultural boundaries of Greek history by Paparrhegopoulos determined a shift in the historiographical narrative, which was now considered a *national* matter and did not have to obey to European visions anymore. Thus, the first constitution of a National Hellenic Historiography juggles between Enlightenment and Romanticism: it inherits the Illuminist understanding of history as continuous progress, but it is characterised by a Romantic attachment to Byzantium (Greek Middle Ages) and folklore,[20] and it ascribes a primary role to Divine Providence. Thanks to these historiographical views expressed in the *History of the Greek Nation*, Paparrhegopoulos became not only the father of modern Greek historiography, but also the spokesman of nineteenth-century Greek national irredentism.[21] As a consequence, nowadays Greeks still refer to him as ἐθνικὸς ἱστορικός, the national historian *par excellence*, and consider him the champion of the idea of Hellenic continuity, since he developed it to connect not only culturally and linguistically, but also ethnically and politically his contemporary Greeks with the Ancients.

The *History of the Greek Nation* was immediately received positively by public opinion;[22] however, in intellectual circles, praise was late to come to Paparrhegopoulos: his innovative historical and cultural system was in fact poorly received by many. Some Greek thinkers, imbued with the values of the European Enlightenment, aspired for the revival of Classical Hellenism and looked at ancient democratic Athens as the highest expression of Western political liberalism and as the only possible model for the newly formed Greek State; they, therefore, despised Paparrhegopoulos for considering the Macedonians (and the

[19] It is worth noting that Paparrhegopoulos was a royalist and supported king Otho of Greece. Monarchy and Orthodoxy, which characterized the Modern Greek state at the time of Paparrhegopoulos, were also the main features of the Byzantine Empire.

[20] It is worth noting that, in contrast to the Macedonians' contested status in Modern historiography, in Greek folklore Alexander the Great has been a Greek hero for centuries, especially due to the popularity of the *Alexander Romance*, and he has covered a protagonist role in many popular tales, songs, mottos and traditions. Cf. Taietti 2019.

[21] Paparrhegopoulos spent three months working in one of Kolettis' newspaper, entitled *Ethinki*, and certainly his irredentist views were forged in this period. Koubourlis 2005: 29-30: Zambelios and Paparrhegopoulos produced historiographical narratives with specific political aims: national unity and territorial expansion for the integration of the Eastern lands which once belonged politically and culturally to the Byzantine Orthodox Empire. Kitromilides 1998: 28: "Paparrhegopoulos managed to bring Byzantium and Kolettis' conception of the Great Idea together as components of the political culture of Romantic Hellenism". On Greek national irredentism and the Philellene King Otto I, see Koliopoulos / Veremis 2010: 28-43; Clogg 2014: 46-57.

[22] Demaras 1986: 227-231. Cf. Kitromilides 1998: 31: the *IEE* offered "a comforting matrix for the self-understanding of Greek identity".

monarchical rules which succeeded after them, i. e. the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Byzantine Empire) as a part of Greek History.[23] Others, such as a group of academics at the Othoneion University, could not accept that the ancient Greek period, the brightest period (λαμπροτάτη περίοδος) of the entire Greek history appeared as a "small and mediocre appendix to the modern period (μικρόν τε καὶ πενιχρὸν τῆς νεωτάτης ταύτης παράρτημα)",[24] not being treated as extensively as it should. Neither were the academics eager to include the Byzantine Empire in their historiographical scheme, since they deemed it a corrupted empire ruled by decadent Emperors, and oppressed by the Church and its obscurantism.[25]

As a matter of fact, the *History of the Greek Nation* caused a big change in Hellenic mindset: the Macedonian kingdom and the Byzantine Empire had been denied a Hellenic status in modern Western historiography for a long period, and, crucially, Paparrhegopoulos himself had not always supported the Macedonians' Greekness and their positive role in Hellenic history.[26] This paper discusses the development of Paparrhegopoulos' interpretation of Alexander the Great, and the impact that the various editions of the *History of the Greek Nation* had on the reception of the Macedonians in the nineteenth century Greek historiography. The paper also aims to provide an analysis of the possible reasons that may have triggered the historian's revision of his initial views.

Paparrhegopoulos' life, works and intellectual development

Konstantinos Paparrhegopoulos was born in 1815 in Constantinople; his family had Arcadian origins, but had moved to Asia Minor for economic reasons. After the outbreak of the Greek Revolution, the Turks killed his father and his family took refuge in Odessa (on the north-western shore of the Black Sea, in today's Ukraine), where he studied at the Lyceum Richelieu. Undoubtedly, the years spent in Odessa –a free city under the protection of the Russian Tzar, in which the ideas of the French Revolution and of the *Philiki Etaireia*[27] were

[23] See, e.g., Korais and the Phanariotes. Koubourlis 2005: 32.

[24] Th. Manousis' words in his evaluation of Paparrhegopoulos' *IEE* for the Ministry of Education, *apud* Karamanolakis 2006: 124. Cf. also Karamanolakis 2014: 121-127.

[25] Karamanolakis 2006: 123-131; cf. especially p. 128: in 1887, after the publication of the second edition of the *IEE*, Stephanos Koumanoudis, Latin Professor at the Othoneion University, wrote a little poem to attack Paparrhegopoulos, in which he calls the historian "a servile corruptor of youth (εἶσαι, Παπαρρηγόπουλε, ὄχ' ἱστορίας συγγραφεύς / ἀλλὰ τῆς νεολαίας μας κολακικὸς διαφθορεύς)". See also Demaras 1970: 212-213; *idem* 1986: 294-298; 318-322.

[26] Cf. Kouburlis 2012: 17-19: Paparrhegopoulos' first historiographical period (1843-1853).

[27] Clogg 2014: 31-38: the Φιλικὴ Ἑταιρεία, or *Friendly Society*, was a secret organisation founded by the Greek *diaspora* in Odessa in 1814. It aimed at "liberating the Motherland from the Ottoman yoke through an armed and coordinated revolt".

circulating– shaped the young Konstantinos and fostered his interests in Hellenic culture and history. In 1830 Paparrhegopoulos moved to Nauplion, where he studied under George Gennadios, one of the most important men of letters of the Greek Enlightenment, also known as "the Teacher of the Nation (ὁ Δάσκαλος τοῦ Γένους)".[28] Although Paparrhegopoulos knew several languages (French, German, and Russian) and was a keen reader, he never completed any studies at university level, which caused a wave of disapproval among the academic community of the University of Athens when he first asked –and repeatedly attempted– to hold the chair of Ancient History in the School of Philosophy. However, in 1850, after a short essay in Latin, which he wrote for the German School of Philosophy, Paparrhegopoulos was awarded the doctoral title *in absentia* by the University of Munich. This academic recognition opened to him the doors of the University of Athens, where he taught the module of Greek History from Antiquity to the Modern era.

Inter alia, in 1843 Paparrhegopoulos published the treaty Περὶ τῆς ἐποικήσεως Σλαβικῶν τινῶν φυλῶν εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον (*On the Slavic colonies in the Peloponnese*), to confute Jacob Fallmerayer's (1790-1861) theory that the indigenous Hellenic population was completely overpowered by the Slavs who settled in the Balkan region between the sixth and the eighth centuries CE.[29] According to this theory, modern Greeks are of Slavic descent and have nothing in common with the ancient Greek people. In the introduction to his treaty, Paparrhegopoulos recognises that, in the period between the destruction of Corinth by the Romans and the Greek Revolution (146 BCE-1821 CE), the Hellenic *ethnos* was significantly transformed, as it had to endure many sufferings from continuous occupations and raids (ἡ ἱστορία τῆς Ἑλλάδος, […] πολυώδυνος […] ἔπαθε πολλὰ ἀπὸ ἀλλεπαλλήλους κατακτήσεις καὶ ἐπιδρομάς), embraced a new religion (προσέλαβε νέαν θρησκείαν), and generated several changes to its language and institutions (ἐτροποποίησε τὴν γλῶσσάν του καὶ ἀνεκαίνισεν ὅλα ἐν γένει τὰ θεμέλια τῆς ὑπάρξεώς του). However, "it carried on its way, guided by the supreme and unexplored law of Divine Providence (ἐπορίσθη, κατὰ νόμον ἀνώτερον καὶ ἀνεξερεύνητον τῆς Θείας Προνοίας), and from all these misfortunes found its moral and material strength (νέα στοιχεῖα ὑλικῆς καὶ ἠθικῆς ἰσχύος)". Finally, the Greek *ethnos* was able to rise up again and to fight for its independence and unity (ἠδυνήθη ν᾽ἀνατείλῃ αὖθις ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς τοῦ κόσμου ζητοῦν τὴν ἀνεξαρτησίαν καὶ τὴν ἑνότητά του). The

[28] On Gennadios, see the lemma Γεώργιος Γεννάδιος, Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Μείζονος Ελληνισμού, Εύξεινος Πόντος, http://blacksea.ehw.gr/Forms/fLemmaBody.aspx?lemmaid=11155#chapter_4 [accessed on 03-09-2017]. For the relationship between Gennadios and Paparrhegopoulos, see Demaras 1986: 111-113.

[29] Fallmerayer, J. 1830-1836: *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea während des Mittelalters*. On Fallmerayer, see Veloudis 1982 and Michalopoulos 2011.

historian also concedes that the Peloponnese received Slavic peoples, as there are several historical and geographical testimonies about their descent to Greece (Ιστορικὰ καὶ γεωγραφικὰ μνημεῖα καθιστῶσιν ἀναμφισβήτητον ὅτι ἦλθόν ποτε Σλάβοι εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον. Ἀναμφίλεκτοι ὅμως μαρτυρίαι βεβαιοῦσιν...) but it did not welcome them as conquerors, nor as brutish destroyers (δὲν ἦλθον ὡς κατακτηταί, οὔτε κατέστρεψαν τὴν χώραν, οὔτε ἐξωλόθρευσαν τοὺς ἀρχαίους αὐτῆς κατοίκους). The Slavs in fact lived together with the ancient indigenous inhabitants peacefully (ἐπῴκησαν εἰρηνικῶς) and, when they tried to rebel, they were conquered not only militarily but also culturally by the Greeks; they learnt the Hellenic language and became Christians (ἐδαμάσθησαν ἐπὶ τέλους ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φυλῆς καὶ δεχθέντες τὴν θρησκείαν καὶ τὴν γλῶσσάν της).

Before starting with an analytic defence of the Hellenicity of several leading figures of the Byzantine period, Paparrhegopoulos concludes the introduction to the treaty stating that the assimilation of the Slavs into the Greek *genos* was so deep that it can be paralleled with the waters of an inflowing river disappearing in a wide sea (ἐσυγχωνεύθησαν ἐντὸς αὐτῆς, καθὼς τὰ ὕδατα τοῦ ποταμοῦ […] ἀφανιζόμενα ἔπειτα ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀχανοῦς ὑγροῦ τῆς θαλάσσης).

On the Slavic colonies in the Peloponnese is an important treaty to understand Paparrhegopoulos' general stances on Hellenicity and Greek history, as in it the historian discusses for the first time concepts that will be the core of his historiographical discourse in the *IEE*: a) the Greek Nation runs on an uninterrupted path, b) it undergoes a progressive development, and c) it is always guided by Divine Providence. In the treaty, Paparrhegopoulos praises the dynamic character of the Greek Nation, since it has been able to keep the Hellenic element alive and at the same time to acclimate to different challenges, which in this case are symbolised by the Slavic invaders threatening the wealth and stability of the country. Furthermore, the historian stresses the importance of the Byzantine period, which had been neglected until then and will become a main topic in his historiographical production of the following years.

Paparrhegopoulos did not miss a chance to highlight the superiority and the continuity of Hellenism: in 1844 he published Τὸ τελευταῖον ἔτος τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐλευθερίας (*The last year of Greek Freedom*), a critical discussion of the ancient sources aimed at disproving the common opinion that the Roman destruction of Corinth brought about the end of Hellenicity, and in 1849 he devoted the Ἐγχειρίδιον Γενικῆς Ἱστορίας (*Manual of General History*) to students of Greek *gymnasia*. As we will later see more analytically, in the *Encheiridion* the Macedonians are described as a barbaric people; despite their foreign origins, they were deeply Hellenised at an early stage, since they lived at the northern border of Greece, and wished to take a share in the superior Hellenic civilisation.

Given his profound knowledge of German, by the time he was writing the *Encheiridion* Paparrhegopoulos was certainly acquainted with the original version of the *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, as also suggested by the footnote in

which he expresses his admiration for Droysen's book on Alexander.[30] However, his Macedonians are still outsiders in a Greek-centred world: they are a warlike *genos*, *clearly distinct* from the Greeks in terms of politics, military strategy, and culture, and Alexander is a sort of barbarian prince who has a fascination for Hellenic language and culture.[31] Possibly, Paparrhegopoulos' inconsistencies can be explained if we assume that he had heard of the *Geschichte* only shortly before sending (or when he had already sent) his final draft of the *Encheiridion* for publication,[32] and he managed to add just minor changes and a single footnote of acknowledgment of Droysen's work, without revising his opinion on Macedonian ethnicity entirely. In fact, it is worth noting that the *Geschichte Alexanders des Großen* was not widely read (nor easily accessible) in Greece until 1859, when the first Greek translation was published by Konstantinos Phrearites.[33] It follows that, until the 1840s, before the diffusion of Droysen's ideas in Greece, Paparrhegopoulos' theories about Macedonian ethnicity and hegemony over Greece were in line with George Grote's views. In fact, they were popular among the Greek intellectual elite of Western upbringing, and later Paparrhegopoulos himself quoted the English historian extensively in the first volume of the *History of the Greek Nation,* dedicated to ancient Greece.[34] Nevertheless, already in the *Encheiridion* his interpretation of Alexander III's personality and aims differed from, and was visibly kinder than, Grote's.

In 1853 Paparrhegopoulos gave to print the first version of the *History of the Greek Nation from the ancient time to today* (Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους ἀπό τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων χρόνων μέχρι τῆς σήμερον), published in a single volume. As the *Encheiridion*, the book was intended for the education of the Greek youth and was

[30] *Encheiridion* I: 206, n. 2: ἀρίστη περὶ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου πραγματεία εἶναι ἡ τοῦ Γερμανοῦ Δροϋζένου.

[31] Cf. *Encheiridion* I: 196-197: with Perdiccas II (462-412 BCE), the army becomes a permanent institution (τακτικὴν στρατιωτικὴν ὑπηρεσίαν); with Archelaos I (412-399 BCE), the process of Hellenisation starts.

[32] Cf. Kouburlis 2012: 25.

[33] Phrearites, K. 1859: Ἱστορία Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μεγάλου κατὰ Δρώϋζεν. Athens.

[34] Demetriou 2001: 39-40. Paparrhegopoulos' admiration for Grote is also proven by the fact that, when he changed his mind about Alexander's role and the genuine aims of the Panhellenic campaign, he criticised him without openly stating his name: cf. *IEE* II: 171: "Some Historians claim that Alexander's politics did not tend to Hellenise Asia, but to Asiatise Greece". Paparrhegopoulos was genuinely critical of this opinion, questioning some historians' negation of an "authentic Hellenic element" in the Macedonian *arche* (but what is to be considered authentic Hellenism and what is fake? τί ἐστι τῳόντι γνήσιος Ἑλληνισμός, καὶ τὶ νόθος;) adding that Pergamon, Ephesus, Alexandria and other places are proof that Greek language, education, art, manufacture and certain institutions were successfully transplanted in the East (*IEE* II: 171-175). Furthermore, in another passage (*IEE* II: 174), the historian states that the greatest result of Alexander's Panhellenic campaign was the diffusion of Greek language, which became the most suitable vehicle of dissemination of the new Christian religion (διευκολύνθη ἡ ταχίστη διάδοσις τῶν ἀληθειῶν ὅσας ἐκήρυξε τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, λαλοῦντας δὲ ἐνταυτῷ τὴν τεχνηκωτάτην καὶ τελειοτάτην τῶν γλωσσῶν).

offered as a didactic tool to teachers and parents; however, it presented a different topic: it was not mankind's general history which interested Paparrhegopoulos anymore, but Greek history in its entirety. In the proem to the book, the historian insists on the didactic value of both modern and ancient Hellenic history,[35] and on his purpose to write an epitome (σύνοψις) of the most important facts, words and actions of the greatest Greeks in order to arouse "dedication to the motherland and virtue (τὴν πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀφοσίωσιν), and respect towards laws and institutions in the hearts of the children (τὴν πρὸς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὐλάβειαν)".[36] The fact that Alexander is named among the greatest Greek leaders is already indicative of the change in the historian's views and aim. The educational role and the relevance of his historical narration are reinforced on page 1, where Paparrhegopoulos gives a definition of history of the Greek Nation and of Greek Nation itself, intended as a narration of all the memorable facts which happened to the Greek speaking people since Antiquity.[37] His belief in the continuity of Hellenism is so strong that he also refers to the history of the Classical period as ancestral history (προγονικὴ ἱστορία).

Droysen's influence on Paparrhegopoulos' thought is visible in his revised interpretation of the Macedonians: in fact, he defends their Greekness stating that the Argeads not only claimed for themselves Heraclid origins, but were *also believed by the other Greeks* to be the descendant of Heracles and Zeus.[38] Moreover, the Macedonians spoke a Greek dialect and participated in the Olympic games. In the *Historia* Paparrhegopoulos also leaves aside ancient Athenian and modern Western biases on the Macedonians, which portrayed them as an uncivilised barbaric people, and visibly starts privileging ancient sources favourable to them, such as Herodotus' account of the Argeads' lineage[39] and of Alexander I's participation in the Olympic games,[40] and Arrian's *Anabasis of Alexander*.[41] As a result of this new interpretation, the

[35] *Historia*: proem α': "children ought to learn about the great deeds of modern times as well as of the Persian wars (μεγάλα κατορθώματα τῶν νεωτέρων χρόνων ἐπίσης καθὼς καὶ τὰ τῶν Μηδικῶν πολέμων)".

[36] *Historia*: proem β'.

[37] *Historia*: 1: Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους λέγεται ἡ διήγησις ὅλων ὅσα συνέβησαν εἰς τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔθνος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαιότατων χρόνων μέχρι τῆς σήμερον, καὶ εἶναι ἄξια νὰ διατηρῶσιν εἰς τὴν μνήμην τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Ἑλληνικὸν ἔθνος ὀνομάζεται ὅλοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὅσοι ὁμιλοῦσιν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν γλῶσσαν, ὡς ἰδίαν αὐτῶν γλῶσσαν.

[38] *Historia*: 57.

[39] Hdt. VIII. 137; 139.

[40] Hdt. V. 22; IX. 45.

[41] Cf. *IEE* II: 106: Paparrhegopoulos considered Arrian the most important among the Alexander-historians for his accuracy (τὰ εἰς πολλὰ ἀκριβῆ τῶν πραγμάτων ἔκθεσιν), and sound judgment (τὴν ἀσφαλῆ περὶ αὐτῶν κρίσιν). The *Anabasis* offered to Paparrhegopoulos a complete account of the Macedonian endeavours in Asia, and a fairly reliable portray of Alexander, which praises the hero without exaggerations or omissions of his less virtuous

Macedonian conquest of Greece did not put an end to Hellenism, but simply started a new political era,[1] characterised by a new form of rule –monarchy– which will accompany the Greek nation also in the Byzantine period.[2]

In the years 1860-1872 Paparrhegopoulos was busy with the writing and publication of his vast *History of the Greek Nation* in five volumes, which he then reworked and expanded in the years 1886-1887.

In 1860s Paparrhegopoulos became involved in several political and cultural corporations (*syllogoi*), and in 1869 he founded the Σύλλογος πρὸς Διάδοσιν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν Γραμμάτων (*Society for the Diffusion of Greek Letters*) together with other eminent Greek intellectuals, with the aim of defending the Hellenic element in regions unjustly claimed by foreign powers.[3] The national historian died in Athens in 1891.

Alexander the Great's evolution in Paparrhegopoulos' historical works from 1849 onwards

In the first book of Paparrhegopoulos' *Manual of General History* (*Encheiridion*), chapter 24 deals within ten pages with the history of the Macedonian kingdom from its mythological times to 336 BCE, although some brief notions of Macedon's geography and ethnography are given in the previous chapters about ancient Greece.[4] Among the Macedonian kings, highest importance is given to Philip II, as he was the ruler who mostly strove to Hellenise his people; moreover, he is awarded with the merit of having expanded and organised the kingdom, and he changed the army radically.

Chapter 25 covers Macedonian history in the period 336-276 BCE.[5] It is divided into four sections: the first, which is the most developed, is dedicated to Alexander the Great's personality and leadership from his accession to the throne of Macedon to the end of the Persian campaign (336-323 BCE); the second, to the decline of the Macedonian *ethnos* after him; the third deals with the Diadochic

deeds. On Macedonian ethnicity and its representation in ancient Greek sources, see Asirvatham 2010: 100-111; Engels 2010: 81-97; Rhodes 2010: 23-39.

[1] *IEE* II: 34: ἑτέρᾳ τις τοῦ Ἑλληνισμοῦ φάσις.

[2] Cf. *Historia*: 2: Paparrhegopoulos divided Greek History in five sections, and described the third one, the Byzantine, as such: "at that time [476-1453 CE] the Greek Nation was free again (κατέστη πάλιν ἐλεύθερον) and obtained its own kings (ἀπέκτησεν ἰδίους βασιλεῖς), whose capital was Constantinople".

[3] Demaras 1986: 240-241.

[4] *Encheiridion* I: 195-205.

[5] *Encheiridion* I: 205-230: Ἱστορία τῆς Μακεδονίας ἀπὸ τοῦ Μεγάλου Ἀλεξάνδρου μέχρι τῆς ὁριστικῆς διανομῆς τοῦ κράτους τὸ οποῖον συνεκρότησεν ὁ δωρικτήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, 336-276 π. Χ. Τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἱδρυθὲν μέγα κράτος, 336-323 π. Χ.

period down to 276 BCE; and the fourth names the ancient sources used by the historian.

According to Paparrhegopoulos, Greeks and Macedonians are not only two racially distinct people, but also differ as to their ethnic constitution: in fact, in the ethnography of ancient Greece, he prompts his modern fellowmen to consider themselves as "authentic offspring of the ancients, because they preserved completely unmixed, pure (οἱ νεώτεροι Ἕλληνες εἶναι γνήσιοι τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπόγονοι, διότι […] διετηρήθησαν ὅλως ἄμικτοι), and, even when they mingled with the foreigners settling down on the Greek mainland from time to time, [...] the Hellenic element was always dominant, so that the foreign elements vanished (ὁ Ἑλληνισμὸς ἀνεδείχθη ἐπικρατέστατος τοσοῦτον ὥστε τὰ ἀλλόφυλα ἐκεῖνα στοιχεῖα ἐντελῶς ἠφανίσθησαν)".[6] Conversely, the Macedonians have no verifiable provenience (ἄδηλον ἐὰν ὑπάγωνται εἰς τὴν Θρᾳκικήν, εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν ἢ εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρικὴν φυλήν), and presented Thracian, Greek, and Illyrian characteristics.[7] The idea of the uncertain and miscellaneous nature of the Macedonians is repeated in chapter 24, centred on the study of their provenience and the civilisation. In a fuller discussion, Paparrhegopoulos states that:

> "According to the most likely opinion, [the Macedonians] were an alloy of Illyrians and Hellenes (κρᾶμα Ἰλλυριῶν καὶ Ἑλλήνων), and the cardinal element of this [the Macedonian] state was Hellenic (καὶ τὸ κυριώτερον στοιχεῖον του κράτους τούτου ἦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικόν), as it follows from its language, traditions and relations with the other Greeks. However, in the account of the fortune of the whole humankind, it is reasonably possible to differentiate the Macedonian period from the Greek one (ἡ Μακεδονικὴ ἐποχὴ δύναται εὐλόγως νὰ διακριθῇ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς), because, in General History, the Macedonian *ethnos* accomplished a different mandate from the Greek people (διότι τὸ Μακεδονικὸν ἔθνος ἐξεπλήρωσεν, ἐν τῇ Γενικῇ Ἱστορίᾳ, ἐντολὴν ἄλλην παρὰ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν)". [8]

In line with Western historiography, up to 1849 Paparrhegopoulos does not consider the Macedonians as fully Greek, distinguishing them both racially and politically. However, it is worth noting that in his works there is room for a positive interpretation of the Argeads.[9] In the introduction to the *Encheiridion*,[10]

[6] *Encheiridion* I: 95.

[7] *Encheiridion* I: 96. In the *Encheiridion* Paparrhegopoulos acknowledges the ancient tradition which links the Macedonians to Heracles, but he presents it as a myth: see *Encheiridion* I: 195.

[8] *Encheiridion* I: 193.

[9] See, e.g., *Encheiridion* I: 202: Greece's decadence and corruption prompted Philip II to move to its conquest. Furthermore, at p. 203 Paparrhegopoulos draws parallels between Macedonian society and the Homeric Greek and Thessalian ones.

[10] *Encheiridion* I: 1.

the historian states that he wants to write general history, defined as a description of all the facts that affected the social life of human kind from Antiquity to modern times. In this narrative, Hellenism has a special position: it is presented as a gift for the entirety of mankind, both because of its intellectual superiority and because it paved the way for the advent of the Christian religion. Within this ideological frame, the 'barbaric' Macedonians are re-evaluated, since they were fully Hellenised by the fourth century BCE, and, in the general history of mankind, they became supporters of Hellenic culture in the Eastern regions of the *oecumene*. Alexander III too is still intended as a non-Hellene, but he is granted with a profound Hellenic education, and he is praised for his world-changing achievements and for his civilising actions in Asia.

Paparrhegopoulos' view in the *Encheiridion* is innovative and, in a way, a compromise: Alexander, although a foreigner, did not put an end to Hellenism but, on the contrary, was its fervent promoter. This positive approach towards the Macedonian conqueror can be reconnected to the historian's wide use of Arrian as a main source and to Droysen's model. In fact, Arrian is quoted by large in the footnotes, and his influence is also visible in the description and interpretation of some ancient facts, such as the attribution of a protagonist role to Ptolemy during the Indian campaign.[11] Droysen's *Geschichte* suggested to Paparrhegopoulos the potential that Alexander III could have in the positive reception of monarchy and in modern nation-building in Greece.

As expected in a volume of general history addressed to middle school students, Alexander's deeds are described succinctly.[12] However, the compelling pace of the narration, which binds the historian to cutting out several events of the Persian campaign, seems to prompt the reader to embrace a positive view of the great conqueror: in fact, the focus is on the final glorious outcome of the Panhellenic enterprise. It seems likely that the historian genuinely admired Alexander III for his courage in battle and value as a leader of the Persian campaign, as his deeds are constantly praised and, more significantly, at the time of the *Encheiridion*, there was no need to force upon the Macedonian any political propaganda or to provide evidence for his Greek origins (as later on). In fact, Alexander comes across as a valiant conqueror and a supporter of Greek knowledge; since Hellenism is the utmost good for humanity, his most brutish actions –taken for the sake of the Panhellenic cause– are underplayed or excused. For example, Thebes is destroyed by Alexander "according to the will of the

[11] *Encheiridion* I: 209. For Arrian's choice of Ptolemy and Aristobulus as main sources, see *An*. I. Pro. 1-2; for Ptolemy's role in the Indian campaign, see *FGrH* 138, F 18; F 20. Cf. Errington 1969: 233-242; Sisti / Zambrini 2004: 441; Howe 2009: 215-233.

[12] Paparrhegopoulos devotes ten pages (*Encheiridion* I: 205-214) to the narration of Alexander's military campaigns from the beginning of his reign to his death (336-323 BCE).

League of Corinth";[13] Philotas[14] and Parmenion[15] are labelled as conspirators;[16] and Hephaestion[17] and Craterus[18] are said "the most favourable to Alexander's plan to mix Asians with Greeks", covertly suggesting that other Macedonians also supported the idea.[19] Moreover, Paparrhegopoulos briefly names the places visited by the Macedonian army during the campaigns in Sogdia and Bactria (329-328 BCE) and, glossing over one of the most disgraceful moments in Alexander's career, he simply adds in brackets: "at that time the slaying of Clitus[20] took place".[21] Similarly, the historian dismisses the army's unrest at the Hyphasis in 326 BCE with a short sentence: "here the voice of the army forces him [Alexander] to go back, and the proclamation of the return [back to Macedon] fills the military camp with joy".[22]

Paparrhegopoulos also expresses great admiration for the moment in which Greek and Macedonian history encountered each other and merged via the figures of Aristotle and Alexander,[23] interpreted as the meeting between the finest Greek philosopher and one of the greatest leaders in the history of mankind. According to the historian, Alexander is the "chosen one", the world-civiliser who brought Hellenism to the entire *oecumene*. It follows that Paparrhegopoulos' Alexander, although a non-Hellene, is not too different from Droysen's hero: he is a tool in the hands of Divine Providence (Θεία Πρόνοια) and a catalyst for historical changes.

After the narration of the events of the Persian campaign, Paparrhegopoulos devotes one page to his reflections about Alexander's character and education:[24] the Macedonian conqueror is defined as "one of the greatest kings (ἕνα τῶν μεγίστων βασιλέων)", granted with an excellent education (ἐξαίρετος ἀνατροφή). In his praise of Alexander, Paparrhegopoulos does not hesitate to state even that in the fourth century BCE "the world needed a man capable of carrying it over from the models of democratic life to monarchic ones (ὁ κόσμος εἶχε χρείαν

[13] *Encheiridion* I: 206.
[14] Berve 1926: 393-397, n. 802; Heckel 2006: 216-219, n. 4.
[15] Berve 1926: 298-306, n. 606; Heckel 2006: 190-192.
[16] *Encheiridion* I: 208.
[17] Berve 1926: 169-175, n. 357; Heckel 2006: 133-137.
[18] Berve 1926: 220-227, n. 446; Heckel 2006: 95-99.
[19] *Encheiridion* I: 208.
[20] Berve 1926: 206-208, n. 427; Heckel 2006: 86-88, n. 2.
[21] *Encheiridion* I: 209: τότε συνέβη ἡ ἀναίρεσις τοῦ Κλείτου.
[22] *Encheiridion* I: 210: Ἐνταῦθα ἡ φωνὴ τοῦ στρατοῦ βιάζει αὐτὸν εἰς ὑποχώρησιν, τὸ δὲ ἐπανόδου κήρυγμα ἐμπλήθει τὸ στρατόπεδον ἀγαλλιάσεως.
[23] *Encheiridion* I: 193: Μάλιστα δὲ περίεργος καὶ ἀξιομνημόνευτος εἶναι ἡ κατὰ τὰ μεθόρια τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ τῆς Μακεδονικῆς ἐποχῆς σύγχρονος ἐμφάνισις τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου, καὶ ἡ στενὴ τῶν δύο τούτων ἀνδρῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους σχέσις.
[24] *Encheiridion* I: 214.

ἀνδρὸς ἱκανοῦ νὰ διακομίσῃ αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν δημοκρατικῶν του βίου τύπων εἰς τοὺς μοναρχικούς)". Alexander is commended for having accomplished his father Philip's great Panhellenic plan, and the reader is reminded to leave aside all the anecdotes about his life and excesses and to focus on the general outcome of his achievements.[25] In fact, Divine Providence, which rules the history of mankind, found in Alexander the hero who could save the world and set into motion the second phase of Hellenism.[26]

By 1853 Paparrhegopoulos' views about the Hellenicity of the Macedonians have changed, and he makes it clear from the introduction to the *Historia*, where he states that the Hellenic people have existed for thousands of years, and their history can be divided into five periods, in which they were either free or subject to foreign powers. Of these five periods, the first goes down to the Roman conquest in 145 BCE, suggesting that the Macedonian domination becomes effectively part of the ancient Greek past, which is described as "the most celebrated part of the history of the Greek Nation (περιφημότερον μέρος τῆς Ἱστορίας τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἔθνους), because at that time not only were our forefathers (οἱ προπάτορες ἡμῶν) free, but they also managed to prove themselves as the greatest of all the nations on the earth (τὸ πρώτιστον τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἐθνῶν) thanks to their genius, their virtue and their education".[27]

The fifth chapter of the book is reserved entirely for Macedonian history and is divided into two sections: a) from the origins of the kingdom of Macedon down to the death of Philip II, and b) Alexander the Great's life and deeds.

Philip II is presented in a celebratory fashion: he was "by nature one of the wisest kings (ἐκ φύσεως εἷς τῶν συνετωτέρων βασιλέων) in world history", and gained great military skills during his captivity in Thebes.[28] Moreover, Paparrhegopoulos argues for the veracity of the Panhellenic campaign, stating that Philip II unified all of Greece in 338 BCE not because he was driven by despotic desire (ὁ σκοπός του δὲν ἦτο νὰ γίνῃ δεσπότης τῆς Ελλάδος), but with the aim of taking vengeance on the Persians and punishing them for the hybristic destruction of the Acropolis (νὰ ἐκδικήσωσιν οὕτω τὴν ὕβριν) in the fifth century BCE.[29] As an Argead, Philip is now said to be a Greek offspring of Heracles –a genealogy recognised by all Greeks, who admitted the Macedonians

[25] *Encheiridion* I: 214: ὁ σύγχρονος καὶ ὁ μεταγενέστερος κόσμος […] ἐπεκόσμησεν, ὅπως συνήθως συμβαίνει περὶ τοὺς ἐξόχους ἄνδρας, τὰ κατὰ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον διὰ πολλῶν ὑπερβολῶν· […] πολλὰ καὶ ποικίλα ἀνέκδοτα, ὧν τὰ πλεῖστα εἶναι προδήλως ψευδῆ.

[26] *Encheiridion* I: 214: […] του μόνου ἀνδρός, ὅστις ἠδύνατο νὰ σώσῃ καὶ νὰ καταστήσῃ εὐτυχῆ τὸν κόσμο […] ἡ θεία Πρόνοια ἀπεταμίευεν εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μέγα ἐκεῖνο ἔργον.

[27] *Historia*: 2.

[28] *Historia*: 58.

[29] *Historia*: 59.

to the Olympic games.[30] The Macedonian society is paralleled to the ancient Hellenic communities described in the Homeric epic poems (ὁμοιότητά τινα μὲ τοὺς παναρχαίους Ἕλληνας, ὅπως περιγράφει αὐτοὺς ὁ Ὅμηρος),[31] and its unsophisticated taste and lack of literary production is reconnected to its geographical position in the north, far away from the main Greek cultural centres and at the borders with many barbarian tribes.[32]

As in the *Encheiridion*, in the *History* Alexander is praised for having brought about Philip's illustrious plan to wage war against the Achaemenids.[33] Thanks to the highest education received by his tutor Aristotle, Alexander is characterised by a "greater spirit and more virtues than his father (ἔχοντα ἔτι μεγαλήτερον πνεῦμα ἀπὸ τὸν πατέρα του, καὶ περισσοτέρας ἀρετάς)", and was rightfully renamed *the Great* after his unprecedented achievements.[34]

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In the *Historia* Paparrhegopoulos makes his hero Alexander actively engage with, and participate in, the ancient Greek past: in fact, he claims that even though Persia was a huge empire rich in resources, the Macedonian conqueror decided to set out for the Asian campaign with only 30,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalrymen, as from the battles of Marathon and Plataea he had learnt that few valorous and trained men were better than many but untrained men.[35] The Macedonian army is openly addressed as Hellenic army (ἑλληνικὸς στρατός) and Alexander himself is the king of the Greeks (βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων).[36] Since the aim of the book is to showcase exemplar leaders to Greek students, Alexander's actions have been polished or rewritten in their positive interpretation: for example, in the Indian campaign, Paparrhegopoulos describes him as ἀκάματος (indefatigable), which entails that the historian is aware of the soldiers' unrest at the Hyphasis and of the criticism towards the Macedonian conqueror's excessive longing for conquests and explorations, but deliberatively omits them. On the contrary, the historian takes the chance to shed a positive light on Alexander, who, although tireless, decided to move back to Macedon because he felt pity for his army (λυπηθεὶς

[30] *Historia*: 57: δὲν ἦτο ξένος· οἱ Μακεδόνες […] ἦσαν ὅμως Ἕλληνες· ἰδίως δὲ οἱ βασιλεῖς αὐτῶν ἔλεγον ἑαυτοὺς ἀπογόνους τοῦ Ἡρακλέους […] Ἕλληνες τοὺς ἐθεώρουν ὡς ὁμογενεῖς, διότι ἐδέχοντο αὐτοὺς εἰς τοὺς Ὀλυμπιακοὺς ἀγῶνας.

[31] *Historia*: 57.

[32] *Historia*: 57.

[33] *Historia*: 60: the Macedonian campaign against the Persian Empire is defined as μέγας σκοπός (great purpose).

[34] *Historia*: 59-60.

[35] *Historia*: 60.

[36] *Historia*: 61.

πλέον τὰ στρατεύματά του).[37] A little later in the book, Alexander is said to have died because of fever, without mention of the negative traditions about his excessive and prolonged drinking parties or about court-conspiracies and his poisoning.[38]

As we may expect in a manual where the historian tries to integrate Alexander and the Macedonians into Greek History, the overall evaluation of the Persian campaign is positive, and the convulsive Diadochic period or Macedon's decadence as a by-product of prolonged war are condoned by the Panhellenic drive of the endeavour:

> "[Alexander] stayed in Asia eleven years, until his death, having achieved so great and admirable things in this short time span (κατορθώσας εἰς τὸ σύντομον τοῦτο διάστημα τόσον μεγάλα καὶ θαυμάσια πράγματα) that no one of the kings who are mentioned in the history of the entire world can compare him in this [deed]".[39]

> "[Alexander] showed commendable value and expertise (ἔδειξε θαυμαστὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἐπιτηδειότητα), […] he founded cities, which he all named Alexandria, and he brought to them Greek citizens, because his aim was not only to subdue Asia, but also to impart to its inhabitants all the good things that Greeks had acquired, especially their education and craftsmanship (ἀλλὰ καὶ νὰ μεταδώσῃ εἰς τοὺς κατοίκους αὐτῆς τὰ καλὰ ὅσα εἶχον ἀποκτήσει οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ μάλιστα τὴν παιδείαν καὶ τὰς τέχνας αὐτῶν)".[40]

The praising tendency of the *Historia* of 1853 is further developed in the second volume of the *Historia of the Greek Nation* (1862), where Paparrhegopoulos bestows a divine status upon Alexander,[41] and argues again with encomiastic words for the moral nobleness of the great conqueror and of his Panhellenic campaign, defined as "the great deed (τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἔργον) in the name not of Macedon but of Greece (ἐπ' ὀνόματι οὐχὶ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἀλλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος)".[42]

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[37] *Historia*: 62.

[38] *Historia*: 63.

[39] *Historia*: 61.

[40] *Historia*: 62.

[41] See, e.g., *IEE* II: 168: at Alexander's death, Paparrhegopoulos says that "the *oecumene* was going to be shaken (ἡ οἰκουμένη τῷ ὄντι ἅπασα ἔμελλε νὰ σεισθῇ)", an image which reminds us of the narration of Jesus' death in the Gospels (Matthew: 27.51); 159: Alexander is said ὑπεράνθρωπος (Übermensch); 178: his sufferings exceded the limits of the human sufferings (τὰ πάθη αὐτοῦ ὑπέρβαλον τὰ ὁρία τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθῶν).

[42] *IEE*² II: preface δ'; preface ε'. *IEE* II 95; 171-174; cf. *IEE*² II: 56: "The first result [of Alexander's campaign] was the freeing from the Barbarians (ἡ ἀπό τοῦ ζυγοῦ τῶν Βαρβάρων ἀπελευθέρωσις) of all the Greek cities in Asia Minor. Later on, the numerous cities founded by Alexander and his Diadochoi until the Caucasus and the Indus River and Ethiopia were populated by Greek settlers (ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ἀποίκων κατῳκίσθησαν); they were organised

To make his case stronger, in the preface added to the second edition of the *IEE* the historian names a list of opponents of the Macedonian king,[43] who, however, were not able to hinder his plan: among them, cities, like Thebes in 335 BCE and Halicarnassus in 334 BCE; Greek mercenaries, such as the 20,000 Greek infantrymen who fought with the Persians in 334 BCE at Granicus and the 30,000 Greek hoplites in the right wing of the Persian army in 333 BCE at Issus; and Greek leaders, namely Memnon of Rhodes,[44] who acted as commander of Darius III's[45] navy and tried to shift the location of the war to Greece in 333 BCE, and Agis the king of Sparta,[46] who waged a war against Macedon in 331 BCE. The praise of Alexander as Panhellenic leader is in fact fundamental to the idea of continuity of Hellenism, and the volume's preface to the second edition becomes a manifesto of the tripartite scheme of Greek history (first/archaic –second/ Macedonian– third/modern Hellenism).

Alexander is characterised by military genius (τοῦ ἡγεμόνος αὐτοῦ μεγαλοφυΐα), courage (τόλμη), virtue (ἀνδρεία), and untamable activity (ἀδάμαστος δραστιριότης).[47] The importance of his conquests and unmatchable military skills is constantly stressed throughout the chapter,[48] whereas the praise for his political ability seems lacking. Paparrhegopoulos acknowledges that Alexander was not a fully formed politician; however, he excuses him, claiming that, during his brief career, the Macedonian did not have the time to start a complete political and administrative reform of his vast Empire. Furthermore, the historian makes it clear that, among all the rulers, Alexander was the most beloved (τῶν κυβερνητῶν ὁ μᾶλλον [...] ἀγαπητός) and that only thanks to him the process of Hellenisation of Asia started.[49]

In the conclusions to the sixth chapter, Paparrhegopoulos offers a last evaluation of his hero, which reminds us of Arrian's "apology of Alexander" in *Anabasis* VII. 28-30: "This is the truth about Alexander. Certainly he was not (ἀναμάρτητος)", but the overall value of his achievements was more important.

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according to the Greek city-institutions, spoke the Greek language, were embellished by Greek artists, defended by Greek generals, and gloried in the presence of Greek philosophers, astronomers, geographers, grammarians, rhetoricians […] to perpetuate the name of Hellenic nationality (νὰ διαιωνίσει τὸ ὄνομα τῆς ἑλληνικῆς ἐθνότητος)".

[43] *IEE*² II: preface δ': πολλοὶ Ἕλληνες ἀντέπραξαν εἰς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα τοῦ Μεγάλου Ἀλεξάνδρου.

[44] On Memnon, cf. Berve II, 1926: 250-253, n. 497; Heckel 2006: 162, n. 1.

[45] On Darius III, cf. Badian 2000: 241-265; Briant 2015.

[46] On Agis, cf. Berve II, 1926: 8-9, n. 15; Heckel 2006: 7-8, n. 1.

[47] *IEE* II: 104.

[48] Cf. *IEE* II: 105: "not only was [Alexander] a perfect soldier (στρατιώτης τέλειος), he was also an excellent general (στρατηγὸς τελειότατος)"; 170: "Alexander is considered invincible (ἀπαράμιλλος), insuperable in the entire history of the human kind".

[49] *IEE* II: 178.

In fact, his actions were so great that they could be considered the work of a divine being.[50]

The proof of Macedon's Hellenicity becomes Paparrhegopoulos' main concern in the *IEE*, and the reader is constantly reminded of the Macedonians' contribution to Greek history. For example, not only is Macedon a culturally and genetically Hellenic region,[51] but it is also presented as a perfect match to the rest of Greece, since, already in antiquity, they completed each other:

> "Macedon had what Greece did not possess: the mightiest army and the most ingenious leader (τὸν κράτιστον τῶν στρατῶν καὶ τὸν μεγαλοφυέστατον τῶν ἡγεμόνων); on the other hand, in Greece there were all the things that were missing in Macedon: the most beautiful language, the best science and art, and colonial ability (ἡ καλλίστη τῶν γλωσσῶν, ἡ καλλίστη ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη, καὶ ἡ ἀποικιακὴ δεξιότης)".[52]

Paparrhegopoulos gives credit to Alexander for having committed himself to establishing a partnership between the two Hellenic regions,[53] and states that the Greek thinkers contemporary to him understood the importance of his political and cultural plan, which they considered a development of the first Hellenism (οἱ σύγχρονοι, οἱ αὐτόπται μάρτυρες τῆς πρώτης ταύτης τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ βιοῦ μεταπλάσεως, ἱστορικοί, γεωγράφοι, φιλόλογοι θεωροῦσιν αὐτὴν ἁπλῶς ὡς συνέχειαν τοῦ προτέρου Ἑλληνισμοῦ). The historian purposely withholds the existence of the anti-Macedonian faction in Athens,[54] as he wants to urge the intellectuals of his time to follow in the ancient authors' footsteps. To this group of wise ancient thinkers, he adds Droysen, the only nineteenth-century historian who had shown interest in the Macedonian period and had written about "Eastern Hellenism (ἀνατολικὸς Ἑλληνισμὸς)".[55] Paparrhegopoulos' criticism against his contemporary intellectuals has a twofold basis: according to him, being anchored to the idea that "Hellenism equals democracy" corresponds to a blind refusal of both the past –not recognising the value of Macedonian Hellenism– and of the

[50] *IEE* II: 178.

[51] Cf. *IEE* II: 34= *IEE*² II: 30: "[Macedon] had always been composed of tribes kin to the Greek people (ἀνέκαθεν συνεκροτεῖτο ἀπὸ φύλων συγγενῶν τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ) […] and ruled by kings of Greek descent (ὡδηγεῖτο πάντοτε ὑπὸ βασιλειῶν Ἑλληνικῆς καταγωγῆς). […] The historical period commencing with Philip II cannot be considered differently from another phase of Hellenism (ἑτέρα τις τοῦ Ἑλληνισμοῦ φάσις), which […] we called Macedonian Hellenism (Μακεδονικὸν Ἑλληνισμόν)".

[52] *IEE*² II: preface ε'.

[53] *IEE*² II: preface ε'.

[54] Lawton 2003: 117-127. See also Hatzopoulos 2011: 60-74.

[55] *IEE*² II: preface ζ'.

present.[56] In fact, in the nineteenth century Greece was still a monarchy, and with his *History of the Greek Nation* Paparrhegopoulos was trying to support both the uninterrupted nature of Hellenism and the royal house.

Paparrhegopoulos concludes that there are indeed differences between an authentic Hellenism and an Eastern one, where with *authentic* he means the first one, flourished in Ancient Greece, and with *Eastern* he describes Greek culture in the cities and kingdoms which were found in Asia after Alexander's campaign.[57] However, it is important to understand that in Asia the "Hellenic *pneuma* was [simply] adjusted to the new cultural background, but it did not wither (τὸ ἑλληνικὸ πνεῦμα ἐτροπολογήθη, ἀλλὰ δὲν ἐμαράνθη)". In fact, the historian points out that, although the political system adopted by the Diadochoi in the East was monarchic and not democratic, a "constitutional change does not entail a subversion of people's ethnicity (ἡ μεταβολὴ ὅμως τῶν πολιτευμάτων δὲν συνεπάγεται τὴν ἀνατροπή τῆς ἐθνικῆς ἰδιότητας)".[58] This approach in the interpretation of historico-political changes is the key to the reappraisal of Macedonians' ethnicity and their role in Greek history: Paparrhegopoulos' Macedonians, who started their way into Greek history as a barbaric people, a mix of Illyrians and Thracians, in the *IEE* are a (Hellenic) ethnic group very similar to the Thessalians and other subordinate tribes of the Greek Nation (Ἐν γένει οἱ Μακεδόνες προσήγγιζον πολὺ πρὸς τοὺς Θεσσαλοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὑποδεέστερα φῦλα τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἔθνους).[59] Furthermore, they speak a language explicitly said to be "different from those spoken by the Illyrians, Thracians or Paeonians, and akin to the Greek one (Ἡ γλῶσσα τῶν Μακεδόνων ἦτο μὲν διάφορος τῆς Ιλλυρικης, τῆς Θρᾳκικῆς, πιθανῶς δὲ καὶ τῆς Παιονικῆς, συγγενὴς ὅμως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς)".[60] The reader of the *IEE* can not fail to notice the assertive stress on Macedonian Greekness in chapter six, dedicated to the history of the kingdom of Macedon.

Conclusions

Paparrhegopoulos' historiography is a product of his time: it is influenced by the transition from Enlightenment to Romanticism, by a strong dependency on Western production and the reaction to it, and by the internal political struggles

[56] *IEE*² II: preface στ': "But our century, not satisfied with the overthrow of regimes, is also seeking for the destruction of the past. (Ἀλλ'ὁ καθ'ἡμᾶς αἰών, μὴ ἀρκούμενος νὰ ἀνατρέπῃ τὰ καθεστῶτα, ζητεῖ νὰ καταλύσῃ καὶ τὰ παρελθόντα)".

[57] *IEE*² p. ζ'. Cf. n. 33.

[58] *IEE*² p. ιβ'.

[59] *IEE* II: 3.

[60] *IEE* II: 3.

of the new born Hellenic state. These changes and uncertainties are reflected in the historian's hesitations and contradictions in his works. In fact, although in the *IEE* the insistence on the Macedonians' Hellenicity is certainly more impelling than in his earlier works, in some passages Paparrhegopoulos still seems to find it difficult to recognise a full Greek status for the Macedonians, who, for example, are said to be unable to pronounce some Greek letters properly.[61]

Paparrhegopoulos was determined to create a historiographical system which would promote unity in the Hellenic speaking communities of Greece and Asia Minor, and he knew that the much revered ancient Greek history was a powerful means to achieve his plan. Specifically, the historian presented the kings of Macedon as patriotic saviours against Greece's endemic political instability and fragmentation, and gave an entirely new interpretation of the victory of Philip II in Chaeronea, suggesting that it was a crucial moment for the national destiny of *Hellas* rather than its end.[62] In addition, he claimed that the feeling of lost autonomy (τὸ αἴσθημα τῆς ἀπολεσθείσης αὐτονομίας) and enslavement to a foreign power (τὴν δουλείαν συμπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος),[63] which circulated not only among ancient rhetoricians and historians like Demosthenes and Pausanias but also within the circles of the spokesman of Greek Enlightenment, was caused by exaggerations and a blind attachment to Athenian democracy.[64] The time was now mature for Paparrhegopoulos to step away from the old historiographical trend and to create a new high impact narrative to support his political ideas. In fact, the 1840s witnessed three important events that brought about a new favourable interpretation of monarchy (and thus a re-evaluation of the Argead family):[65] a) the Revolution of September 3rd 1843, which put an end to Bavarian absolutism and forced King Otto to concede a constitutional reform; b) the need to reply to Fallmerayer's theory on the Slavic origins of the modern Greeks; c) the rising of Greek nationalism and the Balkan question, which saw Greece and Bulgaria competing for establishing their power over the region of Macedonia.[66]

These events certainly influenced Paparrhegopoulos' understanding of national history, and he could also count on a long-standing literary and artistic tradition which portrayed Alexander as the link between antiquity and modern

[61] *IEE* II: 3.

[62] Demetriou 2001: 50: Paparrhegopoulos' Greek Macedonians are "pioneers in promoting the national cause".

[63] *IEE* II: 69-70.

[64] Cf. the anonymous *Greek Nomarchia* published in 1806, in which with Demosthenic verve Philip II and Alexander are accused of having caused the end of Greek freedom. Gkikas 1973: 252-253.

[65] Cf. Demaras 1986: 71-72.

[66] For the importance of education, propaganda and acculturation in the creation of National identity in Ottoman Macedonia, see Yosmaoğlou 2014: 48-78.

period, such as the Greek hero of the *Phyllada*,[67] who kept Hellenism alive during the Byzantine and Ottoman Empire and was beloved by the masses. Furthermore, there had been recent attempts to use Alexander in philosophico-political contexts to awaken "national consciousness": during the *Turkokratia*,[68] several Greek intellectuals prompted Orthodox princes to cast the evil Ottoman infidels out of Greece and save the Greeks as Alexander did in antiquity when he fought against the Persians, and in his *Manifesto* (1797) Rhigas Pheraios portrayed the Macedonian's bust as the invincible liberator of the Hellenic *ethnos* to encourage the Greek people to fight for their freedom. Later on, in 1840s, Dionysios Pyrros promoted Alexander as a symbol of national renaissance in his Ancient History lessons offered in different schools in Athens.[69]

Paparrhegopoulos managed to create a rigorous historiographical system which proved the ability of the Hellenic Nation to endure in times of struggles and projected the continuity of the Hellenic *pneuma*; his works also constituted the first systematic attempt in the emerging Modern Greek historiography to present Alexander the Great as a symbol of national unity. In fact, in Paparrhegopoulos' system, Alexander III and his Macedonians are the promoters of nation-building and the supporters of the *Megali Idea*: as the Macedonians unified all the Greeks in antiquity and fought against the Persians for the sake of Hellenism, modern Greeks were prompted to strive for one single, united Hellenic nation, which would include not only mainland Greece and the Peloponnese, but also the islands, the North (Epirus, Thrace, Macedon), and the coastal regions of Asia Minor. Paparrhegopoulos' historiographical production had the political purpose to make the Hellenic *ethnos* culturally ready for the nation-building process that Europe witnessed during the nineteenth century.[70] By proving that Ancient Macedon deserved a place in the history of the Greek Nation, the historian provided the Greeks with a strong claim over the region Macedonia in the 1860s.[71]

To conclude, it is worth noting that, further to the political reasons described above, Paparrhegopoulos' admiration for the Greek language also paved the way for a reappraisal of Alexander III's image: the Macedonian campaign spread the

[67] The *Phyllada* is a Modern Greek version of Pseudo-Callisthenes' *Alexander Romance* in demotic language. Cf. Veloudis 1977; Pallis 1989.

[68] The term *Turkokratia* refers to the period of Turkish domination in Greece.

[69] Gkikas 1973: 253. Cf. Pyrros Dionysios 1846: Βίος πράξεις καὶ κατορθώματα τοῦ Μεγάλου Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος, Athens, 1: This historical work presents Alexander as the "ancestor of the Greeks (πρόγονος τῶν Ἑλλήνων), who is chosen by the God (προωρισμένος ἐκ θεοῦ) to defeat the atheist Barbarian nations (τὰ ἄθεα καὶ βαρβάρα ἔθνη)". Pyrros wants to inspire pride in, and love for, the nation in his fellow countrymen, and his encomiastic book on Alexander national consciousness building process.

[70] Cf. Koliopoulos / Veremis 2010: 98: [Paparrhegopoulos well understood that] "a cultural concept of unity could provide a bond that would facilitate the acculturation of Albanians, Vlachs, and Slavs inhabiting the Hellenic State".

[71] Demetriou 2001: 50.

ancient tongue in Asia, which led to the creation of a common cultural background and offered a powerful linguistic tool able to disseminate the Gospels' word. Thus, Alexander is presented as the catalyst for the diffusion of Christian religion and for the creation of a Christian Hellenism, which fully flourished later on with the Byzantine Empire. Alexander is, in Paparrhegopoulos' eyes, a precursor of the Byzantine Emperors, a Byzantine *ante-litteram*.

Alexander the Straight: W. W. Tarn and Alexander's sexuality

MARC MENDOZA
University of Lleida
ORCID: 0000-0001-7891-3553

Abstract: W. W. Tarn stands as one of the main researchers on Alexander for the first half of the twentieth century. His description of Alexander as roughly a Victorian, (pre-) Christian gentleman and his idea of the 'unity of mankind' have been thoroughly disputed and rightly rejected. However, the criticism of Tarn's approach has not included so far his particular scope about Alexander's sexuality and sex life. This paper examines how Tarn dealt with this controversial topic, mostly by denying any kind of sexual interest and activity by Alexander. Tarn's own prude morality was transferred to his 'hero' and, even, it became more conservative as an opposition to more 'liberal' approaches by some other contemporary scholars.

Keywords: Tarn, sexuality, Wilcken, Berve, Schachermeyr, Radet.

Some years ago, when I was still an undergraduate student, somebody told me that Tarn "is no longer history, but historiography". Back then I was not able to properly understand this remark and I became captivated by Tarn's fascinating reconstruction of the Greco-Bactrian and Indo-Greek kingdoms[1]. Over the years, I have never forgotten this sentence and has been making more sense to me. One can easily understand why Tarn became so influential and the people got attracted by his compelling and attractive prose. However, his highly idealized Alexander has long been dismissed by the scholars and nowadays Tarn is regarded as a relic of an old –and more naïve– time[2].

[1] If I remember properly, Dr Domínguez Monedero was who said the phrase. It was during a paper presented at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona during the inauguration of the Ancient Mediterranean Master's degree. The book, of course, was *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (1938).

[2] Even if his praising portrait has few followers in the academic field nowadays, his influence can still be perceived in the most popular representations of Alexander, as can be seen in Oliver Stone's film *Alexander* –whose historical advisor was Robin Lane Fox, maybe the somewhat 'spiritual heir' of Tarn. On the film, see Mendoza 2019a: 112-120. On

The main focus of this rejection is his idea of the unity of mankind as the ultimate goal and dream of Alexander[3]. Certainly, it allows us to get a great perspective on Tarn's agenda and methodology, but it has often overshadowed other aspects, equally eloquent. One of them is Alexander's sexuality. Even though his somehow prude approach on this issue has been noticed[4], Tarn's dealing with Alexander's sex life has not received any monographic study so far[5]. This article does not want –if anyone really can– to settle the controversial issue of Alexander's sexuality. This paper tries to expose how Tarn dealt with it and why it was not for him an unimportant aspect, but a central facet of 'his' Alexander. Through this study, we can try to get an insight of Tarn's mind, code of morality and proficiency as a researcher.

Tarn in context

This paper will not give a complete biography of William Woodthorpe Tarn, but some data could be a key factor in order to fully understand this man[6]. He was born in London in 1869. He won a King's scholarship and attended Eton. Then, he went to Trinity College, Cambridge, as a Classical Tripos' student. However, in 1890, he was admitted to the Inner Temple and he became a barrister to please his father. In 1896, he married Flora MacDonald Robertson. Two years later, their only child, a girl called Otta, was born. But in 1905, Tarn's ill-health suffered from a severe blow and then he moved to Scotland, where he lived in Mountgerald (Dingwall) and Muirtown House (Inverness) until his death[7]. The Scottish retirement meant the abandonment of his legal career and a full-time commitment to Ancient History[8]. His academic writings became regular and his first monograph, *Antigonos Gonatas,* was published in 1913. Some years later, in

the depiction of the sexuality on the film, see Nikoloutsos 2008; Carney 2010; Reames 2010; Skinner 2010.

[3] This idea was firstly developed in a publication in 1933 and it reappeared in his two-volume work of 1948. Although he was not the first one to openly question Tarn's assumption, it is nearly compulsory to credit Badian (1958a) as the man who definitely 'killed' the unity of mankind. See Badian 1971: 39; Briant 2016: 401-403, 471.

[4] Burn 1947: 144; Bickermann 1950: 43; Badian 1976a: 287-288; Ogden 2009: 204, 2011: 3-4; Briant 2015: 347.

[5] Badian (1958b) wrote a paper on Tarn's denial of Bagoas' real existence. He properly subtitled it as "A study on method". But, as stated, it is strictly restricted to Bagoas' problem.

[6] For Tarn's biographies, see Adcock 1958; Todd 1964; Bosworth 1983: 132-133; Adcock / Reynolds 2004; McKechnie 2014: 20-25, 29-30, 33; Briant 2016: 381.

[7] During the Great War, he worked for the War Office in London.

[8] Previously, in 1902, he had already published a paper in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*.

1921, appeared his first two papers fully focused on Alexander[9]. In 1927, he wrote two chapters on Alexander's career in the sixth volume of the *Cambridge Ancient History*. As mentioned above, he presented his idea of the 'unity of mankind' in 1933. His ultimate publication was his two-volume monograph on Alexander in 1948, where he summed up his lifetime studies on the Macedonian conqueror. The first volume was a plain narrative of Alexander's life, mainly as it has appeared in the *Cambridge Ancient History* twenty years earlier –very few aspects were rewritten, but with some interesting changes, as we will see. The second book compiled 25 appendices where he dealt with many issues like the sources, military affairs, Alexander's foundations, some problematical historical episodes and a very interesting chapter for us called 'Alexander's attitude to sex', among others. Sir William[10] died in 1957 – and as we have seen, one year later, the storm began.

After this brief overlook of his life, there are certain aspects that should be underlined:

– Son of his age. The date of his main work (1948) sometimes tricks us and we forget that he wrote it in his late seventies. He grew in Victorian England with the British Empire in all its splendour in a wealthy house[11]. Moreover, Tarn himself seems to have had Tory (conservative) affinities[12]. The code of values of the morality of the well-off society of his time leaked to his Alexander's portrait turning him in 'an English gentleman' or a 'pre-Christian'[13]. He was not able to judge his individuals following their own cultural values, but superimposing his conservative, contemporary ones.

– Once a barrister, always a barrister. As we have seen, he studied laws and it was his prime occupation for over ten years. Certainly, he received an early formation on Classical studies and he never abandoned his interest in them –as his 1901's article clearly shows. I am far from suggesting that given his lack of professional training as a historian can be regarded as a mere amateur. Since 1905, he was fully devoted to Ancient History and probably he read more than any coetaneous colleague. But, when having a look at Tarn's methodology, sometimes one gets the impression he is dealing with a forensic analysis. This is especially noteworthy when rebuking a 'hostile'–or, at least, what he considered like that– interpretation

[9] One of them was focused on Barsine (Tarn 1921a) –we will see more of it below. The other was on the so-called Alexander's last plans (Tarn 1921b).

[10] He was knighted in 1952.

[11] When he was born in 1869, Queen Victoria would still reign for 32 more years.

[12] McKechnie 2014: 33.

[13] Welles 1949: 60; Bickermann 1950: 42-43; Burn 1947: 144; Badian 1971: 45, 1976a: 287-290; Bosworth 1983: 133-134; Ogden 2009: 204, 2011: 3-4; Gómez Espelosín 2015: 207-208; Briant 2016: 178, 471.

or story about Alexander. He was fully convinced of the innocence of his 'client' and he used any available resource in his commitment. Therefore, when one sees how he made disappear awkward individuals like Barsine or Bagoas, one can easily remind a lawyer invalidating an inculpatory evidence for his defendant alleging formal irregularities.

– His relative isolation. His daughter Otta married Roger Swire in 1931 and they eventually moved to Skye. In 1937, his wife died. So, as Adcock stated[14], "[d]uring the last twenty years of his life Tarn lived in comparative seclusion". His contact with the outside world diminished drastically[15]. I do not want to force the evidence or to play the psychologist, but his attachment to certain historical individuals, especially Alexander, is one of the most intense examples of the modern historiography. Maybe he already had a certain propensity to idealise and empathise with them[16], but his emotional loneliness could have helped to increase it in order to fill a certain emotional vacuum. The wholehearted defences of his points of view went beyond the mere historian pride and reputation, but they exude a real personal involvement, as we will see. Therefore, he suffered pain for accepting any fault from Alexander[17]. Moreover, he was long cut off from the changes on the society and certain ideas looked out-of-date even then[18].

Before 1948: Barsine and *CAH*.

Tarn dealt with Alexander's sex life early in his studies on the Macedonian king[19]. As we have already pinpointed, back in 1921 one of his first two papers on Alexander focused on Barsine, the alleged lover of the conqueror and mother of his son Heracles[20]. This early interest cannot be understated because it shows it

[14] Adcock 1958: 319; cf. Bosworth 1983: 133.

[15] He was not a complete hermit, of course. He continued receiving many visitors at home and regularly spent some time in Skye with his daughter and his grandchildren.

[16] His portrayal of Antigonus Gonatas as a kind of 'philosopher-king' clearly shows that these characteristics did not appear only during his last years. See Jones 1949: 144; Welles 1949: 60; Andreotti 1950: 598; Badian 1976a: 297; McKechnie 2014.

[17] It is very telling his reluctant acceptance of Alexander's murders (Tarn 1948 II: 262): "Alexander did commit two murders in his day; there is no need to invent one [Caranus'] which he could not have committed."

[18] Briant 2016: 385.

[19] But not early in his life. It was not a youth work, but he was already in his fifties when he wrote it.

[20] Tarn 1921a.

was essential for him[21]. This article already foreshadowed Tarn's methods found elsewhere when dealing with these aspects of Alexander's life. This is not the place to examine step by step his whole argumentation[22], but his main conclusions are that Heracles was not Alexander's son and "his intrigue with 'Barsine' is as mythical as that with the Amazon queen[23]". His study is based on a narrow and sometimes forced reading of the Classical sources, especially on the number of sons fathered by Alexander and Barsine's identity. In this latter aspect, he shockingly concluded that there was not one Barsine, but four or five[24]. His reading of the sources is also influenced by his prejudices toward the different authors. As fully developed in the first appendices of his later monograph[25], he distinguished between the 'good' tradition (Arrian and his sources, Ptolemy and Aristobulus), the 'vulgate' (Justin, Curtius and Diodorus) and the anti-Alexander tradition (Stoics, Peripatetics and Cassander's circle). This categorization paved the way for the rejection of any considered hostile episode and the acceptance of those that reflect well on Tarn's portrait of Alexander: "while stories which show Alexander in a bad light but which are not well attested may easily be Greek inventions of any period, stories which show him in a good light, even if we cannot test them, must at any rate be early-they must belong to his lifetime or very soon after-and are, speaking generally, likely to be true; for once he was dead no one had any interest in inventing such stories, while for many years many people had every interest in inventing stories or incidents derogatory to him[26]". This implies that any story could be rejected just based on who wrote it, without any further decisive proofs. There was no need for them. But this tricky method also entailed problems when the so-called 'slanderous' account came from a 'trustworthy' writer like Aristobulus in this case. But Tarn exonerated him: he was only guilty for trying to rationalize and improve the confusing tradition from the 'vulgate[27]'. Similarly, he was well disposed towards any more or less well-constructed theory that could explain why any given hostile story could have emerged. In this case, he defended that Heracles was just a fake, puppet pretender supported by Polyperchon and Antigonus to threaten Cassander. Therefore, the whole story of Alexander and Barsine's affair and his alleged son was created by them and that is how it

[21] See McKechnie 2014: 29-30.

[22] See Brunt 1975.

[23] Tarn 1921a: 28.

[24] Barsine, Mentor's wife; Barsine, Memnon's widow; Barsine, Darius' elder daughter; Barsine the prisoner; Barsine, Artabazus' daughter –not certainly identified with any of the preceding.

[25] Tarn 1948 II: 1-133. A more summarised description can be found in Tarn 1927a: 352 note. Plutarch is regarded as standing apart. See Welles 1949: 60; Andreotti 1950: 583-584, 598; Bickermann 1950: 42; Badian 1958: 156, 1976a: 297; Bosworth 1983: 135-138; Gómez Espelosín 2015: 209.

[26] Tarn 1948 II: 297-298.

[27] Tarn 1921a: 23-24, 26.

eventually found its way to the 'vulgate' tradition. Finally, besides these sources and historical pieces of evidences, Tarn also employed some 'psychological' explanations. Some things were just impossible because Alexander was not like that. In the paper it is especially attested in relation with Aristobulus –who, Tarn claimed, knew the king very well[28]–, but it lies behind the whole article and it is its main *raison d'être*. As he stated later on: "He […] never had a mistress[29]". To sum up, Tarn's paper on Heracles and Barsine the lover made them disappear from the historical record, except for the former's brief part during the Diadochi struggles. As we will see, the disappearance of uncomfortable people would be recurrent in Tarn's works. Tarn's theory had some detractors[30] –and he found recommendable to reprint it with minor variances in the second volume of his monograph[31]–, but also was gladly accepted by others[32]. It was not until Brunt's paper that the historical existence of Barsine and her liaison with Alexander have been widely accepted by scholars[33].

In his two chapters on Alexander in the sixth volume of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, he devoted some paragraphs in the first pages to describing young Alexander's character[34]. He was "generous, ambitious, masterful, loyal to friends" and he preferred rather the intellectual than the physical activity. But above all, he was moderated. This aspect of his nature was instilled by Aristotle, although his personality was heredity from Olympias, "a woman to whom any sort

[28] "Psychologically, of course, Aristobulus' story that Alexander acted on Parmenion's advice is hopeless; a man of Alexander's nature may be overcome by passion, but not by some one else's recommendation" (Tarn 1921a: 23-24). "Aristobulus […] knew quite enough about Alexander to feel that some explanation of a proceeding so contrary to his character was necessary" (Tarn 1921a: 26).

[29] Tarn 1927b: 424; Tarn 1948 II: 323. On this remark, see Bickermann 1950: 43; Badian 1976a: 288.

[30] Berve 1926 I: 9, II: 102-104 (nº. 206), 168 (nº. 353); Radet 1931: 346; Schachermeyr 1973: 211-212, 354, 409, 567, 635 (precisely Burn (1951: 101) blamed him for still accepting Barsine and Heracles, "which one might have supposed that Tarn had finally buried, long since, in the *J.H.S.*"). Schachermeyr's book of 1973 was an expanded reprinting of his previous work on Alexander of 1949. On Schachermeyr, see: Badian 1976a: 282-285; Bosworth 1983: 140-142, 1996; Pesditschek 2010; Gómez Espelosín 2015: 212-214; Briant 2016: 252, 462-465, 473-476.

[31] Tarn 1948 II: 330-338. He clearly stated that Berve's rejection was among the reasons for reprinting it. However, he modestly declared that his former article "was a conclusive proof" and "it was so obvious that it secured large acceptance".

[32] Robinson (1947 [1984]: 216) called Darius' daughter Barsine after Tarn. Wilcken (1932) did not make any reference of Barsine, nor Heracles. Burn (1947 [1966]: 184) presented Heracles, without saying his name, as Polyperchon and Antigonus' puppet (briefer in 18 n. 1); Barsine is not mentioned anywhere in the book). Droysen (1833 [2012]) had not mentioned any of them in his work either.

[33] See Brunt 1975; Bosworth 1980b: 10; Carney 1996: 572-576, 2000: 100-105; Ogden 1999: 42-43, 2009: 205-207, 2011: 121-122, 139-143; Heckel 2006: 70. Before that she was a key character in Rossen's *Alexander the Great*; see Nikoloutsos 2008: 225.

[34] Tarn 1927a: 353-354.

of moderation was unknown[35]". Even though Alexander was passionate like his mother, he was also practical and he was clever enough to lessen the influence of "his terrible mother[36]" especially once he became king[37]. On Alexander's relation with Darius' family, Tarn emphasized Alexander's magnanimity and chivalrous treatment of the women, especially regarding Darius' wife, whom he "never set eyes on […] or allowed her beauty to be alluded to before him". The story on Thais' role as a trigger in the burning of Persepolis was refused as a legend and needs no further argumentation[38]. The marriage with Roxane was for him just a political affair. He spared himself the effort of writing the fancies stories about their first meeting and he saw no real love in their relationship: they did not have any child for four years[39] and, more important, "it is doubtful if he ever cared for any woman except his terrible mother[40]". Therefore, Tarn was imposing again his own Alexander's portrait: an extremely practical and self-continent man, who knew no love apart from mother love. So, there was no need to discuss the different accounts because they simply did not fit on Alexander's nature. On this, it is interesting to underline some statements found in his final encomium of Alexander[41]. In part, he resumed some ideas already sketched in the first pages when describing young Alexander's character, highlighting Aristotle's teachings. Alexander's mind mastered his body and his greatest deed was to conquer himself. His treatment of women was consequent with that core idea: "he apparently never had a mistress, and his two marriages were mere affairs of policy […] women were merely incitements to the rebellion of the body[42]". This astonishing capacity of self-control was unknown for his contemporaries, but it did not imply that they considered him "more, or less[43], than a man". Alexander's continence was for Tarn a key aspect to understand the man and how he achieved greatness: "[h]is

[35] Cf. Robinson 1947 [1984]: 35, 42, 52.

[36] Tarn 1927b: 397; cf. Robinson 1947 [1984]: 35-36. This remark inspired the title of a paper by Carney (2009).

[37] Tarn denies any implication from Alexander in some of Olympias' actions, especially in her alleged part on Philip's murder or the assassination of Cleopatra and her new-born child. Likewise, the accusations against Olympias as privy on Philip's killing plot were again elaborated by Cassander's later propaganda.

[38] Tarn 1927a: 383.

[39] Therefore, he implicitly rejected the death son born in India in 326 (*Metz* 70). The real existence of the child has been widely accepted both before and after Tarn: Berve 1926 I: 9, II: 346-347 (nº. 688); Wilcken 1932: 176; Ogden 1999: 44, 2009: 206, 2011: 122, 127; Carney 2000: 107. Cf. Tarn 1938: 226; Robinson 1947 [1984]: 38, 161.

[40] Tarn 1927b: 397.

[41] Tarn 1927b: 423-424.

[42] He also insisted that Olympias was the only women ever cared about.

[43] Here Tarn cited Theophrastus and other authors alluded in a passage of Athenaeus (X. 434f). In this passage, there are a series of stories about Alexander's lack of interest in sex. This will be a key passage on his elaboration of the alleged hostility from Theophrastus and the Peripatetic school against Alexander.

personality was adequate to great tasks". As we will see, leadership and military capacities were not enough to reach the top. Without a virtuous character, you were doomed to failure at the end. These two chapters clearly show his idealistic and idiosyncratic approach to Alexander, a being over any human and carnal desire and emotion. His silences are also eloquent, leaving no room for annoying people like Bagoas or Barsine[44]. This image remained intact throughout the years and he found no need to make great changes when two decades later it was reprinted for his monograph. As we will see, the only noticeable changes were not to nuance his former statements, but to strengthen them.

Alexander the Great (1948)

His monograph on Alexander appeared in 1948 and there he offered his ultimate conception of the Macedonian king. Therefore, it is a compilation of nearly thirty years of studies on Alexander, the culmination of a lifetime devotion[45]. It would have been understandable that his perception of Alexander's nature and career had evolved throughout the years, but far from that, we only have a more obstinate defence of his former positions. The criticism had no real effect on him, only to assert more vehemently whatever has been questioned.

The first volume, as we have already seen, was a reprinting of his two chapters of the *Cambridge Ancient History*. They mainly remained unaltered, but there are some interesting emendations, especially focused on Hephaestion. In those two chapters, of course, there was no glimpse of a possible homoerotic relationship between Alexander and Hephaestion, not even to reject it as complete nonsense or slander. Certainly, Tarn alluded to his close friendship and, although sometimes he tried not to single him out among other friends[46], he admitted that "no one living (unless Hephaestion)" could understand his dream of the unity of mankind[47]. Therefore, no one but Hephaestion could be "his second self […] the second man in the empire", despite his quarrels with Eumenes, Craterus and Olympias. Curiously, these remarks disappeared from the 1948 text. Alexander no longer had someone who really understood him: "no one living could as yet

[44] On Hephaestion, see below.

[45] Bosworth 1983: 132.

[46] Tarn 1927a: 359 (he equalled him with Nearchus; see 1948 I: 12; cf. Robinson 1947 [1984]: 70); 1927b: 399 ("Hephaestion and other Macedonians, possibly including Lysimachus"; but in Tarn 1948 I: 80: "Hephaestion and one or two other Macedonians", no mention of Lysimachus). In the same way, Leonnatus and not Hephaestion is the man sent by Alexander to Darius' family tent. So, the anecdote of Hephaestion being Alexander's alter ego was ruled out (1927a: 369); cf. Robinson 1947 [1984]: 97-98.

[47] Tarn 1927a: 384.

understand what he meant, not even Aristotle[48]". Therefore, his appointment as chiliarch became a mystery: "Alexander clung to him as his second self, though the reason is nowhere given[49]". Hephaestion then was turned into a run-of-the-mill and somehow quarrelsome commander, but lucky enough to become the second in power for no reason. Surprisingly, Tarn asserted that he was not even a boyhood friend of Alexander and any parallelism between him and Patroclus was just a poetaster's –Choerilus?– elaboration[50]. Tarn covered Hephaestion's death very superficially and there is no word on Alexander's mourning for his friend. His sorrow was easily relieved with a successful campaign against the Cosseans[51]. The omission of Alexander's grief for his deceased friend also points to the will to conceal any episode that could be used for justifying any more intimate relationship. The accounts of the proverbial mourning cannot be explained without telling their close relationship, whatever its actual nature was[52]. His only remarkable statement on the topic was to dismiss any account on it, again alluding to the alleged hostility of some sources: "there was a large literature dealing with Hephaestion's death and what came after, much of it anything but favourable to Alexander[53]". Therefore, as usual, he found no need to further discuss the topic. It was all slanders, lies and nasty exaggerations.

Not mentioning a possible homoerotic relationship between Hephaestion and Alexander is not something to really reproach Tarn. Nowadays, it is still a very controversial topic and the scholars are far from reaching a consensus[54]. We can also understand that he did not discuss the problem, even for just plainly rejecting it. But these corrections in the second version of the text are very suspicious and some explanation must be suggested. What did change between 1927 and 1948 pushing Tarn to erase any statement that could be misunderstood? During those years, several noteworthy works on Alexander were published. Wilcken's *Alexander der Grosse* appeared in 1931 and one year later there was an English translation by G. C. Richards[55]. That year Radet's *Alexandre le Grand*

[48] Tarn 1948 I: 55.

[49] Tarn 1948 I: 117.

[50] Tarn 1948 II: 57-58, 78. Cf. note 64; Curt. III. 12.16; D.L. V. 27; Berve 1926 II: 169 (nº. 357); Reames (-Zimmerman) 1998: 163, 166, 1999: 88, 91, 2010: 190-191; Heckel 2006: 133.

[51] Tarn 1927b: 420-421, 1948 I: 117.

[52] Ogden (2007: 75-76, 2011: 156) suggests that this episode stimulated the retrospective reconstructions of their relationship in order to explain the king's excessive grief. See also Reames (-Zimmerman) 1998 167, 180-222, 1999: 92.

[53] Tarn 1948 II: 306.

[54] See, for example: Reames (-Zimmerman) 1998: 152-170 (especially 172 n. 2, where she made a list of authors accepting or rejecting the existence of a homoerotic relationship), 1999, 2010; Ogden 2007: 75-88, 2009: 210-212, 2011: 155-166; Antela-Bernárdez 2010: 336-337; Skinner 2010: 127-129.

[55] On Wilcken, see Borza 1967; Briant 2009: 180-182, 2016: 248-252, 392-397; Gómez Espelosín 2015: 206.

was published too[56]. In 1933, Andreotti wrote *Il problema politico di Alessandro Magno*[57]. Wilcken showed the relationship between Alexander and Hephaestion in a very similar way as Tarn had done in *CAH*. Wilcken's Hephaestion is Alexander's closest friend and ally, the only one who could actually understand him[58]. However, he did not try to hide Alexander's grief for his death and he slipped the parallelism between Alexander and Achilles' mourning for their beloved friends Hephaestion and Patroclus[59]. Similarly, although in his own very particular way, Radet presented Hephaestion as Alexander's favourite and also traced the Hephaestion/Patroclus – Alexander/Achilles parallelism, giving a detailed account of Alexander's mourning as well[60]. He also underlined their shared intemperance as heavy drinkers[61], but there is no clear suggestion of a more intimate relationship between them. Robinson, even though accepted Alexander's bitter grief, only regarded them as close friends[62]. These kinds of approach on the issue[63] could hardly have generated great unrest to Tarn[64].

If there is someone to point at, he would be Helmut Berve. This German scholar wrote a two-volume prosopography for Alexander's reign, which still remains as a reference work even after the publication of Heckel's prosopography in 2006. This work appeared in 1926, but as was explicitly stated in the final bibliography (page 594), *Cambridge Ancient History* was already in press,

[56] On Radet, see Seston 1941; Gómez Espelosín 2015: 206-207; Briant 2016: 386-392, 453-454.

[57] On Andreotti, see Badian 1976a: 293-295; Gómez Espelosín 2015: 210-211.

[58] Wilcken 1932: 55, 83-84, 137, 209, 227, 235-236.

[59] Wilcken 1932: 227. He also accepted the historicity of their visit to Achilles and Patroclus' tombs in Ilion (83-84).

[60] Radet 1931: 33, 345, 378-379.

[61] Radet 1931: 378.

[62] Robinson 1947 [1984]: 226.

[63] Droysen's work was reprinted, with a prologue from Berve. There were also translations in French (1935) and Italian during those years. Droysen (1833 [2012]: 64, 116) accepted the analogy between Patroclus and Hephaestion too. For him, Hephaestion was the king's favourite and the only one who could really understand him (161, 247, 363, 365, 375, 399-400, 407). He depicts a very intimate relationship, even saying that they loved each other (283). Certainly, there is no clear statement or suggestion about a sexual relationship, but a wholeheartedly mutual devotion (399).

[64] Tarn reviewed Radet and Wilcken's books. On the former (Tarn 1932a), he criticised his disregarding of the so-called 'good' tradition and he concluded that someway Radet reconstructed Cleitarchus lost' work. Tarn questioned his portrait of Alexander as an excessively imitative man. Concerning our topic, Tarn caviled Radet's identification between Patroclus and Hephaestion, omitting that the identification was not Radet's own, but it was found back in Classical authors: Ogden 2007: 78-79, 81-87, 2009: 210-211, 2011: 157, 163-165: Skinner 2010: 126-127. On the latter, Tarn (1932b) only collected some typos –everything else is praising. However, it would have been interesting to know Tarn's opinion on Schachermeyr's portrayal of Hephaestion (1973: 144, 164, 511-514; see note 30). He accepted Hephaestion as Alexander's lover and he made him the real *alter ego* of the king, nominated to be his successor. See Walbank 1950; Burn 1951; Welles 1951, Cloché 1953.

so it was not used for writing Tarn's two chapters. The first volume contained thematic chapters on different topics of Alexander's career and the organization of his empire. The second volume compiled the alphabetical-ordered entries for every known individual related somehow with Alexander. In one of the initial chapters of the first book, Berve discussed Alexander's marriages, love life and pederasty[65]. He accepted Barsine as Alexander's mistress –and consequently Heracles as his son–, Alexander actually falling in love with Roxane, his dealings with *hetairai*, his wish to adopt Oriental polygamy when marrying Parysatis and Statira and the incorporation of a harem as the successor of the Achaemenids[66]. But, moreover, he also defended that the apparent Alexander's lack of interest in women was caused by his actual interest in boys. He found in the sources many boys that could be labelled as 'pleasure boys', including eunuchs like Bagoas[67]. Although he stated pederasty was widespread among Macedonian nobility, curiously there is no mention of Hephaestion in this chapter. Hephaestion's entry in the second volume[68] does not explicitly support the existence of a homoerotic relationship between them, but his image is far from the on purpose neutral and aseptic Tarn's portrait. In Berve's words, he had a singular masculine grace and a splendid appearance. Their friendship was one-of-a-kind and he was blindly devoted to the king –even provoking Olympias' jealousy. His closeness was not decisive on Hephaestion's official appointments, but his own competences[69]. However, their relationship was somehow unwholesome and had bad effects on their personalities. Berve did not hide Alexander's great suffering after the death of his favourite friend. Therefore, in Berve's work we find precisely what Tarn erased: the special, unique and close relationship between Alexander and Hephaestion. Berve's description of it left more room for reading between the lines, especially when talking about his wonderful looks and his suggestive flair. Tarn's conservative reaction was an attempt, therefore, to dispel any *malentendu*.

But Tarn's nuisance with any suggestion of homosexuality was not something new. As we have already pinpointed, individuals as Bagoas are omitted from his narrative[70]. Nevertheless, it is more interesting how he handled Philip's death. There are different accounts of this death[71], but they all coincide that the murderer was a certain Pausanias, a Bodyguard. The details differ, but all of them imply some kind

[65] Berve 1926 I: 9-11.

[66] On Tarn's conception of Alexander's marriages and polygamy, see below.

[67] Tarn censured this particular aspect in his review of Berve's work: Tarn 1927c.

[68] Berve 1926 II: 169-175 (nº. 357).

[69] Berve 1926 I: 82.

[70] Tarn was not the only one to omit Bagoas from his works. He is not found in Droysen 1833 [2012]; Radet 1931; Wilcken 1932; Andreotti 1933; Burn 1947 [1966]; Robinson 1947 [1984]. Usually, the only Bagoas alluded is the one who helped Darius on his accession.

[71] D.S. XVI. 93-94; Plu. *Alex*. 10.5; Iust. IX. 6.3-8. Cf. Badian 1963, 2007; Bosworth 1971; Develin 1981; Ellis 1981; Kuskowski 2001; Antela-Bernárdez 2012.

of homosexual love or rape concerning Pausanias, Philip and/or Attalus. Of course, there were multiple suggestions of secret instigators, including Olympia, Alexander, the Lyncestians or the Persian king. Precisely, Tarn clung on this latter. Let's see the whole Tarn's account of Philip's assassination: "Next year Philip was assassinated. It was the official belief at the Macedonian court that the assassin was in Persian pay; it is possible enough[72]". That is all. However, this 'official belief' did not appear until some years later at least, in a letter sent from Alexander to Darius in Marathus[73]. Anyway, with or without Persian money, Tarn did not even mention the murderer's name or give any detail of the circumstances surrounding the regicide –not even that it happened during his daughter's wedding. Pausanias is condemned to *damnatio memoriae*. What we find is Tarn's usual sweeping under the carpet of uncomfortable episodes without further comment.

The effect of Berve's monography on Tarn is evident elsewhere. He was cited many times –and also refuted many times–, especially in military issues. But the need of replying some of his assertions is explicitly stated at the beginning of the eighteenth appendix, titled "Alexander's attitude to sex[74]". Berve 'forced' him to write that disgusting appendix[75] and he even apologized to the readers for doing it: "I regret having to write this Appendix, for the title might suggest the worst kind of popular historiography; but it is very necessary to straighten the matter out. What I wrote about it in *C.A.H.* VI is correct, and I have altered nothing; but readers are entitled to ask for the evidence[76]". So, Tarn was going to finally debase himself to give some explanations on those nasty issues after twenty years. Alexander's honour had to be restored. But all we can find in the following pages are reductive explanations: Peripatetics and Stoics' hostility and Vulgata's sensationalism.

This theory was nothing new and Tarn used it over the years on different issues[77]. As I have already pinpointed, the source categorization eased the rejection of any story reflecting badly on Alexander. The first part of the second volume is entirely devoted to fully develop his conception of the primary and the extant sources. Therefore, this first section did not stand isolated from the rest of

[72] Tarn 1927a: 354, 1948 I: 3. Then he discusses the aforementioned other possible accomplices; see note 149. He insisted in Persian instigation later on (1927a: 374, 1948 I: 37). Robinson (1947 [1984]: 54-55), although he regarded the Persian instigation as the most probable option, did not try to hide Pausanias' role as the perpetrator of the murder. However, he concealed the sexual side of the conflict, and only remarked that "[Pausanias] had been outrageously treated by Attalus and Cleopatra".

[73] Arr. *An*. II. 14.5; Curt IV. 1.12. The most contemporary evidence shows that the personal motivation was the most accepted cause then: Arist. *Pol*. V. 10.16 (1311b).

[74] Tarn 1948 II: 319-326. Cf. Robinson 1947 [1984]: 98.

[75] Tarn 1948 II: 319 n. 1: "Berve's disquisition, I, pp. 10-11, will show the necessity as well as anything".

[76] Tarn 1948 II: 319.

[77] Tarn 1939a (esp. 55-57). Cf. note 25.

the appendices, but it laid the foundation for the forthcoming studies. Of course, all of Alexander's 'sexual' episodes could be traced back to some of the so-called Vulgata or 'anti-Alexander' authors. According to Tarn[78], the denigrating stories appeared in the second generation of writers when the sources were in Greek hands. Two schools stood out among them: the Peripatetics and the Stoics. The former hated Alexander's for Callisthenes' death; the latter also hated him, but the reasons remain unknown[79]. The Peripatetics depicted Alexander as a good boy who "degenerated into a cruel, mean, and sensual tyrant[80]." But for Tarn, their attack was clumsy because they generated two weak and mutually excluding theories. On one hand, Theophrastus, among others, suggested that Alexander was not manly, but semi-impotent[81]. On the other hand, Dicearchus elaborated the story of Alexander's homosexuality after an alleged kiss between Alexander and Bagoas[82]. Of those two theories, the latest was the most widespread. Therefore, his main efforts focused on discredit Alexander's alleged homosexuality. Of course, he was halfway there with his previous categorization of the sources: Dicearchus was a biased and non-trustworthy author. However, he also tried to demonstrate that there was no real Bagoas and he was Dicearchus' fabrication[83]. I will not try to rebuke point by point Tarn's arguments –Badian did it sixty years ago[84]–, but we can take a look at his methods. Tarn again turned to psychological explanations: Nabarzanes' episode cannot be true because Alexander could not have act like that –especially if a possible execution could be involved[85]. He also showed his prejudiced opinion on the "careless" Curtius. Tarn made a forced reading of Nabarzanes' passage to report a non-existent contradiction and also privileged, of course, Arrian's account of Orxines' affair in detriment of Curtius' one with no further argument. Finally, his rejection of Bagoas' kiss is somehow embarrassing. His argument against it based on the inexistence of theatres in the East reflects a narrow-minded reading, turning down any single dramatic

[78] Tarn 1948 II: 131, 297-298. Tarn was not the only one to accept the Peripatetic/Stoic theory. He was taking it from Stroux (1933). Wilcken (1932: 171) and Andreotti (1933: 141) agreed too.

[79] Tarn 1948 II: 131.

[80] Tarn 1948 II: 319.

[81] Athen. X. 434f-435a. Theophrastus' story states that Olympias and Philip were worried about her son being a *gynnis*. So, in order to arouse his virility, they 'sent' him the courtesan Callixeina, who slept with Alexander several times. Maybe Callixeina should be identified with Pancaste/Campaspe (Ael. *VH*. XII. 34; Plin. *NH*. XXXV. 86-87; Lucian. *Im*. 7). On these stories, see Berve 1926 II: 190-191 (nº. 406); Reames (-Zimmerman) 1998: 177 n. 50, 1999: 89 n. 47; Heckel 2006: 77-78; Ogden 2007: 88-108, 2009: 209, 2011: 144-146, 174-184; Carney 2009: 192-193. In the previous passage, Cariystius of Pergamum explained Alexander's lack of manliness due to his excessive drinking.

[82] Athen. XII. 603a-b.

[83] Tarn 1948 II: 320-322.

[84] Badian 1958b. See also Ogden 2011: 167-170; Briant 2015: 344-354.

[85] See note 129.

contest celebrated elsewhere in Asia during Alexander's campaign. The second argument after Plutarch's –not Dicearchus– geographical mistake[86] shows his eager willingness to rebuke the episode no matter what. One cannot reject a whole episode on the inadequacy of a pair of casual details. Anyway, Tarn was fully satisfied and closed the case saying it was "refreshing to turn to the truth of the matter[87]".

As we have already seen, Tarn had an extremely negative opinion of Curtius. He was a 'Peripatetic herald' and he took his main portrait of Alexander from that school showing Alexander's apparent degeneration due to his own fortune. Combined with it, there was another hostile portrait –origin unknown– going through Curtius' book, which showed Alexander as bad from his birth[88]. Curtius was also responsible for preserving another "invented character" related to Alexander's interest in boys: Excipinus[89]. He was a very obscure personage and Tarn was probably right when asserted that whose name was not Greek nor from any other known language. But he hid that the reconstruction "Euxenippus", a perfectly Greek name, had been suggested[90]. Certainly, the vague and lonely allusion from Curtius is open to different interpretations[91], but it cannot be simply ruled out based on onomastics. Again, Tarn's haste on getting rid of an annoying individual is counter-productive and his rejection is invalid.

Curtius and the Peripatetics were not the only culprits on spreading bad stories about Alexander. Aelian and Justin were found guilty of producing the "absurdity that Hephaestion was Alexander's minion[92]." For Tarn, Justin sympathised with the Stoic portrait of Alexander as a vicious man[93]. Given that he did not employ Peripatetic material, Hephaestion was just taking the place of Bagoas. Justin was also responsible for some "foolish exaggerations" like Alexander visiting personally Darius' women after Issus without sending a general first, Alexander sleeping with Darius' concubines and his marriage with Stateira considered a crime, among others. It seems an overstatement to single out Aelian and Justin as the creators of the gossip about Hephaestion when Tarn also accepted the existence of many ancient accounts on this topic[94]. Other extant authors, like Arrian – although quoting his master Epictetus -, Curtius, Diodorus,

[86] Plu. *Alex*. 67.7-8. He confused Gedrosia with Carmania.

[87] Tarn 1948 II: 322.

[88] Tarn 1948 II: 92-100, 129.

[89] Curt. VII. 9.19; Tarn 1948 II: 321.

[90] Berve (1926 II: 158 (nº. 318)) and Tataki (1998: 314 (nº. 48)) included him in their prosopographies under this second name.

[91] See Reames (-Zimmerman) 1998: 122, 166-167, 1999: 91-92; Ogden 2009: 211, 2011: 159, 239 n. 34. Curiously, Heckel had an entry of him (as Excipinus) in his *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (1992: 267 (nº. 1.10)), but not in his later prosopography in 2006.

[92] Tarn 1948 II: 321; Iust. XII. 12.11; Ael. *VH*. XII. 7.

[93] Tarn 1948 II: 122-123.

[94] Tarn 1948 II: 306.

Lucian or Diogenes, also wrote in terms that more or less emphatically pointed to a homoerotic relationship between them[95]. It is very likely that these rumours, either well-grounded or malicious, appeared very early, even during Alexander lifetime. Maybe Ephippus or Nicobule would have been better –and earlier– bets for Tarn[96].

To certify Alexander's recovered heterosexuality, Tarn used some further examples. The first is Alexander's rejection of Philoxenus' proposal to buy two beautiful boys for him[97]. But this example cannot stand. It is up to Tarn to regard the boys as potential lovers or prostitutes; maybe they were just dancers[98]. However, the rejection would not have been something really surprising indeed. As we will see concerning his behaviour with women, Alexander's proceeding was just the one expected[99]. It would be unworthy of a civilized king to accept buying two slaves for his own pleasure (i.e. paying for sex) if they really must be regarded like that[100]. Tarn, finally, insisted on his tendentious idea that every positive story must be true, even when coming from dubious documents as Alexander's letters[101]. Curiously enough, Tarn did not say a word on the consecutive anecdote in that passage. It is very similar, but this time is Hagnon's proposal of buying for him a certain Crobylus what is rejected by Alexander. So, the same objections can be raised against the 'exceptionality' of Alexander's refusal. But maybe Tarn's silence could reflect his will to hide a basic fact: Plutarch's bias in this passage. All the episodes gathered in this chapter were selected in order to show Alexander's self-control and sobriety. Previously, Plutarch had depicted Alexander's first meeting with Darius' women and he also stated that Alexander had known no woman before marriage, but Barsine. Therefore, Plutarch's selection was not impartial, but he did it with a goal in mind: proving Alexander's self-continence. So, although Tarn's statement that "no one had any interest in inventing such [positive] stories[102]", maybe some could have had some interest in selecting, adapting or even creating anecdotes for their own 'apologetic' agendas[103]. Therefore, this first proof must be rejected both from historical and source criticism bases. Maybe, as Berve suggested, the offerings themselves –and their recurrence– are very telling

[95] See a compilation of these texts in Ogden 2009: 210-212, 2011: 158-160.

[96] Cf. Heckel 1992: 73; Ogden 2009: 212 n. 59.

[97] Plu. *Alex*. 22.1. The episode is also found in Plu. *Mor.* 333a (one boy, not two), 1099d.

[98] Athen. I. 22d.

[99] Dover 1973: 64-65, 1974: 208-209; Nikoloutsos 2008: 232; Antela-Bernárdez 2010: 340-341; Skinner 2010: 121.

[100] Dover 1973: 63-64, 1974: 178-180, 210. On homoerotic relationships, citizenry and slavery, see Golden 1984.

[101] Tarn 1948 II: 322 n. 5. Cf. Pearson 1955: 447-448; Hamilton 1961: 13.

[102] Tarn 1948 II: 298.

[103] Similarly, the next passage in Plutarch (*Alex*. 23) tries to deny Alexander's alcoholism.

and can be interpreted that it was common knowledge Alexander's interest in boys[104].

The second further piece of evidence is a passage from Plutarch's second speech *On the fortune or virtue of Alexander*. There, Plutarch tells that "Alexander was courteous to everyone except τοῖς καλοῖς[105]". For Tarn, καλοῖς was a euphemism. Of what exactly, it is up to Tarn again. Plutarch's sentence is too vague to draw clear conclusions about his exact meaning. Who were those τοῖς καλοῖς[106]? What did mean to act ὑπερήφανος? However, the context where the phrase is found is clear. Again, it comes from a paragraph devoted to demonstrating Alexander's self-continence. Therefore, again the same objection must be raised: the passage had a very particular goal in order to check the author's conception[107].

Finally, Tarn showed the last defence's exhibit: Carystius' passage about Alexander's rejecting a kiss from Charon of Chalcis' boy[108]. Tarn identified him as Charon's son, but he is described as παῖς, a word also meaning 'boy' or 'slave/servant'. The way the relation between Charon and the boy is expressed suggests probably the latter option. The episode's setting was some kind of symposium or party with Craterus as host[109]. Therefore, it is probable that the boy was Charon's lover or pleasure boy[110]. It seems that Tarn preferred to cling to the first meaning of παῖς, so he could avoid Alexander mingling with wrong-headed people. Tarn also concealed that before Charon told the boy to kiss Alexander, the king had praised (ἐπαινέω) him and maybe it could have been understood as showing some interest for his part[111]. As in the former cases, not to kiss the young boy was the expected –and advisable– behaviour[112]. Moreover, Tarn considered that Athenaeus was stultifying himself because he presented this anecdote immediately after Dicearchus' fragment on Bagoas' kiss. For Tarn, they were mutually contradicting, especially after Athenaeus himself accepting "[f]or though the king was of a very amorous disposition, still he was at all

[104] Berve 1926 I: 11; cf. Schachermeyr 1973: 504.

[105] Plu. *Mor.* 338d; Tarn 1948 II: 322. Cf. Philips 1878: 502 ("mild and affable to all others, proud and lofty only to fair youth"); Babbitt 1936: 451 ("and although he bore himself humanely toward all other persons, it was toward fair youth alone that he conducted himself haughtily").

[106] See Dover 1989: 66 for the genre ambiguity of the term.

[107] Cf. X. *Ages*. 5.1-5.

[108] Athen. XIII. 603b-c.

[109] Dover 1989: 94.

[110] Plutarch also employed παῖς for the two boys of Philoxenus. This word also was used to describe the junior partner of a paederastic relationship: Golden 1984: 309-310, 312; Dover 1989: 85.

[111] The boy's behaviour could have been regarded inappropriate for submitting himself at the first opportunity. The *eromenos* was expected to show some 'resistance' before consenting: Dover 1973: 66-67, 1989: 84-85, 88-91, 106-109; Reames (-Zimmerman) 1998: 156, 1999: 84; Nikoloutsos 2008: 231; Skinner 2010: 124.

[112] X. *Ages*. 5.4-5, *Mem*. I. 3.11; cf. Dover 1989: 63-64.

times sufficiently master of himself to have a due regard to decorum, and to the preservation of appearances[113]". But there is no such contradiction: his alleged continence did not prove he was not homosexual. Athenaeus' commentary has no sense if he did not think Alexander had an interest in boys. His self-control was nothing to highlight if he was not attracted by them. Tarn indeed was the one contradicting himself. If his statement is accepted, then Alexander's chaste behaviour towards Persian women could be regarded as proof of him not being heterosexual[114]. The rejection of a kiss or the refusal of sleeping with those women could be interpreted in the same way. Besides, it feels somehow hypocrite from Tarn accepting this story from the same unreliable man that followed Dicearchus depicting Alexander as lacking manliness[115]. But, of course, a good story should be necessarily true, wherever it comes from.

One could think that the best way to prove that Alexander was straight should have been exposing all the known stories of his multiple mistresses, flings and, of course, his three wives. Not for Tarn. It would have implied accepting Alexander's promiscuity. But as he had already stated in the chapters from the *CAH*, the Macedonian king was the greatest example of self-continence and his relationships with women were only ruled by chivalry and magnanimity. Alexander's body was a servant of his mind, so he was not attracted by feminine beauty, but for the beauty of virtue[116]. Tarn gathered many examples showing Alexander as the ultimate protector of women[117]. The alleged 360 concubines from Darius' harem remained in the palace only to prevent them to fall in prostitution or famine. Any other suggestion about lustful actual intentions were only Stoic defamation[118]. He was also the protector of many other women[119],

[113] Yonge 1854: 962.

[114] This is the same example employed by Athenaeus to reinforce his statement.

[115] See note 193. The anecdote itself it is suspiciously very similar to that other attributed to Agesilaus: X. *Ages*. 5.4-5.

[116] See also Robinson 1947 [1984]: 161-162.

[117] Tarn 1948 II: 325: "there was something very like compassion for the whole of womankind; in his day they needed it badly enough."

[118] Tarn 1948 II: 123, 323 (see also Tarn 1939b: 155); cf. Bickermann 1950: 43. Justin (XII. 3.10) was their representative given his 'proven' Stoic affinities. Surprisingly, the 'Peripatetic' Curtius (VI. 6.8) is used here to show that Alexander gave shelter to the girls only for humanitarian reasons. However, this same passage had been employed by Tarn (1948 II: 98) to denounce Curtius' portrait of Alexander's degeneration. Given the sense of that chapter in Curtius, the latter option fits better. It seems unlikely that Curtius introduced a positive remark in the middle of a paragraph conceived to blame Alexander's decadence (cf. Tarn 1948 II: 94, 325 n. 8). Anyway, this example is maybe one of the most telling about the way Tarn twisted and forced the sources: the same passage was used for demonstrating opposite statements. Cf. D.S. XVII. 77.6-7 (he credited Cleitarchus as the original source of the story: Tarn 1948 II: 67-68, 82).

[119] Tarn 1948 II: 325.

including Darius' family, the brides of Susa, two unknown lovers[120], Atropates' cavalrywomen, Timocleia, some women raped by two soldiers of Parmenio[121] and all Persepolis' womankind[122].

From all the above examples, maybe we should take a look at Darius' women case because it has been mentioned elsewhere in this paper and it stood as one of the key examples for showing Alexander's praised self-control: "[h]is treatment of Darius' family, which so astonished the world, went beyond mere protection; the two girls were not only to be kept safe, but were not to hear or expect or suspect anything wrong[123]". Some scholars have analysed if there was something "wrong" indeed[124]. Plutarch and Justin tell that Darius' wife died by childbirth[125]. If the chronology is correct and she died right before Gaugamela, Darius could not have been the child's father. And then the most plausible option is Alexander himself. However, Curtius claims that her death was due to exhaustion[126]. Anyway, the issue cannot be conclusively resolved, but it is a first doubt on Alexander's behaviour towards the royal women. However, was Alexander's behaviour in fact that exceptional? No, not really. Had he proceeded differently, he would actually have "astonished the world[127]". Alexander's behaviour was no more, no less the one expected. A victorious and civilized leader had to show magnanimity towards the innocent prisoners. Self-control was a virtue to be found in every great man, in order to demonstrate he was no slave of any earthly temptation –eating, drinking,

[120] Plu. *Alex*. 41.9-10; *Mor*. 180f, 339d. Tarn himself (1948 II: 325 n. 4) admitted that the existence of two different names for the man could imply the story not being true. However, again he brought up his idea that the favourable episodes are not likely to be later fabrications.

[121] Plu. *Alex*. 22.4. Very similar Robinson 1947 [1984]: 98. In Tarn's words: "No one could have invented that story, for no one could understand his action." There is no need to insist on Tarn's recurrent criterion and the bias on Plutarch's chapter, but maybe it can be said that some could have understood his action. The victims were mercenaries' women (wives? cf. Hamilton 1969: 57) and the offenders were two Macedonian soldiers. Put into trial the rapists was an advisable measure in order to settle any unrest from the mercenaries in the camp and to prevent any impunity feeling from the Macedonians and the possible relapse in these disruptive crimes.

[122] Another example of Tarn's double standard. Even though he regarded Curtius' information (V. 6.8) on the sack of Persepolis as an invention, he accepted Alexander's order forbidding to touch the women: "that order was given *somewhere*" (his italics).

[123] Tarn 1948 II: 323.

[124] Cf. Berve 1926 I: 362-363 (nº. 721); Atkinson 1980: 392; Bosworth 1980a: 221; Yardley / Heckel 1997: 140-141; Carney 1996: 570-571, 2000: 94-96, 285 n. 34; Briant 2015: 337.

[125] Plu. *Alex*. 30.1; Iust. XI. 12.6.

[126] Maybe the 'hostile' Curtius was there to save the day again: "Curtius may have attributed a different reason to Stateira's death –a rationalization designed to save Alexander's reputation and to remove an inconsistency from the story" (Atkinson 1980: 392). On the other hand, as Carney (1996: 570) pinpoints, Alexander's excessive grief after Stateira's death aroused Darius' suspicion (Curt. IV. 10.31-34).

[127] Tarn 1948 II: 325.

sex… Therefore, it was not an exclusive trait of Alexander, but the proof of him being another of those great men and so he could ultimately achieve great deeds, singling them out from the rest of men. Any men destined to rule had not to be mastered by their passions. Alexander's chivalrous treatment of the Persian royal women was part of a wider literary *topos*[128] and, in turn, it became one itself repeated until modern times[129]. The insistence found in the sources about Alexander's gentlemanly behaviour towards those women –and those beautiful boys offered to him– was not caused by an alleged exceptionality of his actions, but for its usefulness as propaganda topic and character's portrayal[130]. So maybe, as Carney has suggested[131], the emphasis of the sources could also indicate that some malicious gossip had been spread about Alexander's actual dealings with those women and so this account was conceived as a piece of counter-propaganda to silent them. Or, following Briant[132], the episode was employed by some authors to absolve Alexander for the faults and vices sometimes attached to him –and Tarn would fit this option quite properly[133]. Besides that, Alexander's respect for the Persian women –especially Darius' wife– was a wise and advisable behaviour also from the political perspective. They could be a very useful trump card for his future dealings with Darius III –and maybe for not making both Macedonian and Persian elites feel awkward and to sustain his legitimacy[134]. Even with the doubt cast by the possible death by childbirth of Darius' wife, it remains very plausible that Alexander did not have sexual intercourse with her[135]. Nevertheless, this behaviour was far from being surprising and he had very strong practical reasons for acting this way.

[128] Carney 1996: 567-568, 2000: 94; Ogden 2011: 131-133, 137; Briant 2015: 323-337.

[129] Tarn himself (1927a: 369, 1948 I: 28) admitted the creation of this literary *topos*, but he interpreted its significance the other way round: "Later writers never tired of embroidering the theme of Alexander's treatment of these ladies; their praise of what he did throws a dry light on what he was expected to do".

[130] Dover 1973: 64-65, 1974: 208-209; Carney 2000: 94, 100; Nikoloutsos 2008: 232; Antela-Bernárdez 2010: 340-341; Skinner 2010: 121; Briant 2015: 323-324, 336, 343.

[131] Carney 1996: 568, 571; 2000: 96.

[132] Briant 2015: 324.

[133] Other modern –and some coetaneous– scholars did not explain Alexander's alleged lack of interest in sex as the ultimate demonstration of his masterly self-continence. He was simply cold about sex: Wilcken 1932: 54. For Burn (1947 [1966]: 17-18, 65, 88, 105), it was a mix of Oedipus complex and some kind of trauma created by his mother. Schachermeyr (1973: 504, 583) also alluded to psychological problems –psychopathic disorder– combined with his stronger interest in boys. For Berve (1926 I: 10-11), as we have already seen, it was this latter factor the main reason for his frigidity.

[134] Carney 1996: 568-570, 2000: 95, 111-112; Briant 2015: 343.

[135] Carney 2000: 95.

However, Alexander was related in the sources with many other women[136]. For Tarn, there were a group of authors, with Cleitarchus as the main exponent, who loved any sensational or colourful story. Those stories found their way in their works and finally they appeared in our extant sources. In the best-case scenario, they were distortions or exaggeration of real facts, but most of the times were only fanciful inventions. With this list of usual suspects, Tarn rejected any single uncomfortable episode, all covered up with a dubious source analysis layer[137]. For Tarn, Cleitarchus was a hostile, sensationalist liar[138]. He would have been related somehow to the creation or the spreading of certain episodes like Thais' role in the burning of Persepolis, the Amazon queen and Cleophis, among others[139]. Cleitarchus would have been the inspiration for the hostile portrait of Alexander found in Diodorus[140].

As we have already pinpointed, back in 1927 Tarn had quickly rejected Thais' story[141] and so he did it again in 1948, but he spent some more words on doing it[142]. Even so, he admitted that the moral of the story –an Athenian girl avenging Xerxes' burning– was "a clever touch" by Cleitarchus[143]. Curtius' version of the incident did not deserve any trust because it was sheer Peripatetic slander. Besides the usual source prejudices, Tarn also dismissed the episode from the historical ground. Although many generals –not Alexander, of course– had their own mistresses, for Tarn the women were not present during the dinners, which were an exclusively masculine affair because they are not mentioned explicitly anywhere. The presence of flute-girls and others artists was impossible for two reasons: it was a Greek custom, not Macedonian; and "such a practice would have been entirely out of keeping with Alexander's character." Another time the psychological reason. The presence of those girls was just propaganda from those who accused him of drunkenness. And given that Alexander only attended to the banquets "for the sake of friendly conversation, not for wine" the flautists could be easily ruled out. For Tarn, "[w]hat doubtless did happen was that, when the palace was fired, the women rushed out of their quarters to see; that would

[136] As we have already said, in the book was also reprinted his article on Barsine and Heracles.

[137] In this section, we will not focus exclusively on the eighteenth appendix, but we look also at the rest of the book.

[138] Tarn 1948 II: 54-55, 127.

[139] Tarn 1948 II: 45.

[140] Tarn 1948 II: 66-68, 82-83, 128. Especially when referring to his sporadic meetings with Darius' concubines (D.S. XVII. 77.6). As we have seen, for Tarn it was a humanitarian measure.

[141] See note 150. Cleitarchus (*FGrH* 137) F11 (*apud* Athen. XIII. 576d-e); D.S. XVII. 72; Plu. *Alex*. 38; Curt. V. 7.2-7, 11; cf. Arr. *An*. III. 18.11-12 (Ogden 2011: 143-144)

[142] Tarn 1948 II: 48-49.

[143] Tarn 1948 II: 48. This moral, found in Diodorus, should be Cleitarchus own; Diodorus was not clever enough in Tarn's opinion.

be quite enough for a Cleitarchus[144]". Alexander was not drunk, of course, so his act was completely deliberated and was a political statement. Certainly, it is difficult to know how the things went and Thais' actual role[145], but once more Tarn's reasons for rejection are deceptive. As we have already underlined, he again recurred to his prejudice against certain authors and to psychological motives –"Alexander would not have done it this way". Similarly, his dismissal of the presence of women in dinners and symposiums was based on certain preconceptions and a deceitful logical concatenation. Alexander did not drink[146] and every story about his drunkenness was only a malicious invention. For Tarn, if alcohol is ruled out, everything falls apart in a domino effect. Therefore, no drinking, no girls in the party, no Thais instigating him to burn down the palace[147]. Even if Curtius, Plutarch[148] and Diodorus clearly stated the presence of women during the dinner and the inebriated state of the attendees, it wields no significance because Cleitarchus was the ultimate source for Tarn. However, it cannot be ascertained that Cleitarchus was the 'creator' of the story. Athenaeus' passage[149] quoting him gives no details on what exactly happened, but it only says she was the cause of the burning. It is not unlikely that many versions depicted her in a leading role. Plutarch explicitly states that it was explained in this way by some authors (ταῦτα)[150]. Tarn found in Thais' story a good chance to kill two birds with one stone.

The second possible invention of Cleitarchus was Alexander's affair with the Indian queen Cleophis, although Tarn also considered Onesicritus another

[144] Tarn 1948 II: 48-49.

[145] Radet's version (1931: 190-197) of the whole incident is probably one of the most entrancing and suggestive with Thais and Alexander as Dionysus' acolytes. See also: Berve 1926 II: 175 (nº. 359) (the details in Cleitarchus would have been romanticized, but Thais had participated in the banquet and inspired somehow the following actions); Wilcken 1932: 144-145 (Cleitarchus' fabrication); Andreotti 1933: 114 (impossible to know the real motives); Burn 1947 [1966]: 122 (no need to reject Thais' story); Robinson 1947 [1984]: 134 (legend); Schachermeyr 1973: 289 (accepting Thais' part as inspiration).

[146] In a curious example of his narrow-minded way of reading the sources, when telling the details of Diodorus' version, Tarn (1948 II: 47) wrote: "Alexander is at dinner with his Companions, who get drunk; it is not said that Alexander was drunk". When reading the whole passage, there is no motive to support the need to single out the king. He participated in the party like everybody else. Cf. Curt. V. 7.11.

[147] Bickermann 1950: 43.

[148] The same and one Plutarch that gathered the episodes on Alexander's continence and who said that he was not very keen on wine, but on the conversation. This statement seems to go back to Aristobolus (Arr. *An*. VII. 29.4). Tarn (1948 II: 48), of course, gave great credit to Aristobulus' apologetic explanation: "Aristobulus, who knew far more about Alexander than any popular writer did, said that he sat long at dinner, but for the sake of friendly conversation, not of wine; that alone suffices to negative the flute-girls". Also in page 41.

[149] Athen. XIII. 576d-e.

[150] Plu. *Alex*. 38.4.

good option[151]. Tarn regarded the whole incident "worse than untrue, it is silly[152]." However, he admitted that it was based on a real person, not like Barsine or the Amazon queen. Certainly, the historicity of the whole incident seems very dubious and their relationship is only found in Justin –and insinuated in Curtius[153]. But Tarn's arguments for rejecting it are very dubious too. First of all, some classism can be detected. He tried to 'vilify' Cleophis stripping her of the royal condition. So, she was not even worthy of Alexander's attention. He considered the Assaceni part of the so-called autonomous Indians, so they did not have kings or queens. Tarn also regarded her son as hegemon, not king nor prince. The accounts of the episode are confusing, but it seems fair clear that the Assaceni were a monarchy. The homonymous king is mentioned in Arrian, Curtius and Strabo[154]. As Curtius and the *Metz Epitome* clearly indicate, Assacenus had died just before Alexander's arrival. The leader of the defence was not him and we cannot be sure that he was from the royal family neither[155], but there is some agreement in showing Cleophis as a queen –or regent at least. Her possible leading rule during the negotiations would have been strange for the mother of a mere *hegemon*, but not for a queen.

Besides, Tarn stressed the difference of age between them to emphasize the impossibility of any intimate relationship. Certainly, Cleophis would have not been a very young woman then. The sources agree that she was the mother of the deceased king Assacenus[156] at least –and maybe she was the mother of Amminais and Aphrices/Erices[157]. Therefore, her sons were old enough to lead the local forces and the *Metz Epitome* even gives her a grandson –and Arrian, a granddaughter[158]? But she should be still fertile if the stories about her later son are true –whoever the actual father was. It is difficult to assess her real age without any further data. Having grown-up sons and even grandsons/granddaughters is not enough to tell she was really an old age woman[159]. But how old was she when she

[151] Tarn 1948 II: 45, 81. However, some authors have propounded that the episode was (re) elaborated in Roman times to recall the relationship between Cleopatra and Cesar. Certainly, the name of the queen only appears in Latin authors. If true, this would imply Cleitarchus' absolution in this case. See von Gutschmid 1882: 553-554; Yardley / Heckel 1997: 241-242; Heckel 2009: 47-48; Ogden 2009: 209, 2011: 150-151

[152] Tarn 1948 II: 324.

[153] Iust. XII. 7.9-10; Curt. VIII. 10.34-36; cf. Arr. *An*. IV. 27.2-4; D.S. XVII. 84; *Metz* 39-46; Oros. III. 19.1. As Tarn happily highlighted (1948 II: 324 n. 3), even Berve (1926 II: 214 (nº. 435)) thought that all the episode was a romantic invention.

[154] Arr. *An*. IV. 27.4, 30.5; Curt. VIII. 10.22; Str. XV. 1.17. See Bosworth 1995: 167.

[155] Could he be Assacenus' brother, Amminais? Cf. Bosworth 1995: 174; Yardley / Heckel 1997: 241; Heckel 2006: 22, 90, 280-281 (s.v. M24).

[156] But Heckel (2009: 47) suggests she could be her widow.

[157] Heckel 2006: 22, 40.

[158] Arrian (*An*. IV. 27.4) tells that a daughter from Assacenus was captured with Cleophis. *Metz Epitome* (39, 45) considers him a boy. Curtius (VIII. 10.35) says that the child was her own son.

[159] Tarn 1948 II: 45, 324.

bore her first son? When an Assacenian boy was old enough to rule and command the army[160]? It feels like Tarn projecting his own world criteria and prejudices to ancient events[161]. As we have already said, the available data does not allow to conclude that she actually slept with Alexander. Nevertheless, Tarn preferred to dismiss the possibility alluding to her class and age, and not through source criticism. Alexander would not indulge to lose his praised self-continence with an old, vulgar woman. Cleophis' episode was not the first time recurred to that kind of arguments. In Barsine's paper, he also put forward similar objections to dismiss their liaison. If she was the widow of Mentor o Memnon, she had to be old[162]; if she was Artabazus' daughter or a mere prisoner, she was not worthy enough[163]. Somehow, it is the same with the courtesans: they were not of the appropriate class to meddle with the king. All the above is very telling about Tarn's ideas about human relationships, where there is no possibility of overstepping the generational and hierarchical gaps.

The third case linked by Tarn to Cleitarchus is Thalestris' one[164], the Amazon queen. However, Tarn admitted that Cleitarchus was not the original creator –maybe Onesicritus or Polycleitus[165]-, but he should be the source for the accounts found in Curtius, Diodorus and Justin[166]. Tarn devoted an entire appendix to assess the real facts which could have inspired the legend about the meeting between Alexander and Thalestris[167]. Certainly, Thalestris –or whatever his real name was– was not an actual Amazon and the accounts are highly romanticized and far from the truth which could be lying at the bottom[168]. Therefore, I find more interesting to take a look at some details from Tarn's explanation.

[160] After all, Alexander was left in charge of Macedonia with only sixteen years and had a leading role in Chaeronea, among others diplomatic and political appointments: Aesch. I. 168-169; Isoc. *Ep.* V; D.S. XVI. 86.1; Arr. *An.* I. 5.2; Plu. *Alex*. 5.1-3, 9.1-4, *Mor.* 342b-c; Iust. IX. 1.8, 4.5

[161] See also Tarn's depiction of Agathocleia: Tarn 1938: 227. For Tarn, Agathocleia would have been between 24 and 34 years when she married. This 'advanced' age of marrying was because a worthy candidate had not appeared before. Any princess who married a commoner would not have been very young.

[162] Tarn 1921a: 24-25.

[163] Tarn 1921a: 26. He explicitly tried to demonstrate that Artabazus was not from royal blood, and so Barsine.

[164] The sources agree in her name, but Justin gives also the alternative name Minythya.

[165] Plu. *Alex*. 46.1; Str. XI. 5.4; Tarn 1948 II: 328.

[166] Curt. VI. 5.24-32; D.S. XVII. 77.1-3; Iust. XII. 3.5-7; Tarn 1948 II: 45, 55, 83, 92, 103. Tarn (45) suggested that the Amazon queen's episode could have been the inspiration for Cleophis' story; cf. Ogden 2009: 209, 2011: 151. The alternative name Minythya found in Justin maybe suggests that either he or Trogus combined two different sources: cf. Tarn 1948 II: 125; Atkinson 1994: 197; Yardley / Heckel 1997: 200-201; Baynham 2001: 116 n. 10; Munding 2011: 127.

[167] Tarn 1948 II: 326-329 (App. 19: "The Queen of the Amazons"); see also 132, 302. However, he had previously stated that she did not exist (323).

[168] Cf. Bosworth 1995: 103.

He believed that the girl who inspired the whole episode was the king of the Scythians' daughter, who was offered to Alexander as a bride[169]. He was somehow surprised because Arrian called her βασίλισσα, 'princess': "[n]o doubt Arrian's use of the word for a 'barbarian' girl is a glance at the Queen of the Amazons story[170]." It is not definitively disposable, but Arrian related another episode with the Amazon queen more explicitly. So, I suspect here we are dealing again with another attempt by Tarn for driving any improper person away from Alexander. A Scythian girl was not worthy enough for bearing any royal title, so it could only be explained through the connection with the mythical Amazon queen. But Tarn employed it as an argument to support his theory. Besides, it is remarkable his explicit orientalism in pointing Pharasmanes as the involuntary trigger for people calling Amazon the Saca girl. Alexander would have asked him for the Amazons, and Pharasmenes, "with the usual Oriental desire to please", asserted they were his neighbours without even knowing what the king was talking about[171]. Pharasmanes was turned in a servile fool by Tarn[172].

Maybe some authors based the Amazon queen episode on this event, but not Arrian, whatever Tarn said[173]. As aforementioned, Arrian connected the Amazons with the hundred armed girls sent by Atropates, even devoting a digression to discuss some Greek traditions about the Amazons[174]. In Arrian's passage, we can find a common characteristic alluded in all the other accounts about the dealings of Alexander and the Amazon queen: her desire to beget a child from the king[175]. Although Arrian gave no credit to these details, it is plain clear he thought that Atropates' girls' incident as the base for the stories about the encounter of Alexander and the Amazons, not the Saca girl one[176]. However, Tarn used this episode to praise and illustrate Alexander's protection of the women. Arrian tells that Alexander sent them back to prevent any act of ὕβρις from the soldiers. Tarn again interpreted this decision as another extraordinary display of Alexander's nature: "[n]o one living but Alexander could or would have thought of such a thing, and no one could have invented such a reason; had there never been camp-followers before[177]?" It is clear that camp-followers and soldiers were far from

[169] Arr. *An*. IV. 15.1-3; cf. Plu. *Alex*. 46.3; Curt. VIII. 1.9.

[170] Tarn 1948 II: 327.

[171] Tarn 1948 II: 327-328; Baynham 2001: 120.

[172] And so Robinson (1947 [1984]: 151-152).

[173] Tarn 1948 II: 329; Burn 1947 [1966]: 139; Bosworth 1995: 102-103.

[174] Arr. *An*. VII. 13.2-6; Berve 1926 II: 419 (nº. 26); Radet 1933: 376-377; Mederer 1936: 90-91; Badian 1985: 484; Bosworth 1988: 65-67; Atkinson 1994: 198-199; Baynham 2001: 118, 122; Ogden 2009: 210; Munding 2011: 132-133.

[175] Cf. Baynham 2001: 121.

[176] Certainly, Arrian also used here the word βασίλισσα for referring two Amazon queens. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Arrian exclusively employed it for this and he could not label any other royal woman, whatever his origin, with the term.

[177] Tarn 1948 II: 329; see also page 325.

being the same. The female squadron would have been integrated somewhere in the army ranks and there was no place for women among 'civilized' troops[178]. Their integration would have meant the complete barbarisation of Alexander in Greek and Macedonian eyes[179]. Moreover, Alexander could have especially protected women, but that is far from regarding them as his equal and he probably thought that including women in the army was out of place too[180]. Therefore, even though the potential assaults from the soldiery could have been also weighed, Alexander probably was just following more pragmatic reasons for sending Atropates' cavalrywomen back home.

It is also curious that Tarn hid certain 'embarrassing' details keeping the Greek words, and not the English translation: "the Queen of the Amazons came to Alexander παιδοποιίας χάριν, as a foreign bride married for political reasons would"; "Alexander sent them home again with a message to their queen that he would come to her παιδοποιησόμενος[181]". Both expressions made reference to the Amazon queen's offer/wish of begetting a child from Alexander. We found a third variation with the same meaning but without Greek words this time: "a mythical Queen of the Amazons visited him for the same purpose for which the Queen of Sheba visited Solomon[182]". Tarn seemed to be trying to protect lay eyes from those disgusting matters, as some others did not translate certain Catullus' poems or bowdlerize some Classical texts, for example.

A final episode worthy of mentioning is Alexander's visit to Delphi. Tarn devoted many paragraphs on the issue in his appendix about the epithet ἀνίκητος[183]. According to Plutarch[184], Alexander went to Delphi on an inauspicious day, and the prophetess rejected to make any prediction. However, when Alexander was forcing her to go to the sacred tripod and carry on with the consultation, she exclaimed: "You are invincible, son." The king interpreted it as an omen and he

[178] We are referring to plain soldiers. Some Macedonian queens are attested leading armies, especially during the Diadochi struggles. However, the only one allegedly involved in actual fighting was Cynnane, Alexander's half-sister: Polyaen. VIII. 60. But she was regarded half-barbarian being her mother an Illyrian princess. In the 'vulgate' accounts the Amazon episode occurs related to Alexander's implementation of Persian customs and dress: Baynham 2001: 123.

[179] In Arrian, this episode appears right after Opis' mutiny. The Amazon queen story is followed by Alexander's adoption of Persian ritual and dress in Curtius (Bagoas included), Justin and Diodorus; cf. Daumas 1992; Munding 2011: 134-135, 138-142; *contra* Baynham 2001: 126.

[180] If they were really cavalrywomen. Badian (1985: 484) and Baynham (2001: 120-121) suggest that maybe they were just some prostitutes who had learnt to ride and they were part of a charade.

[181] Tarn 1948 II: 327, 329.

[182] Tarn 1948 II: 323.

[183] Tarn 1948 II: 338-346 (App. 21: "ΑΝΙΚΗΤΟΣ").

[184] Plu. *Alex*. 14.6-8.

left her in peace. As I stated elsewhere[185], the historicity of this episode is very questionable and there is no way to assess if Alexander actually visited the shrine and how the visit would have gone on. The story is very similar to another attributed to Philomelus, who also compelled the Pythia to prophesy and regarded as an omen a casual expression from her[186]. Those stories can hardly be interpreted as flattering for either men, but Tarn differentiated between the behaviours of the gentle Alexander and the insolent Philomelus[187]. The latter was so infamous that would have used his men to force the prophetess. But, for Tarn, "no one can even imagine Alexander using force to any woman, let alone a priestess[188]". He did not display any force against her, probably he had only said something like "O, come along[189]". Therefore, Alexander appeared again as the great protector of women. Moreover, he contrasted "a middle-aged woman saying to a young prince: 'Boy, you are irresistible' and her saying to a body of armed soldiery: 'I am in your power.'" This suggestive commentary looks extremely odd for the prude Tarn because it seems to insinuate a kind of underlying sexual tension, although only from the Pythia. Maybe he was trying to emphasize that he was manly enough to rouse attraction in any women. Given the nature of this episode, it seems unlikely that it arose from the so-called 'good' tradition. However, Tarn twisted the story based on his ideas about Alexander's personality and, by excluding from the get-go the possibility of any violence from him, it became an anecdote to praise Alexander's chivalry[190].

To sum up, after analysing these cases, Tarn virtually made disappear any single person who could be related somehow intimately with Alexander[191]: Hephaestion became an average –but lucky– official; Bagoas, Excipinus and Barsine were malicious elaborations and vanished; Thais had nothing to do with Persepolis' burning because there were no courtesans at Alexander's sober parties; Cleophis was just an ordinary woman with no chance to have a liaison

[185] Mendoza 2019b: 323-339.

[186] D.S. XVI. 25.3, 26.6-27.2.

[187] Tarn 1948: 345-346.

[188] Tarn 1948 II: 346.

[189] Tarn 1948 II: 346 n. 1. Tarn interpreted Plutarch's word βίᾳ as "against her intention", and he considered that "any display of real force is out of question". But this word clearly denotes some kind of force or violence. Clearly, it was an action carried on against her will, but also with actual or threatening force involved. Cf. Bosworth 1983: 135.

[190] The episode did not receive many attention from other authors, who usually omitted it. Radet (1933: 124) said that Alexander 'ripped' the proclamation from her. Robinson (1947 [1984]: 57-58) presented the episode plainly, with no further commentary. Schachermeyr (1973: 110 n. 95) did not describe the visit and only mentioned a prophecy from Justin about possible conspiracies in Macedonia.

[191] Tarn did not deal with other cases like those of Callixeina –although he knew the episode and even it would have helped him to discredit Theophrastus' insinuations–, or Hector, Parmenio's son. However, they are very anecdotal and dubious cases, so we can forgive him for ruling them out.

with the younger king; Thalestris was just fruit of some misunderstandings and sensational writers[192]. Alexander was a model of self-continence and chivalry rejecting any immoral offer, like taking advantage of his prisoners, even if they were the most beautiful women of Asia. Tarn had a very accurate opinion of Alexander's nature and he made fit him in. Everything outside his model was just ruled out because they came from 'hostile' sources or just because that was not 'what Alexander would do'. Therefore, Alexander could not have been a homosexual nor a promiscuous. Alexander had more lofty ideals and/because he was not worried about worldly things like sex.

Tarn and mixed marriages

As it may have been noticed, Alexander's marriages have not been discussed yet. Tarn's interpretation of those unions can be compared to how he regarded other mixed marriages in the Ancient world. Following his Alexander's portrait, the Macedonian king never fell in love and, as we have already seen, he never really cared for any women, but his mother[193]. So, his marriages were only political business. The stories about love at first sight with Roxane were just romantic tales, and in a condescending tone he asserted that "[o]ur historians naturally represent him as in love with Roxane, for that was the proper thing to say[194]". That marriage was only a political tool to pacify the unruly Iranian barons. And in a very proper way, it is assumed that Alexander saved himself for marriage: "The conclusion is that when Plutarch says that Alexander had known no woman before Roxane except Memnon's widow, he is, so far as our records go, speaking the truth, allowing that the story of 'Memnon's widow' is an undoubted fabrication". So, forgiving Plutarch's slip up about Barsine, Alexander would have lost his virginity with Roxane –and not a lot. According Tarn, if he did not beget a child until four years later, it was because there were not many intercourses –the possibility of some kind of fertility problem is not even considered[195].

Although the political ramifications cannot be disdained, there is no real reason to reject Alexander actually falling in love with Roxane[196]. The only reason

[192] Another missing person was Pausanias, the assassin of Philip.

[193] However, Tarn also accepted that maybe Alexander also cared for Sisygambis, his adoptive mother.

[194] Tarn 1948 II: 326. Cf. Tarn 1948 I: 76: "Tradition naturally represents him as in love with her, but it is doubtful if he ever cared for any woman except his terrible mother." It is the same sentence we can find in *C.A.H.* (see note 39). Cf. Robinson 1947 [1984]: 161.

[195] See note 151. We also ignore Roxane's date of birth; cf. Berve 1926 II: 346-347 (nº. 688); Tarn 1938: 226.

[196] Cf. Droysen 1833 [2012]: 278-280; Berve 1926 I: 9-10, II: 346-347 (nº. 688); Wilcken 1932: 161-162, 208; Radet 1933: 253-255; Burn 1947 [1966]: 145; Carney 2000: 97-100, 105-107;

put forward by Tarn was that it did not fit on his own ideas about Alexander's nature. More or less romanticised in the details, the extant sources –including the 'reliable' Arrian and Plutarch[197] - coincide in love as the cause for Alexander's marriage with Roxane[198]. Plutarch indeed clearly distinguished his love union with Roxane from his later political marriage with Stateira, the daughter of Darius[199]. His marriages with Stateira and Parysatis are nearly not pointed out by Tarn. The latter is not even mentioned in this whole book. The former is named Barsine after Tarn's denial of Alexander's mistress existence[200], and her few appearances are mainly related to this issue. The massive weddings at Susa were used by Tarn to hide that Alexander had married back then two women at the same time, even though he converted his double marriage in a single one with Stateira-Barsine[201]. Therefore, Alexander's embarrassing polygamy was covered up. In his book *Hellenistic Civilization*, he avoided labelling him as "polygamist", but he preferred saying that he "had two legitimate queens at once[202]".

The mixed marriages of Susa held great importance in Tarn's scheme about Alexander's ideal of the unity of mankind. They were the ultimate expression of the fusion of the peoples of the empire[203]. Nevertheless, his commentaries about the effects of this kind of unions seem to contradict this statement. These potential disadvantages were not 'biological[204]' but from the cultural and spiritual grounds. For Tarn, the Greek civilization and language were superior, so they probably could resist the incorporation of much alien blood before being endangered. Especially in the first generations, the fathers were the main transmitters of this Greek legacy. Tarn considered that 'nationality' did not rely

Ogden 2009: 206-207, 2011: 122, 124, 127-128, 131-133.

[197] Arr. *An*. IV. 19.5-6; Plu. *Alex*. 47.7-8.

[198] The episode was part of a wider Greek *topos* and it showed clear parallelisms with the account about the dealings between Alexander and Darius' wife –something already noticed by Arrian (*An*. IV. 19.6-20.4): Briant 2015: 323-343.

[199] Plu. *Mor*. 338d.

[200] Tarn 1948 II: 103, 333 n. 1, 334-335 n. 4, 336.

[201] Tarn 1948 I: 110-111; 1948 II: 434.

[202] Tarn 1927d: 50. The only "free polygamists" among the Successors were Pyrrhus and Demetrius; see below. But Tarn 1913: 47 n. 21: "Pyrrhos and Demetrius were as frank polygamists as Philip II and Alexander". It seems that in this earlier stage Tarn did not regard Alexander still as the later strict abstemious, and he would have even been drunk in some special occasions: "The Macedonian of the third century was fond of huge banquets, and expected that his king should get drunk on the proper occasions, as Philip and Alexander had done" (Tarn 1913: 248).

[203] Also for Robinson (1947 [1984]: 21, 74-75, 216-219).

[204] He regarded the unions between Greeks and Asians more resembling anyone between two Europeans from different countries than between a European and a black person: Tarn 1938: 34-35.

on mothers when an extremely higher culture was in play[205], although Alexander would have planned to send European women in order to transmit better the Greek culture[206]. Tarn emphasised his disregard towards the Asian women's role: from "native women" in 1927, they went to "native concubines" in 1948[207]. Besides, he regarded Macedonian women as something unique in the Ancient world and they kept the Hellenistic flame burning longer than the men. They took part in public affairs and held great power[208]. But, above all, "there is little even hinted against their morality; no lover is anywhere recorded[209]". They were ambitious women, but also devoted wives[210]. Therefore, from Tarn's point of view, Asian women were only for reproduction and they did not really play any role in her children's education due to his inferior civilization[211]. On the other hand, Macedonian and Greek women were exceptional and played a key –although somehow submissive– role in keeping the Hellenistic civilization alive.

However, as times went by, the foreign blood would have overwhelmed the almighty Greek culture and the new generations lacked their forefathers' vigour. In Bactria and India this process did not begin until the Common Era[212], but in other places, it started earlier (*ca*. 200 BCE[213]). Therefore, Tarn's 'unity of mankind' could only be viable if Hellenic men could take native wives if there were no countrywomen available and if they were neither from a very different stock, although he opposed Wilcken's idea of unity restricted to Macedonians and Persians[214]. The Hellenistic civilization was so superior that it was not in actual risk if the flood of foreign blood was not overwhelming. Local womenfolk was completely passive, unlike the vigorous Macedonian women. Only a superior culture could breed worthy –and unblemished– women. There is no need to stress the intense smell of colonialism and British imperialism that these statements emanate.

[205] Tarn 1938: 36-37. In Tarn 1927b: 429, he stated that "nationality depends primarily on the mother". This sentence disappeared from Tarn 1948 I: 134.

[206] Tarn 1927b: 429; 1948 I: 134.

[207] Referring Susa's brides. Tarn 1927b: 417; 1948 I: 111.

[208] Tarn 1927d: 51, 84-86. Among them, Tarn did not count Apama, Seleucus' Sogdian wife. She is only mentioned once (11), but only as Antiochus' mother.

[209] Tarn 1927d: 51.

[210] After all, Tarn (1927d: 85) considered that the women who desired emancipation were only a minority.

[211] Cf. Tarn 1927d: 128-129.

[212] Until then, the incorporation of Asian blood would have more limited, maybe due to the arrival of Macedonian and Greek women: Tarn 1902: 269, 286, 1938: 37, 1927b: 429, 1948 I: 134.

[213] Tarn 1927d: 5, 127-128, 163.

[214] Wilcken 1932: 247-252; Tarn 1948 II: 443-446.

The men (and woman) who would be Alexander

Throughout this paper, we have alluded that Alexander's sexuality and moral code were not just a side issue, but they were key factors for understanding his deeds and goals. Success in great objectives could only have been reached by certain men, not eroded by vices and moral faults. Many others, although they seem to have great conditions on the outside, failed due to his internal blemishes. Tarn devoted his first monograph to Antigonus Gonatas, whom Tarn tried to show as a 'philosopher king'[215]. Tarn drew a comparison up between Antigonus and his father Demetrius the Besieger. The latter was probably the main potential successor of Alexander during the Diadochi age: "to the superficial eye he had everything and more than everything, (save hereditary claim), that had belonged to Alexander[216]". But this resemblance did not go beyond the "glittering surface" and Demetrius lacked Alexander's inner qualities. Therefore, Demetrius could only achieve temporary successes, just to lose them right afterwards, like a new Sisyphus damned to never reach the top[217]. Demetrius was a man undermined by excesses and they played a great part in his failure[218]. Nevertheless, "Antigonos was the son of his mother rather than of his father […] he inherited neither his father's genius nor the instability which made that father impossible[219]". Antigonus reacted against the sins of his father and did not indulge himself in the same vices[220]. He was not a polygamist, he was never worshipped as a god and he understood that only through moderation could keep united his reign, unlike Demetrius[221]. His only known flaw –his fondness for wine– was excusable: he was only acting like any other Macedonian king[222]. Nevertheless, Antigonus lacked Alexander's and his father's genius, and he was aware of. These two examples clearly illustrated the need to combine both kinds of qualities in order to succeed.

Tarn compared Demetrius not only with Alexander but also with Mark Antony[223]. In 1934, Tarn co-wrote with M. P. Charlesworth three chapters for the tenth volume of *Cambridge Ancient History*. His main contributions were about Cleopatra and Mark Antony. The latter's depiction fits very well with what we have seen about Demetrius: someone with a great potential, but weakened

[215] McKechnie 2014: 25-29.
[216] Tarn 1913: 18.
[217] Tarn 1913: 18-19.
[218] Tarn 1913: 18-19, 47 n. 21, 248, 1927d: 8.
[219] Tarn 1913: 18.
[220] Tarn 1913: 247-248 n. 92. Tarn nuanced his liaison with the *hetaira* Demo. He contrasted her as Antigonus' ἐρωμένη with Melissa/Mania, Demetrius' πόρνη. Even though, it occurred when he was still the crown prince, not the king.
[221] Tarn 1913: 248-249.
[222] See note 308.
[223] Tarn 1913: 18.

by his main vice: women[224]. Mark Antony and Cleopatra would have dreamt on achieving Alexander's goal of the unity of mankind[225], but at the end of the day, Tarn concluded that maybe they –especially Antony– were not the most appropriate to carry on this great ideal, and "it was well for the world that Octavian conquered[226]". Tarn's Cleopatra is far from the seductive and sensual woman usually described in many modern works. After all, she was one of those vigorous Macedonian princesses[227]. Therefore, any sexual accusation against her was just slander[228]. "[T]he key-note of her character was not sex at all, but ambition […] and the essence of her nature was the combination of the charm of a woman with the brain of a man". This sentence sums up Tarn's main point: even being educated and ambitious, Cleopatra was a woman and she needed a man to fulfil her/Alexander's plans. Therefore, she never actually fell in love with Mark Antony[229] –although she remained loyal to him[230]–, but he was her tool to achieve those great dreams[231]. In conclusion, it was similar to Antigonus and Demetrius: if they would have not been two people, but a mixed (male) individual, he would have gathered the qualities to become Alexander's successor and fulfil his ultimate dream of the unity of mankind. But, unfortunately for Tarn, Cleopatra was a woman and Mark Antony was not the ideal choice, being a sinful and self-indulgent man.

Conclusions

Thus, for Tarn, Alexander was one-of-a-kind man. His higher ideals, not fully understood by his contemporaries, were not really pushed forward by any of the Hellenistic kings and queens. Nobody met the requirements, but him. He did not only had an outstanding genius, but also the so much needed inner virtue. His self-continence played a key role in his deeds because he was not

[224] Tarn (/ Charlesworth) 1934a: 32.

[225] Tarn (/ Charlesworth) 1934b: 68-69, 82-83.

[226] Tarn (/ Charlesworth) 1934b: 83.

[227] See note 320. Tarn (/ Charlesworth 1934a: 35) emphasized her Greco-Macedonian ancestry, only "with a slight tinge of the Iranian". No drop of Egyptian blood ran through her veins.

[228] Tarn (/ Charlesworth) 1934a: 35 n. 4, 98-99. Her fame of alcoholic was just a Roman misunderstanding: Tarn (/ Charlesworth) 1934a: 38-39. Actually, her image in the sources was distorted due to the pleasure-lover Antony: Tarn (/ Charlesworth) 1934a: 39.

[229] Tarn (/ Charlesworth) 1934a: 35: "perhaps she never loved any man". One nearly expects Tarn ending the statement like "but her 'terrible' father".

[230] For Tarn (/ Charlesworth 1934a: 41), Cleopatra would have suggested marriage, but Antony was only having fun then. However, Antony would have already fallen in love with her in 37 and married Cleopatra: Tarn (/ Charlesworth 1934b: 66).

[231] Tarn (/ Charlesworth) 1934a: 36, 38-40, 76.

distracted or flawed by any vice. Only that way success could be gained and retained. In consequence, Tarn regarded any suggestion going against this model as falsehood, fabrication and/or misunderstandings. In order to affirm his image of Alexander, Tarn recurred to narrow-minded reading of the sources, cheating arguments, concealing evidence... But, when all the other failed, he employed the 'ultimate' proof: "Alexander would not have done such a thing[232]". Sometimes, he seems to know better Alexander than Alexander himself.

Tarn's Alexander was, therefore, an utterly straight, not homosexual, abstemious, not promiscuous, nearly monogamist, virgin until marriage man. Other remarkable individuals –like Antigonus Gonatas, Cleopatra and other Greco-Macedonian princesses– were also depicted in a similar way. But this list of praiseworthy facets was not modelled following Ancient premises, but Tarn's own. As many others have stressed, Tarn's portrait of Alexander was shaped to fit the perfect devoted Christian, Victorian, English, tory gentleman[233]. Alexander incarnated the perfect son-in-law for Tarn. As we have stressed, some of his arguments emanated a clear smell of modern prejudices, classism, sexism, colonialism and imperialism. It would not be fair to claim that Tarn was the only scholar to defence some postures. As we have seen throughout the article, many of them were shared by others[234]. However, the main difference would be the degree and intensity employed by Tarn in his assertions. The rest of the scholars were more moderate in their claims and accepted that Alexander could have had vices and committed some sins, more or less serious. But Tarn did not admit any flaw in his hero and, when some of his statements were criticised, he did not reappraise them, but he stuck in his guns and refused to budge. Maybe "every student has an Alexander of his own[235]", but Tarn's one is still one of the most personal.

[232] Cf. Bosworth 1983: 135.
[233] See note 125.
[234] Especially by Robinson (1947 [1984]: 38).
[235] Wilcken 1932: v.

Alexander, Asia and Altheim

BORJA ANTELA-BERNÁRDEZ
Autonomous University of Barcelona
ORCID: 0000-0002-3118-3300

Abstract: Franz Altheim was a quite strange scholar. Although his fieldwork was Roman Religion, he showed also a wide interest in Asia. In the Historiography on Alexander the Great, he also deserves a special place, both for his links with the *Ahnenerbe* and for the impact and presence of his work and ideas in the academic context of the period after the IInd World War. Among the many perspectives of Altheim, the vision that he had on Alexander allows to analyze not only the historiographical and cultural context of his time, but also the impact of these and the German academic tradition of the second and third quarter of the twentieth century CE.

Keywords: Alexander the Great, Altheim, Nazi Historiography, German Historiography.

A very usual commonplace in the studies about Alexander the Great the Scholarship is to begin to write about Alexander with the frequently quoted sentence of Ulrich Wilcken,[1] that Ernst Badian made so popular,[2] which stress that each historian has an Alexander of his own. In fact, this sentence does not mean a surprise for anyone. On the other hand, this sentence acquires a main dimension if we opt for a wide scope, and instead of each author, we try to analyze the perspective of each age, a purpose that, again, is not really a new one. However, as Pierre Briant has claimed,[3] the unique way to say something original about Alexander the Great would be through the study of the visions that about him Scholarship has been portraying age by age, in a historiographical perspective. This, for sure, is the best way not only to understand Wilcken sentence, but also to develop a renewal in the studies about Alexander the Great.

On the analysis of the age of *Nazionalzocialismus*, the study of the historiographical perspectives had been very rich, but the study of the topic of Alexander and the Nazism had been somehow neglected. Silence on this topic

[1] Wilcken 1931: vii.
[2] Badian 1976: 280.
[3] Cft. Briant 2012: 161-162.

seems actually most surprising if we consider the great amount of papers, books and chapters dedicated to Alexander the Great year by year from all the points of view one can imagine. By this reason, we think that a series of studies about this question is more that appropriate, analysing any of the different historians that have written about Alexander with a Nazi ideology and during the age of Nazism.

In this sense, it is worth that we begin with a remembering of the role that historiography about the Ancient world had in the cultural context and propaganda of the II World War, not just from the Nazi perspective, because this was a fact that involved all the contenders. Maybe the best example of this context and of the use of Ancient items, for being explicit and evident, is the work of Adela M. Adam, former wife of James Adams, a prominent member of the Emmanuel College in Cambridge and specialist in Plato's works. Adela Marion Adam presented in 1940 during a session of the Cambridge Philological Society a quite curious essay, with more allegorical will than historical research, with a conference, titled "Philip *Alias* Hitler", which aim was to warning the audience of the lessons history provided, especially in front of the danger Hitler's Politics meant for England.[4] The conference has also the curiosity of being read the day after Hitler, in his usual yearly celebration of the *Pust of Munich* of each November 8th, gave his yearly speech for the National Socialist Party. In fact, if we read both texts, that of Adele Marion Adams and the one of Hitler, one can wonder if Hitler did hear about what Mrs. Adams had told the evening before, as far as some aspects in both speeches seemed to be linked, like the use of the term "warmongers" for the English people,[5] or the idea of Hitler that the British Government was trying to "Balkanize" Europe, in reference to the English Politics in the Balkans region, which is very close to what Mrs. Adams would like to stress about Hitler similarities with Philip of Macedon.

Nevertheless, we cannot be really surprised by the close links between the Ancient History and the historical ideology of Nazism, and even of the whole European culture along the first decades of the twentieth century. This is a well-known question which has been analysed in deep by researchers with more abilities and resources that those that I can offer here. However, the interest of Hitler in particular and of Nazism in general for the great characters of History, those who marked a change of age and embodied by themselves the values of

[4] Adam 1941.

[5] Adam 1941: 108: "I seem to see a parallel to the resistance of part of our community to attempts our Government to rearm after 1933; they were branded as warmongers, notably in the by-election at West Fulham, in which this reproach gained the day over prudence".

each new age, seems to be linked with the ideas of Hegel.[6] These "great men" were, then, considered as vehicles of the spirit of the nations (*volkgeist*), and with this, they were also the reflection of the will of God for Humanity.[7] Among these "great men", within which Hegel included Caesar, Achilles or Alexander himself, the historians and politicians of the National Socialism Party would have add other characters of history, like for example Philip of Macedon,[8] as we can observe in the words of an author like Helmut Berve, who wrote about the Macedonian victory in Chaeroneia considering that from this battle…

> "sorgeva una civiltà unitaria, in cui aspetto esteriore era piú ricco e splendiso che nelle etá precedenti".[9] de manera que para Berve la victoria de Filipo "avrebbero veramente servito alla causa di tutti i Greci, che chiedevano un allargamento dello spazio vitale a spese dei barbari".[10]

The idea of a living space (*Lebensraum*) needed for a people to rightly develop itself seems a clear reminiscence to one of the most known worries of Hitler's ideology as showed in the *Mein Kampf*. The same happened with these "great men" of Hegel's philosophy, which were so present in the German Scholarship about the Ancient World. Likewise, more than Philip, Alexander had been linked to this role of "agent for the change of History" since, at least, Droysen,[11] if not even before.[12]

Many can be, actually, the proposals of study and the evidences from where we can plan a research about the relationship between Alexander and the Nazism. In this sense, our aim now is to focus our attention just in the work and the life of one concrete author, as it was Franz Altheim.

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[6] Although the unique reference about Alexander in the *Mein Kampf* is not quite positive, the truth is that the interest by Alexander could be wider that what this unique reference shows. Actually, the Boston Museum of World War II contains a gramar notebook by a young Adolf Hitler where he underlined the information related with Alexander's conquests. Likewise, the name of Alexander appears at least in two ocasions within the table talk and conversations we know of Hitler: Cf. Trevor-Roper 2004: 350, 408.

[7] On the matter of the idea of History as a theodicy, cft. Bermejo Barrera 1999.

[8] Canfora 1991: 139; Chapoutot 2013.

[9] Momigliano 1966: 702: Berve "era ormai passato alla propaganda".

[10] Momigliano 1966: 576. Reading these lines of Berve's work, it seems easy to see, the idea of a Philip/Hitler aimed to conquer terriories to satisfy the *lebensraum* of his people, with a strongly centralized and militarized State under his control.

[11] On Droysen vid.Antela-Bernárdez 2000. This historical perspective about Alexander would probably survive and was strongly present in the age of Altheim, due for example to works like Wilcken's book about Alexander (1931), which had a great impact not only in Germany, and continued Droysen's perspective on the topic.

[12] The conception of Alexander had a key role in the works of Herder and Hegel: Antela-Bernárdez 2004: 366-367, 412-415.

Altheim and the Ancient History

Franz Altheim was born in October 6th 1898 in Frankfurt am Main. He was the son of the eccentric Wilhelm Altheim, a Bohemian artist who committed suicide the day of Christmas of 1914.[13] Around those years, Franz Altheim, who was only 16, began to write his early attempts of historical research, as shows the publishing in 1914 of an essay by him titled "Geschichte von Escherheim".[14] In the final years of the I World War, Franz Altheim was recruited by the German army and sent to Turkey within the section of translators, because of his studies of Humanities and Philology during the years of Gymnasium. Back from war, he work hard to gain some training as historian, archaeologist and classical philologist, while he work in a bank office.[15] As a result of his abilities for the study of the Ancient World, he began to obtain some fellowships and grants for traveling to Italy, where he observed and searched for archaeological and epigraphical evidences. This studies allowed Altheim to gain the confidence of his supervisor, Walter Otto,[16] who recommended him for a post in the University of Frankfurt in 1928. During the decade of the 30's, the historical research made in Frankfurt under the direction of Otto resulted in what some scholars has named as the *Frankfurter Schule*,[17] where Altheim, among others, was responsible for some new perspectives in the views of the History of Rome, because of the methodological use of a mix between a deep analysis of recent archaeological discoveries and some careful philological approaches. To this, the *Frankfurter Schule* add the perspectives offered by the studies in linguistics and the etno-anthropology,[18] two branches of Social Sciences and Humanities that were of high interest for the intellectuals of this time in Germany. On the other hand, the presence in Frankfurt of Leo Frobenius had a great influence in Altheim. The relationship between Altheim and the *Forschungsinstitut fur Kulturmorphologie* (later named *Frobenius Institute*) meant for Altheim the access to the circle of the exiled Kaiser Wilhelm II, and also the opportunity to meet the photographer

[13] A juzgar por la descripción que de él recoge Pringle 2006: 104.

[14] Vid. Sanders 1978: 789.

[15] This was not the unique way for Altheim to obtain benefits. As it seems, he quickly take a great profit of his habilities and contacts to do many business concerning antiquities and art pieces: Pringle 2006: 105. In fact, Rebenich 2005: 49 describes Altheim as a "Konjunkturritter".

[16] Under whose direction he finish his *Griechische Götter in alten Rom* (1930): Cf. Sanders 1978: 789.

[17] Sanders 1978: 789; Mazza 1978: 148.

[18] Gandini 2001: 69.

Erika Trautmann,[19] who work for Frobenius. Trautmann and Altheim quickly began an emotional relationship that probably lasted their whole lives.[20]

It was in this context that the career of Altheim began to be focused to the study of the Roman Religion. Altheim was then probably the younger of the *Frankfurt Schule*.[21] Indeed, Altheim's works gave him a strong international reputation as a serious and prominent scholar, and his books were highly considered both within and outside Germany. In fact, in 1939 a translation of his *Romische Religionsgeschichte*[22] was published in English by the eminent H. B. Mattingly.[23]

In 1935, the National Socialist Part and the German society, in a process of deep transformation, would surely mean the cause for which Altehim was not considered for promotions in the university or for funding.[24] Maybe this can be an explanation for the twist in Altheim's political position, until then he showed to be alien to the rise of Nazism and to the intellectual circle of Nazi ideological apologists. In fact, this twist in Altheim's political involvement is quite surprising, if we considered his international prestige. Nevertheless, this prestige seemed to have been decreasing since Altheim began to be a member of the *Ahnenerbe*, the Pseudo-scientific society under the protection of Himmler, founded in the 1st of June of 1935, with Hermann Wirth as director. The aim of this society was to study and promote the legacy of the German race, usually misunderstood by the historical approaches about the Ancient world in benefit of the cultures of Greece and Rome.[25]

Thus, Altheim became the first archaeologist of the *Ahnenerbe*,[26] and he began a series of studies dedicated to the rocky paintings in Val Camonica (1937-1942) in collaboration with Erika Trautmann, with funds of the *Ahnenerbe* and the Forschungsinstitut fur Kulturmorphologie de Frobenius.[27] As a consequence, Altheim defended the theory that the first italian people, from which some centuries after the Roman nation would emerge, were in fact no other than a consequence of an Indo-Germanic migration.[28] Likewise, Altheim had been

[19] Pringle 2006: 105-106. About Trautmann, with attention to her travel around Spain with the Forschungsinstitut fur Kulturmorphologie of L. Frobenius in 1934-36 (a suspicious date for a German trip to Spain), vid.Gracia 2009.

[20] Pringle 2006: 304-5.

[21] Gandini 2001: 69-70.

[22] Altheim 1931-1933.

[23] Altheim 1938.

[24] Pringle 2006: 106.

[25] Chapoutot 2013: 103-104.

[26] Chapoutot 2013: 108-9.

[27] Gracia 2008: 7.

[28] Cf. Losemann 1977: 125. On the immediate reactions against Altheim's interpretations on Val Camonica, vid. Jacobsthal 1938. Cf. Chapoutot 2013: 109. On Altheim and Trautmann's studies in Val Camonica, vid. also Maretta 2005.

closely involved in the *Ahnenerbe* during the whole II World War period until the end of the war,[29] and with that, he would have also being close to the SS[30] and the National Socialist Party.[31] When the Russian army ocuppy Halle, Altheim was initially investigated but finally liberated, so he could follow his academic career until he was invested as chairman in Freie Universität Berlin in 1949.[32] No reprisal nor judgement for his former involvement in the circle of Nazism had ever happened.

Altheim and Alexander

At the light of our own days, nobody would surely assures that Altheim can be considered, a priori, a specialist on Alexander the Great. Nevertheless, Alexander would had had some kind of special value for Altheim, if we look at the close attention he paid to the young Macedonian conqueror, despite the fact that Altheim used to study aspects of the Roman religion.[33]

Not in vain, Altheim probably had enjoyed an exceptional position, because of his wide perspective and his ability to defend risky interpretative proposals without the required rigour in the study of the evidences.[34]

First, it seems worth to have in mind the aim of Altheim, probably of great merit in his time, to establish himself as opposition to Tarn's Alexander, so widely accepted after II World War. Thus, in his book *Weltgeschichte Asiens im greichischen Zeitalter*, published in 1947, Altheim did not accepted the perspective, so popular, of Alexander portrayed as planning the union of humanity, and he rejects also the idea that Alexander began some policies to mix the Greek civilization with the indigenous culture of the conquered peoples.[35] In this sense, the attention Altheim gave to the Hellenistic world in general and to Alexander in concrete need to be explained in relation with his own historiographical perspective and his intellectual obsessions.

[29] Cf. Losemann 1977: 123-132; Christ 1982: 246-254.

[30] Hansen 2002: xv.

[31] Although we can doubt of the real influence Altheim could had in Nazi Germany, especially if we consider him just as an academic, some details seem to allow us to review this kind of perception: A proof of Altheim's authority is the preg by his old friend, the eminent Karl Kerenyi, who asks Altheim to help Kerenyi's daughter, a prisioner in Auschwitz. Altheim could finally get her freedom, thanks to his contacts: Casadio 2007: 21-22; Hakl 2013: 123. On the relationship between Kerenyi and Altheim, vid. Losemann 1998.

[32] Pringle 2006: 305. In this trip Altheim was in company of Ruth Stiehl, to whom he finally adopted (Sanders 1978: 790; Casadio 2007: 25). Some years later, he also helped his former lover, E. Trautmann, to cross the border to Federal Germany: Pringle 2006: 305.

[33] Altheim is highly present, for example, in the analisys by Andreotti 1950.

[34] See for example the place Altheims has in the work of Seibert 1972: 309.

[35] Momigliano 1975: 947.

To begin with, we can date the first interest we can observe in Altheim for the Ancient Orient at least to 1935, when he publishes his book *Der Einbruch der Parther*. If during his works in Val Camonica with Erika Trautmann we can date the twist of Altheim to the racial interpretations and the statement of his ties with National Socialism, it seems that the key date for the turning point of Altheim's attention to be directed to the Orient would be in 1938. Indeed, it was then when he and Trautmann propose the *Ahnenerbe* the project of traveling to the oriental boundaries of the Ancient World, in order to analyse the clash of forces that drove the Roman Empire to decline, as a result of a weakening provoked by the racial fusion caused of the conquest of the Mediterranean world. Altheim's aims were to focus on the Indo-Germanic peoples of the north, from which Rome was heir, as he had tried to show in his studies in Val Camonica, and oppose them to the populations in the Orient,, some of them of Semitic origin, with which Rome had a strong conflict during the Late Antiquity.[36] This project of visit the Eastern boundaries of the Ancient Roman Empire was enthusiastically approved and obtained the main funds it needs. So, Altheim and Trautmann could cross East Europe until the Levant and Central Asia, where apart from scientific observations, the couple could also collect very interesting data of the region very useful for the spy services of the III Reich.[37]

In my opinion, it seems probable that it was then that Altheim had acquired a solid perspective on the matter of the peripheral populations of the Roman Empire in the East. Likewise, as Mario Mazza has stressed, the interest of Altheim for the boundaries of the Ancient World allowed him to add the Germanic landscapes and the Parthians, Huns and Arabs to the scope of the Classical Scholarship.[38] In fact, to the typical interpretation of Nazism about the conflict between Orient and Occident that resulted in the fall of the Roman Empire because of its racial weakening, Altheim incorporate a new view, analysing the other people of the Ancient East, being some of them equally Aryans. This interest, which we can consider as the main contribution of Altheim to Classical Scholarship, is a result both to racial perspectives and to facts of the Contemporary history. Despite the usually negative view of the historiographical Nazi tradition about Alexander, as responsible of the Hellenic weakening and the cultural fusion,[39] the Alexander portrayed by Altheim follows the steps of Hegel and Droysen[40], understood as an agent of civilization, responsible of the expansion of the essential elements of

[36] Pringle 2006: 111. Likewise, Mazza 1978: 151. Mazza dates the trip in 1936, Pringle in 1938.

[37] Pringle 2006: 111-120.

[38] Mazza 1978: 153; Christ 1982: 252.

[39] Chapoutot 2013: 476-482.

[40] On the historical perception of Asia and Alexander in Droysen and Grote, vid. Vasunia 2007.

the Greek culture to the landscapes of Central Asia. The defeat of the Hellenistic rulers by the nomads in this region had, in fact, meant nothing in the cultural perspective, where the main factors of Hellenic culture had been incorporated to the bone by the populations living in this area. This is probably the aspect of Altheim's theoretical perspective which shows a more clear influence of the concept of *Kulturkreis* defined by Kossina and copied by Frobenius,[41] which Altheim applies to Alexander and the Hellenistic world.

For Altheim, Greeks must share their usual protagonists with the Iranians, who had also been introducing their cultural essence in the geography of Central Asia along the Hellenistic period, with the result of a fusion between Greeks and Iranians in historical realities like, for example, the Greco-Iranian kingdom of Bactria. In this process, the nomads, whose historical mission seemed to have been the destruction of these kingdoms, were also responsible of the diffusion of this mixed culture fruit of the fusion between Greeks and Iranians. Thus, this fact can explain the extremely strange structure of the book that Altheim dedicated mainly to Alexander, titled *Alexander und Asien*, with a first chapter dedicated to Zarathusta (in a clear device of a scholar who came from the history of religions), the second one to the Achaemenids, and the third chapter to Alexander himself. The rest of the book is dedicated to the relationship between Achaemenids and Bactrians and the history of the Diadochs, especially in relation with their fight in Central Asia, Bactria and the Indus, to conclude with a final reflexion that analyses the arrival of the Huns and other peoples, like the Parthians, so they connect the world created by Alexander with the crisis of the third century BCE in the Mediterranean world. Then, Altheim assures that:

> "Depuis le Ier siècle av. J.-C., une nouvelle civilisation collective était née entre l'Inde et la Syrie, le plateau de Pamir et la Méditerranée. Les différences ethniques et topographiques continuaient à subsister mais, dans la littérature et dans l'art, dans l'écriture et dans la langue, une conscience collective apparaît et elle se manifeste par son opposition aux particularismes existants. C'est dans la religion que la nouveauté allait trouver sa plus forte expression;

[41] On the concept of *Kulturkreis*, including the perspective of Frobenius, vid. Westphal-Hellbusch 1959: 849-850. On Frobenius' influence in Altheim, Casadio 2007: 10.

> partout où elles allaient faire leur apparition, les nouvelles communautés religieuses devaient avoir des buts universels".[42]
>
> "Les religions universelles devaient avoir une mission mondiale".[43]
>
> "On en arriva au point où les communautés religieuses devaient entrer en conflit avec les communautés ethniques".[44]
>
> "La communauté religieuse devint une puissance qui pouvait se mesurer avec la communauté ethnique et même la surpasser. Elle représentait une nouvelle unité; pour Bardesane, qui embrassa le christianisme, c'était une unité d'un ordre supérieur. Sa cohésion n'était pas due au sang et à la race, mais au consensus de l'enseignement et de la foi. (…) La propagation des religions orientales, n reconnaissant ni race ni État, devait éveiller des forces contraires: celles-ci apparurent presque simultanément en Occident et en Orient. Ces forces se cristallisèrent aussi et prirent des formes nouvelles: pour la première fois dans l'histoire, on vit apparaître l'Église d'État".[45]

Then, the history of Alexander and Asia of Altheim is, actually, a history of Asia during the whole Antiquity, where the geographical scope is defined by certain frontiers that were in coincidence with that of the empire of Alexander. There, the spiritual and aesthetical influence of the Greek culture allowed the unification of historical rhythms and tendencies in what we can consider a macrovision supported by Altheim's usual methodology of a great amount of data and the search for simultaneities. These simultaneities are, in fact, a clear influence Altheim acquired from Spengler.[46] And hidden after this ideas, there was strong belief that History can understand the laws and rules of evolution of the facts, i.e., of what will come about.[47]

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[42] Altheim 1954: 366.

[43] Altheim 1954: 367.

[44] Altheim 1954: 368.

[45] Altheim 1954: 369-70

[46] Altheim 1954: 401: "En tête de son œuvre sur la philosophie de l'histoire, Spengler a fait figurer des tables de concordances d'époques historiques "simultanées". Altheim wrote about Spengler (Altheim 1954: 410) that "Comme jeune checheur, il [el autor, es decir, el mismo Altheim] avait décliné l'offre que lui avait fait Spengler d'être son élève et collaborateur, tout comme il s'est refusé tout attache avec n'importe quel parti, n'importa quelle religion de n'importe quelle tendance".

[47] Altheim 1954: 400: "Peu de problèmes ont été discutés avec autant de passion que ceux qui traitent es lois de l'histoire. (...) Nous voulons seulement soulever la question de savoir si certains événements historiques ne doivent pas logiquement être considérés comme répondant à des lois, alors que d'autres, non moins logiquement, doivent être rangés parmi les phénomènes qui se moquent de toute régularité. Dans ce cas, il nous faudrait aussi nous demander si, pour chaque événement, il 'est pas important – peut-être même essentiel, – de savoir s'ils appartient à la catégorie des faits qui se reproduisent ou à celle des faits uniques".

However, in this case Altheim considered that what Spengler has suggested did not solve the historical problem that meant the understanding of Asia from Alexander to Aurelian.[48] Then, facing the difference between the cultures of Greece and Rome he defends the need to consider these cultures not as different ones, but in a succession. To this succession, also, Altheim added the influence of Ranke: "ills son immediate par rapport à Dieu".[49] This influence of Ranke was also clear in the fact that, although Altheim defends a cultural fusion, his kind of history was, in fact, a relation of the politics and military matters,[50] with a strong value of the idea of "age".[51]

Turning back, again, to the norms and laws of history, that resulted from a careful observation of the repetition and the simultaneity, with attention also to what succeeds, we can consider this kind of perspective as clearly derived from Hegel, both in the idea that the clash of cultures develops the next, the successive one, and that the historical reality was a consequence of the conflict between the Hegelian concepts of Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis.[52] To the case we are now considering. It is clear that the cultural fusion between Alexander and the Achaemenids was the Thesis, and being the nomads the Antithesis, Altheim defined the Synthesis as the new culture resulted in Central Asia from the opposition between Thesis and Antithesis. Thus, in Altheim's view, this Synthesis was developed by peoples like the Partians or the Sassanids.

To sum up, the vision of Altheim, which sounds initially so heterodox, is based mostly in the traditional visión of Alexander of the Nazi Germany, which consider the success of Alexander in racial terms. Nevertheless, Altheim defends that Hellenism was a result of the government of a racially-based ruling class, as they were the Greeks.

> "Eine griechische Herrenschicht setzt sich mit dem Orient auseinander; sie ergreift sogar Massnahmen zur Reinhaltung der Rasse".[53]

In this way, the kind of Asia that resulted after the civilization created from the fusion between the Iranians and the Greeks as a consequence of the conquest of Alexander was, actually, the tool Altheim was looking for to explain the defeat of the Roman Empire in the East. Again under the influence of Spengler, who

[48] Minor criticism to Spengler in Altheim 1954: 401-403.
[49] Altheim 1954: 410.
[50] Altheim 1965: 10. Also, the influence of Ranke in Altheim can be observed in Altheim 1954: 410-411.
[51] "epochal": Sanders 1978: 790.
[52] de Ferdinandy 1971: 480.
[53] Altheim 1947: II, 35. This racial assesment is clearly present also in Altheim's view of Antiochus IV's anti-jewish politics: Losemann 1977: 129.

considered the migrations as a key element of historical configuration,[54] the crash between this Asia of Altheim and the Roman Empire would produce a new culture, which meant a new phase in History. But here we must not forget the situation in Asia in the times of Altheim, after the end of the II World War. In his book about Alexander and Asia, Altheim assures that:

> "L'auteur pensé que son sujet concerne l'home daujourd'hui, au même titre que s'il s'agissait pour lui de ses problèmes les plus personnels et les plus intimes. Il croit, ni plus ni moins, que les événements actuels se refètent dans ceux du passé; plus encore: que le passé permet un diagnostic des faits actuels et un pronostic de ceux de l'avenir".[55]

So, again, History is considered as a hermeneutic message.[56] The past is useful to the observer from the present days as far as it allows him to understand his own world and even the future.[57] And here is where we must bear in mind the situation of Central Asia, Israel and Palestine in the decades of the 50's and 60's, to which I guess Altheim is referring when he wants to warning his audience about the links between the present and the past.

To conclude, it is surprising how Altheim, after his links with Nazi racial determinism and his strange theories about history, could be considered as "le *Althistoriker* le plus lu et le plus controversé de nos jours".[58] Thus, his colleagues around the world still saw him, years after the II World War, a brilliant historian of the Ancient World.[59] In the words of Momigliano, "noi non possiamo che seguire con simpatía l'Altheim nel suo sforzo di liberare gli studi protostorici dai loro presupposti naturalistici".[60]

Time, nevertheless, used to put things in the place that deserve, and this seems to have happened for Altheim, for example, in 1984, when Bowershock claim against Altheim historical method and perspectives: "Altheim's work was

[54] Mazza 1978: 152.

[55] Altheim 1954: 6. The original German date of edition is 1953.

[56] Sanders 1978: 791.

[57] The idea that History has to be a useful tool for the present days is one of Altheim's main concepts, and it is frequently repeated in Altheim's works. For example, Altheim 1965: 8.

[58] Sanders 1978: 791.

[59] Momigliano 1975b: 946: "Nemmeno la seconda guerra mondiale è riuscita a diminuire la straordinaria vigoria di ricerca dell'Altheim. Fa piacere di poter tornaré a discutere e disentire a proposito di un volume rico di fatti e di idee". Gabba 1995: 415 considers Altheim an equial to the Great Historians like Beloch, Arthur Rosenberg, Wilamowitz, H. Rudolph, apart from even Momigliano and Mazzarino, who are the protagonists of Gabba's paper. Also, Näf 1986: 142: "Altheim fand jüngere und ältere Schriften akzeptable – und komplementär", turning back to validate the ideas of Altheim, before and after his links with *Nazionalsocialismus* and the *Ahnenerbe*.

[60] Momigliano 1975a: 916-7.

accomplished with such breathtakingly poor judgement and inaccuracy that most scholars have, in recent times, note even bothered to take account of his work in any serious or detailed way".[61]

In some sense, this is the kind of feeling any scholar can get when he approach to the work of Altheim. Nevertheless, he was just a clue for the understanding of what could be considered the historiographical rebuilding of Alexander from the dark gaze of National Socialism.

[61] Boweshock 1984: 376.

Making Alexander 'Great' (or not so great) in Hammond's and Bosworth's scholarly biographies*

JAAKKOJUHANI PELTONEN
Tampere University
ORCID: 0000-0002-6537-2353

Abstract: I explore how the different Alexanders have been created in the modern academic field and what we can learn from it. The focus of this paper is on how scholars produce their narratives by using the ancient source material. As my primary material for this study, I have chosen two famous critical scholarly biographies: Hammond's *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman* and Bosworth's *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great*. We can see how the two views; benign and cynical views are constructed in scholarly narratives. The narratives on Alexander's action are promoting certain moralistic views of imperialism and war.

Keywords: Alexander the Great, scholarly biography, Getae, Siege of Tyre, Burning of Persepolis, Death of Parmenio

From the very beginning of the modern historiography the positive and negative, idealising and anti-idealising, praising and critical images of Alexander the III of Macedon, also known as Alexander the Great, existed. Already in the works of Enlightenment there were contrasting images of Alexander. This comes evident in Pierre Briant's monumental study *The First European – A history of Alexander in the Age of Empire* (2017). Briant pinpointed that Montesquieu's *l'Esprit des Lois* (1748) offered influential positive/idealising image of Alexander's imperialism while Sainte-Croix's *Examen critique de anciens historiens d'Alexandre le Grand* (first edition 1771, second edition 1804) represented the opposite viewpoint offering critical and negative image of the Macedonian imperialism.[2] Sometimes

* I wish to express my deep respect and recognition of the significant contribution of Nicholas Geoffrey Lemprière Hammond and Albert Brian Bosworth to the field. The purpose of this paper is NOT to undermine the great scholarly work that Hammond and Bosworth have done for research on Alexander.

[2] For Sainte-Croix's critique of Montesquieu's theories and benign views of Alexander, see Briant 2017: 227-236. Besides these two there were several other authors who composed their works on the Macedonian world-conqueror in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For example, Johan Gustav Droysen' *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen* (Droysen

the debate over the nature of historical Alexander have been emotionally strong. Example of this debate were carried only a few years ago. In 1999, the *Ancient History Bulletin* published Ian Worthington's provocative article "How "Great" was Alexander?" (Worthington 1999) in which Worthington questioned the greatness of Alexander's career and accomplishments. In response, Frank Holt wrote an article entitled "Alexander the Great Today: In the Interests of Historical Accuracy?" and criticised some of Worthington's arguments and accused him of poor interpretation of the sources. According to Holt, Worthington had accused Alexander of crimes which he could not be proven guilty of. In the final paragraph of the article Holt sounded a warning for all Alexander scholars:

> "The strong inclination today to de-heroize Alexander has contributed to a new consensus about the king that may be making us careless. Tarn's ideas, in as much as they arose from a prejudiced reading of the sources, have rightly been rejected; but backlash begun so well by Badian has perhaps led us to a new extreme orthodoxy that too, runs counter to the interest of historical accuracy" (Holt 1999: 117).

In this passage Holt was referring to the two divergent views on Alexander. This division of views in the Anglo-American scholarship of the twentieth century had been recognized by some other modern-day scholars too. Stanley M. Burstein pointed out this division in 1997 when he published a summary of the scholarship of the Hellenistic Age in *Ancient History: Recent Work & New Directions*.[3] According to Burstein, there was first the 'benign' view of Alexander, which governed scholarship for much of the first half of the twentieth century. According to this view, Alexander was a visionary statesman and a great leader who rose above racism and national prejudices. The famous representative of that outlook was Sir William Tarn (1869-1957).[4] Later, it was Nicholas G. L. Hammond (1907-2001) who strongly promoted this idealistic portrayal of Alexander. On the other hand, as Burstein further explains, the most dominant representative of the opposite view was Ernest Badian (1925-2011). In a series of articles in the late 1950s and mid 1960s he presented a 'tough-minded' Alexander

1833 [1877²]) and its idealising image of Alexander's reign was also influential work. Cf. Wiesehöfer 2018.

[3] Burstein 1997: 40-43. For the German, Anglo-American, French scholarship on Alexander composed during the period from the aftermath of World War I to the Cold War, see Bichler 2018. In fact, Bicher 2018: 668 states that idealising tendencies dominated most of the portrayals of Alexander written by the scholars during this period.

[4] See Tarn 1948. Many of Tarn's ideas were rejected in later Alexander studies. Holt 1999: 111-112, described as Tarn's one fault his predilection to pardon Alexander's sins by choosing his sources uncritically and persuading his readers to see only good in his hero. See Mendoza's contribution to this volume.

to set against the idealised interpretations of Tarn.[5] Badian's Alexander was as a ruthless politician whose aim was to achieve autocracy and glory through conquest. As Burstein states, the recent contemporary representative of this view has been A. B. Bosworth (1942-2014).[6]

How is it possible that scholars who use the same body of evidence construct such a different picture of Alexander? The purpose of the present paper is not to claim who is right concerning the trustworthiness of the accounts on Alexander, or in finding 'historical facts' for the Alexander interpretation, but to examine how the different views on Alexander have been created and promoted in scholarly biographies.

According to Burstein, the reason for the division among scholars lies in their differing attitudes to the ancient authors. In other words, they disagreed on the reliability of different authors. Tarn and Hammond relied on Arrian as the most 'trustworthy' source. On the other hand, Badian and Bosworth were strongly critical of Arrian and relied more on 'vulgate' sources, such as Curtius and Diodorus. In Holt's opinion, Bosworth and Worthington produced their negative Alexander picture at the expense of historical accuracy, asserting the worst about Alexander based on inclination rather than evidence.[7] However, I will argue in this article that the big differences between these two 'views' are not only a result of the fact that Hammond often follows different sources than Bosworth and vice versa (Burstein) or that the scholars did not care enough about historical accuracy (Holt). Rather more likely, differences occur because Hammond and Bosworth are representatives of different value-systems; they see Alexander's reign from different moral perspective. The image of Alexander they create reflect their personal views on military conquest, imperialism, and one-man rule. Or at least their works construct distinctive images of these concepts.

The focus of this paper is on how scholars produce their narratives, different 'Alexanders', by using the ancient source material. For this goal, I have systematically read through a large quantity of Alexander biographies. However, in this current article I have decided to follow two different lines of argumentation. As my primary material for this study I have chosen two famous critical scholarly biographies of Alexander from the works of Hammond and Bosworth: Hammond's *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman* (1980) and

[5] As is well known, Badian attacked W. Tarn's idealistic Alexander interpretation in his two articles Badian 1958b; 1958c. Badian's critical view of Alexander can also be read from his article 'Alexander the Great and the Loneliness of Power': Badian 1962. Badian's *Collected Papers on Alexander the Great*, containing articles published in the years 1958-2007, has been published (Badian 2012).

[6] Both N. G. L. Hammond and A. B. Bosworth have written various articles concerning the reign of Alexander the Great and the history of the Macedonian empire. See for example Hammond 1989; 1993; 1997; Bosworth 1980a; 1995; 1988a; 1996a.

[7] Holt 1999: 111-112.

Bosworth's *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (1988b). These studies can be regarded as one the most influential Alexander biographies which already Burstein mentioned as recent representatives of the two divergent views. Both of these monographs claim to give an accurate description based on the best sources available. They treat Alexander's life and career as statesman and military commander in chronological order and therefore deal with much the same episodes in the career of the Macedonian king. Above all, they represent the two opposing interpretations: the idealised and praising picture of Alexander and the anti-idealising and cynical one. This dichotomy prevailed in the texts of the ancient authors as well.[8] In the ancient texts Alexander could be both praised as the Greek cultural hero of the Second Sophistic and strongly criticised in the Roman philosophers as the despot whose inclination to anger and wine destroyed his relationship between his Macedonian staff.[9] To show that Hammond's and Bosworth's interpretations are not extraordinary in their argumentation, I shall also discuss some more recent studies for comparison.[10]

I will discuss these studies by taking up how certain specific cases are being dealt with in the scholarly narratives. Since it is unnecessary here to treat all the known episodes of the reign of Alexander in one article, I have selected four episodes and I will analyse these by closely reading how Hammond and Bosworth build their respective narratives. These events are as follows: first, Alexander's military expedition against the Getae; second, the siege of Tyre and its interpretations; third, the divergent images of the destruction of Persepolis and the burning of the palace; and finally, the death of Parmenio.

I will pay attention to the sources the scholars used and the elements in that information that are regarded as true or false. What particular terms and concepts are chosen by the scholars and how do they assign meanings to Alexander's reign? How do the scholars assess the incidents that took place and on what basis do they make their moralizing judgements concerning Alexander? It has been observed more than once that we all whether professional historians, or not create/invent the Alexander of our dreams –or nightmares. When Paul Cartledge discussed the different Alexander traditions that had developed since Antiquity, he stated: 'There are not one but many Alexanders, because every historian, or anyone seriously interested in him, creates an Alexander of her or

[8] Cf. Briant 2015: 65.

[9] As an example of the two extreme views of Alexander in antiquity see Plu. *Mor.* 335f; Sen. *Cl.* 1.25.1. For a reception of Alexander in the Roman world, see Spencer 2002; Peltonen 2019.

[10] The list of published studies on Alexander's career is long and rich. Cf. Bichler 2018; Bowden 2014. In this study I especially deal with works composed in the twenty-first century: Cartledge 2004; Heckel 2008; Freeman 2011; Gabriel 2015.

his own.'[11] In this study, I explore how the different Alexanders have been created in the academic field and what we can learn from it.

I. Alexander and the Getae

Alexander's military expedition against the Thracian Getic tribes was part of his Balkan campaign in the year 335 BCE. This took place six months after Alexander was crowned king of Macedonia, succeeding his father, Philip. The importance of the expedition rests on the fact that it gives an image of the early development of Alexander's reign and of what kind of military commander and leader Alexander was at this early stage of his reign.

Arrian's *Anabasis* is the only remaining source for the Balkan campaign and in this respective it differs from all the episodes below. Both Hammond and Bosworth consider the account reliable and follow its main lines in detail.[12] However, their viewpoints and interpretations differ crucially. Bosworth begins his narrative:

> "The Getae peoples of the northern Danubian plain had gathered by the riverside, hoping to deter the invader from crossing. That was a mistake. Alexander took their appearance as a challenge – and an opportunity to display the versatility of his army".[13]

Bosworth has chosen to describe the event from the perspective of the Getae. He calls Alexander's army the *invader* and the gathering of the Getae a *mistake*. In his narrative Bosworth does not pay attention to the armed forces of the Getae. He does not mention the numbers given in Arrian concerning the strength of the Getic army (4,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry).[14] Instead he uses the term *peoples*, giving the impression that the operation was carried out against the helpless inhabitants of the land instead of an offensive army. This impression is emphasized when the narrative continues:

> "They [Alexander's army] had crossed into the rich corn land, and the king proceed to ravage it; the sarisa blades of the phalanx, held horizontally and diagonally, made havoc of the fresh harvest. The unfortunate Getae kept their distance, first retreating to a lightly fortified town and then withdrawing their entire population beyond the cultivated area. They preserved themselves, but

[11] Cartledge 2004: 21. The statement had previously been quoted by Wilcken 1967: 29.
[12] Arr. *An*. 2.3.5-4.5.
[13] Bosworth 1988b: 30.
[14] Arr. *An*. 1.3.5.

> their town was looted and then destroyed. Alexander withdrew to the river, piously sacrificed to Zeus, Heracles and the Danube itself, and transported his army unscathed back to camp".[15]

Here Alexander is the man who decides to *ravage the rich corn land*, in other words destroys the Getae's means of earning a living. Now Bosworth makes it clear for the reader that the military act was directed against the whole nation, including women and children, and its consequence was that the whole nation lost both property and dwelling places:

> "It was a gratuitous act of terrorism on a helpless people, but it demonstrated yet again the efficiency and ruthlessness of the invaders and proved that the Danube was no defense against them".[16]

Bosworth takes a moralistic tone and calls the military expedition a *gratuitous act of terrorism*, a term loaded with negative connotations. Describing the operation's *efficiency* he also uses the word *ruthlessness*. In doing so he wants to make sure that the reader will reconsider the ethical meaning of the incident. At the same time, he openly questions the heroic stance of Alexander. In this passage Alexander is the evil one, while the Getae are not dangerous and cruel enemies but *helpless people*. He draws a scene where the morally corrupt Alexander and his troops meet the poorly equipped army of a primitive people. This impression is supported by the fact he does not mention the number of Getic troops mentioned in the source.

In contrast, Hammond creates an opposite impression of the incident:

> "The fact that the Getae held the far bank with a force estimated at 4,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry did not deter him".[17]

Here Hammond presents the size of the Getic army given by Arrian and builds an impression of a real, threatening army almost as big as Alexander's waiting in position. In Hammond's construction the Getae army forms a great military threat and challenge to Alexander and the Macedonian troops. At the same time, Alexander's courage is presented in a positive way. Alexander is a leader who does not fear or panic in the face of a considerable military threat. Later in his narrative Hammond calls the Getae an *enemy* without making any reference to the civilian population:

> "Alexander plundered and razed the town, entrusted the booty to two of his brigadiers, sacrificed on the river bank to Zeus the Saviour, Heracles and the

[15] Bosworth 1988b: 30.
[16] Bosworth 1988b: 30.
[17] Hammond 1980: 47.

> river-god, Ister, for their safe crossing, and returned without the loss of a single man to his main body on the south bank".[18]

Hammond's focus is the successful military campaign and he does not express any negative ethical judgements. In Hammond's view, the Getic people were not Alexander's target. However, Alexander's strategic genius and military courage are presented in the words *without the loss of a single man*. Compared with Bosworth's, Hammond's overall picture of Alexander is not only positive but even laudatory.

In accordance with Hammond, Freeman (2011) does not present Alexander's expedition as a terrorist action. Although Freeman does not praise Alexander for his military efforts, there is no negative tone in his narrative. Still, he points out one humane aspect of Alexander that Hammond did not bring forth: "He [Alexander] had no desire to chase the Getae refugees further because his point had been made".[19] Heckel (2008) calls the operation 'a show of force' and he considers it similar to the operation that Alexander later carried out against the Scythians in 329 BCE. According to Heckel, in both operations there was no thought of conquest and these campaigns were strictly pre-emptive.[20] Gabriel (2015) follows explicitly Bosworth's narrative by referring to his study, and calling the attack as "gratuitous act of terrorism".[21]

If a scholar's intention is to analyse the success of a military operation from the point of view of the victorious army, then he must underline certain aspects in the source material. On the other hand, when a scholar aims to present a narrative from the angle of the defeated army, he chooses to stress other parts of the sources. Here we see how Hammond highlights Alexander's genius as a military commander, while Bosworth wants to remind his readers of the ethical aspects of warfare. Hammond and Bosworth present the Getae episode from different angles, and their chosen angle also has an impact on their image of Alexander. The ancient source, the account of Arrian, is like wax which can be shaped to serve hugely different interpretations. On other words, their narratives offer idealising and anti-idealising image of war of conquest.

II. Siege of Tyre

Alexander's military operation against the city of Tyre in the year 332 BCE was one of the biggest undertakings of his Persian campaign. The siege lasted

[18] Hammond 1980: 47.
[19] Freeman 2011: 53-55.
[20] Heckel 2008: 28, 97-98.
[21] Gabriel 2015: 27.

seven months and it ended in victory for the Macedonians. This episode is used by modern scholars to draw a picture of Alexander as a great commander of his army and a skilled statesman.

In all the ancient texts the direct cause of the siege derives from the negotiations between Alexander and the envoys of the city. Alexander wishes to go to the city and offer a sacrifice to the city's patron god, Melqart/Heracles. The envoys refuse and ask Alexander to conduct his sacrifice in another temple outside the main city. This response angers Alexander and he decides to launch the military operation against the city. This is the way the episode is described in the texts of Diodorus, Curtius and Arrian.[22]

Bosworth and Hammond create an overall picture of the siege and they both analyse and judge Alexander's decisions and leadership in the Tyre campaign. Bosworth starts with criticism:

> "He dismissed the ambassadors in anger and prepared to lay siege to the island city. Strategically this was unnecessary. Tyre, like Celanae, could have been left supervised by a garrison on the mainland and held in check by her neighbours' enmity. Eventually she would have to make her peace with the invader. But Alexander's sovereignty had been frontally challenged and he was not prepared to leave the contumacy unpunished. He would sacrifice to Melqart whatever the cost".[23]

Bosworth makes an effort to give reasons why the siege was *unnecessary*. It was all about Alexander's wounded honour. Bosworth's Alexander has no rational or reasonable motives to start the siege. Instead, Alexander is a reckless leader who does not care about human or material loss. The only thing he is interested in is the punishment of the Tyrian people, who had given him such a disdainful answer.

Hammond's interpretation is quite different:

> "Alexander explained to his officers why it was necessary to undertake the Herculean task of capturing Tyre. In fact it cost him some seven months. But it was time well spent. His strategic concept was correct: to consolidate a base of operations which included Greece and the Aegean as well as the Eastern Mediterranean seaboard, before he embarked on a major campaign against Persia".[24]

[22] The descriptions of Diodorus, Curtius and Arrian of the siege are for the most part similar, even though in some details they differ. Curt. 4.2.1-4.4.21; Arr. *An.* 2.15.6-2.24.6; D. S. 17.40.2-17; 17.46.6.

[23] Bosworth 1988b: 65.

[24] Hammond 1980: 112.

In his narrative Hammond does not mention Alexander's anger, and thus he clearly neglects ancient evidence to be found in Diodorus (17.40.2-3.) and Curtius (4.1-5.). Even the most 'favourable' Alexander historian, Arrian, mentions it (2.16.8). In contrast to these authors, Hammond builds an image in which Alexander's decision is due only to his calculations. The decision to launch the siege is *correct* and the seven-month waiting period is *time well spent*. Hammond's Alexander is a rational leader who explains to his generals why this operation has to be carried out. This is totally the opposite of Bosworth's text, where Alexander is a ruthless warlord who does not care about his staff.

In the sources we find different figures regarding the Tyrian losses. Curtius and Diodorus give 6,000 Tyrian dead in the final assault. They also say that after the assault Alexander crucified 2,000 Tyrians on the shore.[25] Arrian says that 8,000 died in the assault without mentioning the crucifixions.[26]

The way the scholars choose to interpret these numbers shows once again their tendency and how they approach Alexander's war of conquest. Bosworth includes the report of the crucifixion of 2,000 Tyrians. According to Bosworth, it was *a grim warning of the futility of resisting the conqueror*.[27] Hammond sees it differently. He sees the crucifixions as *improbable* and compares their plausibility to the reports of marine monsters and omens during the siege.[28]

Arrian and Diodorus report that Alexander sacrificed to Melqart/Heracles in the temple after the siege.[29] Bosworth gives a gloomy meaning to this incident:

> "It was a copy of his thank-offering at Soli for recovery from his illness, but this time the ceremony commemorated mass slaughter and enslavement and Melqart received a savagely ironical dedication from his self-proclaimed descendant".[30]

Bosworth calls the whole operation a *mass slaughter*. Religion is a pretence for Alexander. In this context his prominent motives are hypocrisy and savagery. Bosworth's study encourages readers to abandon their benign thoughts about Alexander and any idealized or heroic images. For Hammond, on the other hand, the incident contains nothing morally wrong or dubious. Alexander asked the Tyrian envoys for permission to offer a sacrifice in the city and after the siege he finally did what he wanted.[31]

In the majority of studies, the siege of Tyre has been seen as a strategically important operation. Heckel (2008) and Freeman (2011) both present Alexander's

[25] Curt. 4.4.16-17; D.S. 17.46.4.
[26] Arr. *An.* 2.24.4.
[27] Bosworth 1988b: 67.
[28] Hammond 1980: 113.
[29] Arr. *An.* 2.24.6; D. S. 17.46.6.
[30] Bosworth 1988b: 67.
[31] Hammond 1980: 116.

anger and the crucifixion of 2,000 Tyrians but they do not call into question Alexander's motives and leadership. Heckel (2008) considers the operation as part of Alexander's plan to destroy Persian naval power by seizing the ports of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean and the operation itself as a "strategic necessity". Paul Cartledge (2004), also in line with Hammond, calls the siege a masterpiece of Alexander's leadership which proves the king's strategic genius. In contrast, for Ian Worthington (1999) the siege of Tyre represents a prime example of how Alexander's various sieges were often lengthy, costly and questionable. According to Worthington, the siege was "not necessary" and took place purely because of the king's personal pride (affronted ego) and regardless of the cost in time and manpower. Similarly, Gabriel (2015) writes: "Alexander's decision to reduce Tyre and punish its people was produced by his personal rage at having his will thwarted, and not any military calculus".[32] Here Worthington and Gabriel both more or less follow Bosworth's interpretation.[33]

Hammond and Bosworth interpret the scene differently and this is not just because they often follow particular sources. In fact, the ancient authors do not make any moral accusations or flattering remarks with regard to the political significance of the siege of Tyre.[34] On the other hand, both Hammond and Bosworth express strong judgements –respectively positive and negative– on the value of and 'justification' for the military operation. Hammond's narrative emphatically praises Alexander's strategic action as formidable, while Bosworth uses the episode to highlight how wretched and irresponsible a leader Alexander was. The two scholars' goals radically influence the way their narratives are constructed in order to support their divergent interpretations of the nature of Alexander's leadership.

III. Capture of Persepolis and Burning of the Palace

The third event under examination is the capture of Persepolis and burning of its palace. This occurred in 330 BCE. The event is connected to the overall picture of Alexander's Persian campaign. The city of Persepolis itself had great symbolic value as the location of the Persian Achaemenid court.

[32] Gabriel 2015: 90.

[33] See Worthington 1999: 39-55; Cartledge 2004: 118-119, 147-148; Heckel 2008: 65-68; Freeman 2011: 129-138.

[34] It is true that according to Curtius Alexander's anger (*ira*) towards the Tyrian envoys is presented as avoidable behavior. In addition, Curtius calls the crucifixion of 2,000 Tyrians an "awful spectacle" (*triste spectaculum*), which was motivated by the king's anger (*ira regis*). Cf. Curt. 4.2.5; 4.4.17. However, Curtius's narrative does not accuse Alexander of bad policy or deny the importance of the military operation.

The ancient sources give conflicting accounts of the episode. According to Diodorus and Curtius, large numbers of inhabitants were killed and some were enslaved when the Macedonians arrived in the city.[35] Both sources describe how the Macedonians savagely plundered and destroyed the property of the inhabitants and barbarously killed civilians. According to Diodorus and Curtius, the burning of the palace was not a part of well-planned strategy but an imprudent and hasty action that took place during a banquet. In this tradition, Alexander, who was drunk, gave his approval to the famous Athenian courtesan Thais, who took up a torch and set the palace on fire.[36]

Arrian's account is quite different. He does not mention anything about the Macedonians' plundering or killing of the inhabitants of Persepolis. According to Arrian, Alexander quickly launched the operation and prevented the fleeing army of the Persians from taking the riches of the city. The burning of the palace/city is presented as an intentional and planned act of revenge because the Persians had burned Athens during the Persian War. In Arrian there is no reference to drinking or banquets. Instead he mentions that Parmenio urged the king to preserve the palace, but the king replied that he wanted to punish the Persians for sacking Athens and for other injuries they had done to Greeks. Interestingly, the burning of the palace is one of the rare passages in *Anabasis* where Arrian was ready to criticise Alexander's action in exacting punishment for old crimes.[37]

Again, the two scholars, Hammond and Bosworth, give totally different interpretations of Alexander's actions. Bosworth follows the tradition of Diodorus and Curtius and describes at length the plundering of the civilians:

> "The private homes of the Persian nobility were sacked without mercy, the men cut down and the women enslaved. It was an act of outrage on a helpless populace and was coldly calculated".[38]

Bosworth expresses no doubts concerning the validity of the information he has drawn from Diodorus and Curtius. Alexander coldly calculated the looting because he wanted to give material rewards to his troops. Bosworth's interpretation is based on the fact that Diodorus's and Curtius's accounts give an impression of systematic plundering. Bosworth calls Alexander's decision an *act of outrage*. In Bosworth's construction Alexander wants to offer his greedy troops some extra income and he does not care about the human suffering. Alexander's Panhellenic revenge is described as 'propaganda'; in other words, a pretext for barbarous acts. Bosworth has a strong moralistic tone when he condemns the

[35] Curt. 5.6.2-8; D. S. 17.70.1-6.
[36] Curt. 5.7.1-12; D. S. 17.72.1-6.
[37] Arr. *An*. 3.18.10-12.
[38] Bosworth 1988b: 92.

incident. Bosworth sees it as probable that Alexander discussed the destiny of the palace with his generals but regards the debate with Parmenio as apocryphal.[39]

Bosworth also considers the tradition concerning the banquets and the role of the Athenian courtesan Thais as historical. According to this tradition, the palace burned down as a result of the banquet arranged by Alexander. During these drunken banquets, Alexander and his guests lit fires spontaneously with their torches. In Bosworth's view, Alexander wanted to conceal this senseless act and embroider the truth by linking it to the Panhellenic revenge motif. It is interesting, though, that Bosworth does not refer here to other traditions. Plutarch, for example, makes reference in his *Vitae* to other traditions and presents the Thais version as disputed.[40]

Bosworth's choice of words stresses that the burning of the palace was condemnable and inexcusable. He calls the burning of the palace an *orgy of destruction*. He also sets forth archaeological evidence. The fact that marks were found on the treasures of Persepolis is proof of the conflagration.

In Hammond's narrative Alexander does not arrange or permit any plundering or lawlessness in the city. Strikingly, Hammond does not even mention the passage of Diodorus and Curtius concerning the plundering and lawlessness of the Macedonians. Hammond decides to follow Arrian's account and no alternative option is given to the reader.

On the contrary, according to Hammond's narrative, Alexander sets up his army's camp outside the city and thus prevents an eruption of lawlessness. Before deciding what to do regarding the palace, Alexander holds a council with his officers at which he discusses the proposal to burn the palace. Hammond once again presents Alexander as a rational leader who pays attention to his subjects and explains his opinions before carrying out his projects. This is the very opposite of Bosworth's Alexander image. Most interesting is the way Hammond depicts the reasons behind the event and its significance:

> "In January 330 BC the Achaemenid palace at Persepolis went up in flames by order of Alexander, Hegemon of the Greek League, King of Macedon and King of Asia. It was symbolic of a vengeance which was intelligible, indeed acceptable, in terms of Greek religion (less so, of course, to the Roman Arrian or to modern Christian writers, but Alexander and his commanders were neither Roman nor Christian); symbolic also of vengeance for Persia's past

[39] Bosworth 1988b: 93.

[40] Plutarch does not describe the capture of the city but he tells the anecdote about Thais (when he mentions the banquets arranged by Alexander) and says that some writers say the burning of the palace was caused by Thais while some say that the work was put forward deliberately (ἀπὸ γνώμης). Cf. Plu. *Alex.* 38.1-4.

> occupation of Macedonia and now of Macedon's victory over Persia; symbolic finally of the liberation of Asia from Achaemenid rule".[41]

Hammond takes here a clearly apologetic stand. The burning of the palace was *indeed acceptable* because it was a part of the religious practice of the Greeks. This argument is left unsubstantiated. Did the Greek religion really permit the conscious burning of the palaces of the barbarians? Did there exist a single value system in Greek religion concerning the righteousness of revenge?

It is also interesting how Hammond reacts to Arrian's criticism of Alexander. Arrian had said in *Anabasis* that on this occasion Alexander did not act *σὺν νῷ* ('with good sense').[42] Hammond states that Arrian did not accept the burning of the palace because he was a Roman. Was there really a difference between the religious system of the Greeks and the Romans concerning revenge? If there was some known difference, no information is included in the reference. The whole statement rests on a vague assumption of a distinction between the Greeks and the Romans.

In Hammond's narrative the burning of the palace was a consequence not of drunken madness but of the pursuit of a reasonable policy. Hammond mentions only that many stories grew up around this spectacular event. After that, like Bosworth, Hammond appeals to the archaeological evidence. According to this evidence, rooms were cleared of their contents, which is, as Hammond claims, proof that the destruction was deliberate, not accidental. In a footnote he explicitly makes reference to the story of Thais, the Athenian courtesan, and says it is thus proved to be mistaken.[43]

Burstein seems to be right that these two scholarly traditions often follow their 'favourite' sources.[44] However, it is not just about following one source over another. Indeed, a remarkable factor is that these scholars do not report or make any reference to the rival traditions. Hammond does not usually mention the vulgate' sources (either in the text or in the notes) and Bosworth treats Arrian's statements in the same way. In other words, Hammond does not criticise Arrian and Bosworth expresses no criticism of the vulgate tradition.

Bosworth's Alexander is a man of destructive impulses who acts barbarously. Hammond's Alexander is always rational and capable of cooperation with his

[41] Hammond 1980b: 169-170.

[42] Arr. *An.* 3.18.12.

[43] Hammond quotes from E. F. Schmidt's *Persepolis* (Schmidt 1953), a study on the excavations of Persepolis, 1.157, 220 and 2.3. In the third edition of *Alexander the Great – King, Commander and Statesman* (1989) Hammond made three references to his study *Three Histories of Alexander the Great* (Hammond 1983a: 57, 85, 132). In these passages Hammond supposes that the story of Thais was derived from the account of Cleitarchus and that it belongs to the group of passages that should be rejected as fictional.

[44] Burstein 1997: 42-43.

men. The two scholars describe the same events differently and give them opposite meanings. What Bosworth calls propaganda is for Hammond understandable and rightful revenge. Hammond's tone is apologetic and at some points he even goes beyond Arrian. He is always understanding and ready to present Alexander in a favourable light, while Bosworth has an accusatory and reproachful tone.

Among the more recent research, Paul Cartledge (2004) sees the burning of the palace as a conundrum and cannot find any particular reason why the palace was burnt, since the action did not strengthen Alexander's position as the new Persian king in the eyes of the Persian ruling elite. However, Cartledge, like Hammond, dismisses the Thais anecdote as a scandalous story created at a later date. Heckel (2008), Freeman (2011) and Gabriel (2015) consider it as a historical fact that Alexander subjected the city of Persepolis to looting. Freeman presents his narrative in a tone favourable to Alexander: 'He [Alexander] felt he could no longer constrain his men. Rather than have a riot on his hands, he gave his army free rein to sack the great city of Persepolis, sparing only the palace for himself.' Gabriel (2015) follows the interpretation of Bosworth by stating: 'Once again, Alexander visited a pointless slaughter upon helpless civilians'. When it comes to the burning of the palace, Heckel (2008) and Freeman (2011) leave the question open whether the king deliberately burned it down, while Gabriel (2015) accepting the story of Thais as fact regards the destruction of Persepolis as first clear example of Alexander's use of alcohol affecting his military decision-making.[45]

IV. Death of Parmenio

During the thirteen years of Alexander's reign some conspiracies against the king took place. Something of this kind occurred in the year 330 BCE. There is not much reliable information on those who were involved in the conspiracy, nor on their motives. Nevertheless, Dimnus of Chalaestra was considered to be the leader of the conspiracy and he was executed for treason. Moreover, Alexander's commander-in-chief, Parmenio, who had already served as a commander in Philip's army, was killed (along with his son Philotas) for having taken part in it.

Ancient accounts differ in length and emphasis concerning this event. In Curtius we have the longest and most detailed and dramatic depiction of the events.[46] According to him, Alexander secretly plans and arranges the execution of Parmenio by ordering his officers to travel for seven days in order to kill the unsuspecting general. Arrian's passage is considerably shorter, without

[45] Cartledge 2004: 99-100; Heckel 2008: 83-84; Freeman 2011: 207-208, 212-214.
[46] Curt. 7.2.11-7. 2.33.

any detailed account.[47] Arrian states that Alexander planned to kill Parmenio because he could not believe that he was innocent and unaware of the conspiracy. Interestingly, in Diodorus it is the Macedonian council that passes the sentence and Alexander only carries out the death penalty they have imposed.[48]

For Bosworth, it was Alexander's private desire to kill his distinguished general Parmenio. Bosworth's Alexander tried to find him guilty at any cost, not to punish a dangerous conspirator who deserved the death penalty but to get rid of a great general who still had an influential position in the army. According to Bosworth, Alexander attempted to obtain a death sentence from the Macedonian council, but he could not get enough evidence. That is why Alexander was reduced to arranging a political assassination.

Bosworth says that Alexander "[h]ad determined on the eradication of the family and had no intention of letting the father survive the son".[49] Alexander acts here mainly out of a lust for killing and enacts the deliberate plan which he had already developed in his envious and deluded mind.

I would say that Bosworth is here even more critical of Alexander than Curtius. Curtius presents a long, dramatic scene where Alexander first gives instructions for the murder and appoints Polydamas and Cleander to perform the task. These two travel for eleven days wearing 'Arab costume', until they finally meet Parmenio and kill him.[50]

In Bosworth's text the killing is described as Alexander's "reward for a lifetime of service to the Macedonian throne". Bosworth uses the terms "formidable" and "totally ruthless".[51] These may refer to the efficiency and unexpectedness of the plan and to its mercilessness and cruelty because Parmenio had no opportunity to defend himself. There is a strongly ironic and accusatory tone in Bosworth, stronger than we find in the Latin account of Curtius.

When comparing the passage in Curtius and Bosworth, we see that Curtius places Alexander in the background and not as the chief agent. Curtius leaves the question open whether Parmenio was actually driven by a desire for royal power or was merely suspected of being involved in the conspiracy.[52] However, Bosworth quite clearly rejects the possibility that Parmenio would have posed any real threat to Alexander. Instead, Bosworth raises sympathy for Parmenio and questions the motives of Alexander to a much greater extent than Curtius. He states explicitly the reason why Parmenio was killed:

[47] Arr. *An.* 3.26.1-4.
[48] D. S. 17.80.1-4.
[49] Bosworth 1988b: 102.
[50] Curt. 7.2.11-18.32-33.
[51] Bosworth 1988b: 103.
[52] Curt. 7.2.34.

> "His disagreement over policy had become too strong to be tolerated by the increasingly autocratic Alexander, who seized upon the first opportunity to eliminate him".[53]

In Hammond's account Parmenio was a real threat to Alexander and therefore his killing was understandable. Whether Parmenio was actually found guilty by the Macedonian court he leaves unsaid. Nevertheless, Hammond makes quite clear his opinion on the episode. He quotes Arrian directly to remind his readers that Arrian was especially interested in the case of Parmenio. Otherwise, Hammond asserts that the testimony of Arrian was credible. Hammond says that they (Arrian and the sources he uses: Ptolemy and Aristobulus) were right about the danger.[54] There was a real threat in store for the empire because Parmenio was the commander of a massive army in Ecbatana. Then Hammond gives an overview of the episode related by Curtius and describes it strikingly:

> "They killed Parmenio, mercifully unaware of Philotas' death, and they quelled the mutinous reaction of his troops by reading them a statement which Alexander had supplied".[55]

Thus, Hammond even sees traits of mercy in the episode! After this, Hammond approaches the matter from the angle of Alexander:

> "After the conspiracy he had a diminished sense of security in relation to his leading officers. His judgement of his men had proved faulty and more sinister was the realization that Philotas, Demetrius, and others – perhaps even Parmenio – had been motivated probably not by personal ambition (for they were at the top already) but by detestation of his policy".[56]

These officers, according to Hammond, rose in revolt against their well-meaning king, who had already given them a good position in the army. Before the conspiracy Alexander did not have any suspicions about his leading officers, but now his private security was threatened by his ungrateful generals. Once again, Hammond wants to build an image in which Alexander's rule is always good and straightforward, especially regarding his own men. Hammond creates an impression that Alexander, being a good king, commander and statesman, treated his generals well even when they tried to kill their benefactor.

[53] Bosworth 1988b: 103.
[54] Hammond 1980: 186.
[55] Hammond 1980: 186.
[56] Hammond 1980: 186.

As a comparison, Paul Cartledge (2004) sees the murder of Parmenio as an "undisguised assassination", which was carried out for reasons of "*realpolitik*", since the general had great influence in the army. One reason was that conservative and traditional Parmenio was a 'Philippian' commander whose way of thinking was an obstacle to Alexander's temperament and ambitious plans. Freeman (2011) leaves the question open whether Philotas and Parmenio really plotted against Alexander. Yet Freeman tends to present Parmenio's position in the army as a real threat to the king's authority.[57] Gabriel (2015) again writes critically that Parmenio was proven warrior something Alexander longed to be. In his narrative the murder of the general shows the king's developing anger and paranoia which caused tremors of fear through the army and the officer corps.

Once again it is evident, as in the other three cases discussed, that Hammond's and Bosworth's Alexander images are in conflict. Here again, it is not a matter of the sources followed, as these give a quite similar overall view of the episode. For Bosworth, Alexander's action is a much more condemnable one and is described in more unfavourable terms even than by Curtius. For his part, Hammond is more apologetic than Arrian himself, who wrote that Parmenio had probably had no part in his son's plot.[58] In contrast, Hammond even sees some traits of mercy in the episode. Therefore, we could state that the differences between the two narratives do not occur only because of the chosen sources. Hammond's account is very apologetic and favourable to Alexander. At the same time, Bosworth draws a very negative picture of Alexander as a mistrustful tyrant who kills his own men out of lust for killing.

V. Conclusions

On the basis of the present analysis we can see how the two views, benign and cynical views, are constructed in Hammond's and Bosworth's narratives and continue to be constructed in the scholarly biographies of Alexander published after 2000. It seems that the opposite interpretations of Hammond and Bosworth are partly due to the sources they choose to follow. As Burstein claimed, Hammond relies more often on Arrian and Plutarch who represent favourable accounts towards Alexander and Bosworth leans towards Diodorus and Curtius

[57] See Cartledge 2004: 69, 140; Freeman 2011: 232-234. Lane Fox 1973: 290 has similarly apologetic tones to Hammond and calls the murder of Parmenio an act of "self-defense". Fox states: "It is irrelevant to complain that he [Alexander] would have mistaken on his general's ambition; among Macedonians, the king who waited in crisis in order to be certain would find himself dead first." In other words, the murder of Parmenio was fully just and reasonable according to Lane's narrative.

[58] Arr. *An.* 3.26.4.

who contain material more hostile to Alexander. But as we have seen, following certain sources is not an adequate explanation for the existence of two radically different narratives of Alexander.

The material examined show that scholars can take completely different stances towards the historical figures they portray, and these stances inevitably guide their overall interpretations. In creating a certain narrative, and positive/idealizing or critical/anti-idealising image of Alexander a scholar uses certain techniques. (1) The chosen concepts and terms can be seen as a way to promote either pro- or anti-Alexander attitudes. Some criticise, question and condemn Alexander's motives and decisions, while others' choice of words is sympathetic, laudatory and understanding. Other scholars often use adjectives like 'ruthless' and 'gruesome' when they depict certain actions. And when it comes to the military operations, words like 'slaughter' and 'massacre' often occur.[59] On the other hand, others almost always describe Alexander's decisions as 'correct' and 'acceptable'.[60]

Another factor (2) is the choice of point of view. Bosworth treats his subject from Alexander's opponents' angle. He presents incidents from the perspective of the Getae, the inhabitants of Tyre and Persepolis, and Parmenio. On the other hand, Hammond tells the story from an angle that underlines Alexander's skills as a splendid king, commander and statesman who always acted in the best possible way.

The third possible factor (3) behind divergent Alexanders might be the aim to challenge/replace the orthodox view, or stance presented in the previous scholarly biographies. In his later work *Alexander and the East: The Tragedy of Triumph* (1996a) Bosworth called Plutarch's positive creation of Alexander as emotive rhetoric, and wrote that Hammond's image of Alexander as a promoter of the ideal brotherhood of man in *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman* (1980) is virtually paraphrase of Plutarch.[61] In addition, one could make such a conclusion that Bosworth's *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* can be seen as a response to Hammond since he later in 1996 explicitly criticised Tarn's and Hammond's image of idolised Alexander as now rational, now visionary, now humanitarian.[62] Bosworth follows the same structure of events as Hammond and he gives the opposite interpretation of each episode. When Hammond depicts the Getae forces as a strong military threat, Bosworth builds an opposite picture of the Getae people as victims suffering at the hands of a terrorising army. Again, when Hammond praises Alexander's strategy in the siege of Tyre, Bosworth makes an effort to prove

[59] See Bosworth 1988b: 33, 112, 121, 135-136.
[60] See Hammond 1980: 53, 169.
[61] Bosworth 1996a: 4-5.
[62] Bosworth 1996a: 4-5.

to his readers that the siege was foolish and unnecessary, revealing negative aspects of Alexander's leadership. When Hammond depicts the burning of the palace in Persepolis as an understandable act and a part of Alexander's consistent policy, Bosworth calls it as an *orgy of destruction* without any positive implications. In the same way, the death of Parmenio is seen by Hammond in a sympathetic and acquiescent light, but for Bosworth the whole episode is proof of Alexander's growing tendency towards corrupt autocracy. In the light of these examples, whatever his preconceptions might have been, the outcome of Bosworth's study can be seen as a reaction to Hammond or as a deliberate replacement of the earlier and 'benign' view. Perhaps one could suggest that motive for Bosworth's cynical narrative was to overturn the heroic myth of heroic Alexander sustained by Tarn and Hammond in the level of scholarly narrative.[63]

By their images of Alexander's conquest Hammond and Bosworth (as every historian writing about Alexander) portray certain image of imperialism and autocracy. The Alexanders created in the scholarly biographies are related to author's own views towards imperialism and autocracy. Bosworth's image of Alexander's bloody reign can be viewed as an implicit critique of imperialism where the disputes over power and possessions have caused considerable human suffering. The Iran-Iraq and the Soviet invasion of Afganistan could have had an influence on his critical image of Alexander as a bloody mass-murder whose conquest brought pain and destruction to the eastern people. In contrast, Hammond who had served with distinction in the British army in World War II, fighting with the Greek guerrillas, pays attention to the glorious shade of conquest and military courage.[64] His experiences in war, before being professor of Greek at Bristol University evidently made an impact on the way he constructs his idealising pro-military narratives of Alexander.

According to the hermeneutical approach, pre-understanding, preconceptions and foreknowledge inevitably influence on the process of interpretation.[65] Even as scholars, we cannot (and should not?) get rid of our values and emotions which by all means may entice us to make judgments on the moral character of certain historical figure. Naturally this setting is by no

[63] There are many examples and it is unnecessary to go through all the passages. To give some examples, Bosworth considers as historical that Batis, the commandant of Gaza, was "executed in gruesome style" by Alexander. Cf. Bosworth 1988b: 68. The story is found only in Curtius. Hammond, however, does not make mention of this episode (Hammond 1980: 118, 293). In addition, Bosworth 1988b: 108-109 regards as historical the massacre of Branchidae, which he describes as "an appalling act of violence against a defenceless population", while Hammond 1980: 298 says in footnote 131 that he has not included it because it is "generally regarded as unhistorical".

[64] He even published memoir of his war service entitled *Venture into Greece: with the Guerillas, 1943-1944* (Hammond 1983).

[65] On the theory of hermeneutics see Gadamer 1985; 1988: 68-78.

means restricted to Alexander studies. In his famous work *The Content of the Form* (1987) Hayden White attested that historical narratives are not found but they are invented. Instead of being a neutral medium for the representation of historical events (or historical figures), historical scholarly narratives impose "a mythic structure on the events it purports to describe".[66] The divergent narratives of Alexander in scholarly biographies are a good example of this process taking place. In the scientific research scholar's opinions can easily affect the way we select and interpret the available source material. The researcher's values, whether deliberately or unintentionally brought out, tend to make a difference when he or she deals with historical acts that have moral or ethical implications. For example, military operations, killings of individuals and the destruction of material possessions might call for moral judgements which can have an influence upon the way he or she portrays a certain historical episode. This can result in very rivalling presentations of the same historical figure.

In addition, it is true that scholars make their judgments and evaluation of king's career in terms of current values.[67] Alexander and his contemporaries most likely would not have recognised the modern western, or democratic standards when making political and moral decisions. Therefore, 'the Alexanders' created and re-invented reflect the contemporary world which they were composed. They are portraits of the values the authors and scholars regard most relevant in the time they write their works. The point is that a scholar should be aware of the ethical factors that tend to influence on his or her research.

[66] On the ideas of Hayden White, see Herman 2011: 115.

[67] Briant 2010: 139-140 criticizes the fashion to condemn Alexander's conquests out of hand both for political and "moral" reasons. According to Briant "moral" judgements passed on Alexander are inappropriate in the context of historical research. Cf. Anson 2013: 7-8 who writes: "Much of the modern criticism of Alexander comes from an evaluation of his career in terms of current values. While such criticism is certainly a viable approach and much that Alexander did should not be extolled to modern audiences, such censure tends to hold Alexander and his contemporaries to standards they likely would not have recognized."

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In a famous statement, Ulrich Wilcken argues that each historian has his own Alexander. A critical examination of the traditions in Historiographic Alexander allows to reconsider both our ideas of alterity and success, and how great can be a human being, or to what extent what was great in the past still has to be accepted as such in our present days. To sum up, to revisit Alexander from the eyes of the historians in the Contemporary Age offers a genuine opportunity to rethink History as such, and to evaluate how can we imagine new ways to explain the past in order to build a rich appreciation of the present in order to imagine brand new futures. The aim of the following pages is to review Alexander's portraits and concerns in the works and scopes of the more recent historical traditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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